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A B S T R A C T

The objectives of this dissertation
are two-fold.
Firstly, it
attempts to demonstrate
the relevance of
a
comprehensive marketing approach to. the improvement of the
performance of
Kingston Terminal Operators Ltd (KTO), and
secondly to present guidelines for the development of a marketing
plan for the Terminal.
For analytical purposes, the paper is
divided into seven chapters.
Chapters 1 to 3 attempt to set the scene. The first two are
concerned with evaluating the impact of containerization on the
shipping and port sectors. While chapter 3, reviews the current
trends in both the macro environment and the shipping industry,
and their implications for ports.
Chapters 4 and 5 present a basic introduction to KTO and
appraise its performance to date.
This serves to evaluate the
current problems being faced by the Terminal, and presents the
framework for subsequent proposals.
Chapter 6 addresses the question of the relevance of port
marketing in improving the performance of ports.
Some general
marketing concepts are first presented, followed by discussions
of their application in ports.
Where possible, examples from
other ports are furnished to demonstrate applicability. Although
the emphasis here is on container facilities, it is intended that
the general principles outlined can be applied,
in varying
degrees, to other types of ports.
The final section of the paper, chapter 7, takes the form of
an illustrated manual outlining the steps to be taken in
developing a marketing plan for KTO.
It incorporates all the
analyses of the previous chapters to develop the methodology
required in the actual preparation of the Marketing Plan.
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C H A P T E R
COrsiXAIIMERIZ<SiXIOISI

1
AND

SHIRRING

INTRODUCTION
Since their inception in the 1950s containers have
experienced widespread use and a-F-Forded vast economies to the
shipping industry.
The -First and most noticeable bene-Fit was
the reduction in time vessels spent at ports - -From weeks to
hours. In the face of increased trade flows following
the
second world war, the labour intensive nature of
port
operations represented a significant bottleneck in the through
carriage of cargo.
It was thus economically impractical for
vessel operators to invest in larger tonnage since this would
almost have certainly meant at least a proportionate increase
in port time. Containerization, with its speedy and efficient
operations, meant that larger ships could be employed and
economies of scale achieved.
In contrast to
conventional break-bulk
operations,
containership operations meant substantial investment on the
part of both port and ship operators. Formerly, the level of
port investment ran merely to the provision of a safe
berth/pier, with cargo movements from ship to shore and vice
versa, being provided largely by the ship's gear.
Movement
from quayside to transit area was very labour intensive,
employing about 25 men per gang to unload a 15000 deadweight
vessel. The level of port mechanization required to handle
unitized operation therefore meant vast and unprecedented
outlay of capital.
This represented one of the reasons for
the initial slow development of container port facilities as
in many cases the level of available traffic did not justify
the investment. As a means to supplement domestic traffic and
therefore make investment more feasible, ports have had to
cast their nets wider than the domestic market to encompass
those of other countries and regions - thus acting out a
1

transhipment role.
While the possibilities -for transhipment cargo made
investment worthwhile, port operators soon realized that it
also represented a sti-f-Fly competitive arena, with hardly any
guarantee o-f continued viability.
In -Fact ship operators
given the new ability to -funnel cargo to selective ports, have
tended
to trade
ports of-F
intensi-Fy ing the competition.

against

each

other,

thus

In
a similar situation o-F
heavy investment, ship
operators, in order to ensure the levels o-F loading which
would a-Fford the desired cost savings through economies o-F
scale, have -Found the answer in cargo and port consolidation.
Two things became clear:
(i) It

was quite

uneconomic -For

large vessels to

make

direct calls to outlying ports with small cargo volumes.
Such practice would in -Fact totally erode any benefits to
be accrued from large scale operation.
<ii) It is far cheaper to gather cargo from the outlying
ports and absorb the inland transport cost rather than
make direct calls.
Shippers were therefore quoted freight rates covering the
entire movement and
relieved of the
responsibility of
transporting cargo to the port. The total transport concept
as provided by shipping companies, gave them control over
ports from which cargo is shipped, thereby removing the long
established revenue base of most ports - their captive cargo.
Thus the concepts of door-to-door service, intermodalism and
through transport gained widespread application.
The fact that the idea of transhipping was not novel,
meant of course that the actors in the industry were aware of
its potential and even those who were initially slow to react
soon came aboard. The result was fierce competition leading
to over tonnaging in the case of the shipping sector and
2

excess capacity
had emerged.

or underutilization in ports -

a new problem

To e-ffectively compete and cope with the deflationary
impact of excess tonnage in the market on freight rates,
shipping lines
have had to devise
new and innovative
strategies, which enabled them to retain their market share
(or improve it) through continued frequency of service as well
as maintain financial viability.
strategies employed were:

Broadly speaking, operating

a)

Port Consolidation

b)

Amalgamation of services and routes

c)

Mergers, Joint Ventures and other Agreements

1.1

PORT CONSOLIDATION

The vast investment in larger and faster ships for
container trade, required
for a reasonable return

the
on

investment, a high degree of cargo density and minimum number
of calls.
As a means of achieving this, one option is to
reduce the frequency of calls so as to gain fuller cargo
loads.
However,
this has
its problems
in* shipper
dissatisfaction and loss of market to competitors.
Another alternative was to reduce the number of ports on
the itinerary, primarily those with light traffic flows.
Again, the obvious disadvantage with this strategy is that it
could leave the door wide open for other carriers to enter the
market, taking up the slack at the 'unselected’ ports. A more
viable solution was found by funnel.ing ( by sea or otherwise)
cargo from the ports not on the itinerary, to
which became the hub of their activities.

selected ports

1.1.2 .PORT SELECTION
The decision as to which port to consolidate activities,
will depend on a trade-off between the various factors which
3

a-F-Fect

the

economics

o-F

the

port

call.

The

relevant

literature highlights the following as being paramount in

the

shaping of route itineraries
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)

Liner Pricing Policy
The relative cost of sea transport
Transport convexity ratio
Consignment and ship size

v)
vi)

Port Pricing
The quality of port services

i)
Liner Pricing Policy ; In liner shipping,
practice of equalization pricing is employed wherein
freight charged for shipping a given cargo from a port at
end of the route to any of the range of base ports at
opposite end, was the same. As mentioned previously,
it

the
the
one
the
was

the shipper’s responsibility and cost to get the cargo to a
port frequented by the Line.
This meant that in order to
minimize their costs the port closest to the cargo source
would often be selected.
This also meant that to secure this
cargo ships had to call at the ports.
The elimination of
traditional ports of call would therefore lead to increased
transportation cost to shippers not sited near the hub port.
In

order

to

implement

a

selective port

call

system

without incurring a loss of customers, a form of absorption
pricing was used: The inland transport cost was subsidized by
the sea freight or the resultant savings gained'on the long
haul leg was used to subsidize feedering costs.
ii)
Relative cost of Sea transport:
The decision
whether to transport cargo overland or make an additional port
call will depend on the cost and time trade-off of the
different modes of transport.
In general, the cost of
transport by sea tends to be 10 to 50 times cheaper than land
based.modes.
The cost of sea transport is also affected by

^ World Deepsea Container Shipping by Roy Pearson ,& J .
Fossey. Gower Publishing Co. 1983. Page 132.
4

ship size, speed and age.
iii) Transport convexity ratios; As an input into the
decision process the convexity ratio measures the relationship
between marine distances saved or incurred as a result o-F
making or not making a call.
This is particularly useful
where one port serves as a minor cargo area.
In general an
additional call is feasible if the distance the ship has to
divert to make the call is less than that of feedering over
land. =
Of course,
if maritime transport is decided best,
based on this criterion, the question of whether to use a
mainline or feeder vessel is relevant.
iv)
Consignment and average ship size:
For each port
call, the entire ship and her attendant costs are involved,
Therefore the greater the cargo available and or the smaller
the ship size
the more economical it becomes to make a
diversion to include a port in the itinerary.
Thus a
multiport itinerary tends to be-more feasible for smaller
ships than mainliners.
The average distance the cargo is to
be shipped will also affect the decision of ship size.
Port pricing and quality of
with later on in this paper.

port services will be dealt

From the above it will be seen that each of these criteria
of themselves will not be sufficient to create an optimal
solution but
rather a simultaneous
optimizing of each
variable.
Obviously, an additional port call should not only
enhance the line’s revenue inflow, but impact positively on
its profit position as well.
Therefore, the decision to
extend an itinerary involves a constant balancing of to be
incurred and potential revenues to be gained.
That is, the
impact of the additional call on the entire system.

1.2
Ibid. 1.

AMALGAMATION OF SERVICES AND ROUTES
Page 136
5

The e-F-fect

of containerization on ship

size has already

been highlighted:
Container ships had far more carrying
capacity and operate at higher speeds than the conventional
general cargo ships, spent less time in port and were
therefore more productive.
In order to maintain the desired
service frequency and fill these substantially larger vessels,
changes had to be made to some
of the former operating
practices.
One such change involved the amalgamation of
routes
and services.
A brief look at the impact of
containerization on the route itineraries and services offered
by shipowners is relevant.
The

effect

of

selective

port

calling

on

shipping

itineraries and operations can be readily seen: Instead of
multi-port calling,
it became economical to call at a few
ports located strategically along the route, where cargo
concentrated and fed to various other ports.
The most
reaching change in ship itineraries since containerization
been the introduction of the global strategy originally by
operators: Evergreen and US Lines. Far reaching, since at

was
far
has
two
the

time of its introduction in 1984/85 the container routes were
already experiencing massive over tonnaging, and based on the
logistics of such a global service, some 34 new ships of
larger than average capacity appeared on the market for the
new Round-the-world (RTW) service.
The increase in tonnage in a market already over supplied
and experiencing fierce competition for the available cargo
seemed foolhardy.
However,
in a market
so fiercely
competitive and where the strategy for survival (at least in
the short term) largely involves rate undercuts to lure
business away from competitors, operators must ensure that
vessels are operated in such a way that capacity utilization
and thus slot earning capability is improved beyond that of
rivals and that operational costs are also lower.
Thus the
deployment of newer, larger, faster and more fuel efficient
vessels by the RTW operators impacted favourably on their
operating
costs, thus
providing the
competitive edge.
However, the main benefit from the adoption of RTW itinerary
6

is the

possibility to cross subsidize

di-f'Ferent trade routes

thereby ensuring not only stimulation o-F trade but high vessel
utilization. ®
In -fact, this is the crucial element in any
RTW
strategy and the US Lines -Failed largely because by
adopting
a unidirectional
service route
compared with
Evergreen's east

and

west—about, they

were unable

to

-Fill

their substantially larger vessels. ^
A concomitant o-F the move to load centering is the
development o-F door—to—door services by ship operators so that
shippers not located close to the selected port will not be
disadvantaged. Thus a through rate is quoted covering the
movement of cargo from consignor to consignee regardless of
the various modes of transport used to achieve this.
This
gave rise to the concepts of intermodalism/multimodalism and
large investment by

some of the larger operators in

road and

rail networks ( and even recently into air transport) to
facilitate inland on-carriage. Thus the use of double stacked
train in the carriage of containerized cargo between the US
East and West coasts became a feature of APL, and piggyback
operators

are a regular feature of the roads.

The development of a reliable information network through
EDI allowed for smoother transportation logistics and more
recently the Just In Time (JIT) concept.
What JIT affords is
the ready availability of goods to various manufacturers and
retailers,

where

needed

and

when

needed,

thus

keeping

inventory costs down.
The ship operator providing these services can be seen as
a transport specialist who will employ any mode of transport
(and not necessarily including sea transport) to get cargo to
the client on time.

=
Routes.
1986.

The role and responsibility of

Traffic & Competition on Round-The-World
Page 61-62.
Drewry Shippinrg Consultants.

the ship

Container
January,

^
Round-The-World
Services:
Its
All
Square.
Containerization International. November, 1982. Page 65.

7

operator

has signi-ficantly

changed

-from the

days

where it

began and end at the ship's rail and included just voyage -from
A to B and possibly loading and discharge o-f cargo.
This
change o-F responsibility is amply re-Flected in the IMO
Convention on Multimodal ism.
Today, the total transport
concept is more active since the ship owner has integrated
both backwards and -Forwards, the services it supplies to its
clients.

1.3

MERGERS, JOINT VENTURES AND OTHER AGREEMENTS

At this juncture,
it is necessary to look at the impact
of containerization on the liner shipping conferences as this
will place in perspective the new forms of cooperation and
organizational designs which emerged.
Conferences have existed in the deep sea liner trade
since the 1870s when the Calcutta - UK conference was
established.=
The primary aim of such an organization is to
stabilize the market served (in terms of shipping tonnage and
thus freight rates) and guarantee revenue to its members. The
need for a stabilized market is a result of the inherent
problems faced by companies offering liner service, that is,
frequency of sailing at fixed tariffs (in the short run).
Fixed schedules
imply a. commitment to
sail at a
particular time and this is true whether a full ship load is
received or not.
The load factor is again dependent on
frequency of sailing of not just a particular line, but also
its competitors.
Hence a situation of over tonnaging can
occur on a route where there is no regulation of tonnage as
exemplified by the open conference system in US trade.
The formation of a cooperative organization by shipowners

Conferences operating out of the European Community
by B. Allen. Paper presented at Worlpl Maritime University in
1991.
8

regulating the availability o-F supply o-F shipping services and
guaranteeing revenue to each member (through a cargo sharing
■Formula) was a means o-F ensuring the desired stability (both
■From shipowner and shipper’s viewpoint), by placing a limit on
the competition between member lines.

not

O-F course, the objective o-F tonnage regulation meant that
all lines desirous o-F joining the con-Ference
were

accepted. This ability to dispense or re-Fuse membership and
there-Fore to some extent determine the financial viability of
new lines was a powerful tool and often used.
This was a
prime reason for the UNCTAD international code of conduct,
dictating mandatory admission of national shipping lines to
conferences serving their country’s trade.
Conferences

not

only

regulated

tonnage

but

tariffs,

frequency, fleet size and ports of call.
Tariffs were
established on a commodity basis with the higher value cargo
attracting a higher rate and therefore subsidizing the lower
valued ones.
Schedules and frequencies are organized to
prevent intra-conference competition (eg. two conference ships
should not call at the same port at the same time). Market
share of liner cargo is allotted to each member and if
exceeded the revenue has to be handed over to the conference
for redistribution to members.
Conferences therefore developed into a powerful force
within a trade and under the conventional liner system it was
rare that ’outsiders' could survive.
As a new line in a
trade, there was the choice of trying to develop a market by
securing a port and shippers which could take a long time
(depending on the strength of the existing conference)
and
outsiders largely went bankrupt.
Another option was to seek
to join the conference and be given a share of the conference
trade and have a more or less secure revenue base.
The advent of containerization has seen a considerable
weakening in the power of conferences and the growth of
outsiders.
Whereas in the 1950s conferences controlled over
9

70%

o-f trade on

most routes, today

its between

40 and 60%.

"Competition with the conference in the days of conventional
vessels required the acquisition of substantial expertise on
shore and at sea for the handling and stowage of cargo".
With containerization, the emphasis is on marketing, the
efficiency and flexibility of service now rest with the ports.
Other factors that have limited the power of conferences
are the emergence of shipper’s councils with negotiating
powers
regarding
freight
rates, and
service quality;
governmental intervention primarily through the UNCTAD Code of
Conduct and cargo reservation practices;
different ship
sizes, designs and cost structures. The latter is important.
For a conference to exist or work at all, its members should
have similar cost curves and hence no incentive to compete on
pr ice.
It is within this scenario of weakening conference powers
and loss of control on capacity, that shipping companies have
sought new and innovative methods of survival.
With the
massive capital investment required to operate a container
fleet, the stability of revenue became even more vital.
But
the power of the* conference is so weakened that vicious
competition from both within and from outsiders, resulted in
loss of conference market share, excess tonnage (further
exacerbated by the mandatory admittance of national lines to
conferences under the Liner Code) that operators had to resort
to other means of cooperation. Such cooperation may be found
in the establishment of shipping pools, joint ventures and
consortia, joint service, slot chartering and other operating
agreements.

^

Conferences operating out of the European Community
by B. L. Allen. Page 12
10

CHARTER

2

COMT AIIMERI Z AT IOM

AIMD R O R TS

Be-fore discussing the impact of containerization on ports
it is important to review the general functions of ports as a
link in the transportation chain. This will serve to better
illustrate whether,
ports have altered.

and to what extent the basic functions of

The transport chain can be viewed as a system with three
major subsystems:
a) the nodes, which consist of interfaces between
different modes or link of the chain
b) the links which consists of railroads, highways,
routes, inland waterways, marine routes, and

air

c)
theflows which involves the
movement of the
different means of transport along these routes with
cargo and people.
The marine port represents a very important node in the
total transport system as it is the interface between the sea
link and the land link.
It is here that the largest
possibilities for inefficiencies exist, since large amounts of
cargo (or people) are transferred from one means of transport,
processed/stored and passed on in smaller quantities to
another mode of transport.
This implies that to prevent
bottlenecks,
congestion
and
increased
costs, adequate
facilities will need to be made available.
This

does

not

mean

the

11

provisionof port

facilities

should

be o-F

tra-F-Fic.

the order

Rather,

to cover

such a strategy

any conceivable

volume o-f

would certainly result

in

very high port costs and therefore the aim of minimizing cost
in the total transport system would still be frustrated.
Instead, it becomes necessary for a
trade-off to be made
between the cost of providing a given level of port facilities
as against the cost of not doing so. For example, the cost of
a ship waiting for a berth (and the probability of loss of
business to the port) against the cost of provision of an
additional berth. This will depend on the port's objectives.
If

the

aim is

to

attract

transhipment traffic,

then this

becomes more important.
The foregoing has two implications:
Firstly, the port
authority must view the port as
a part of the entire
transportation system in order to properly evaluate exactly
where additional investment in the expansion of facilities is
required. Another example will serve to illustrate;
It must
be carefully investigated whether the long lines of lorries
awaiting receival or delivery of cargo is a result of too
small a gate complex to accommodate the peaks, or whether it
is the congestion on roadways which have caused a 'lumping' of
arrivals.
While the former . reason would necessitate an
expansion/reorganization of the gate complex the latter would
suggest that
improvements need to
infrastructure. In such a case the

be made to the road
upgrading of the port

facility

a

would

actually

result

in

worsening

of

the

situation.
Secondly, the trade off situation implies
that sub
optimalities will necessarily have to occur in the different
subsystems in
order to minimize the cost of the whole.
And
conversely,
that optimalities inthe
parts
will
not
necessarily constitute minimization of the whole.
Besides facilitating the

change between different

12

modes

o-F transport, the following may also be said of ports;
<i)
They are the point where change of economic and
commercial systems occur such as customs formalities, payment
of duties and taxes, change of ownership, quality controlinspection and so on.
(ii) They generate economic activity within a country and
facilitate trade.
In addition to its facilitation role, port
activities themselves tend to generate the development of
commercial activities relating to the various support services
required by shipping. Such as ship chandlering, warehousing,
bunkering, agencies and forwarders, banking and insurance,
drydocking and so on.
With

the

post

war

trade

boom,

the

advent

of

containerization and the possibility to use larger ships and
high technology cargo handling equipment to achieve improved
productivity, the volume of cargo passing through ports have
experienced quantum increases;
between 1970 and 1984 world
container fleet increased at an annual rate of 18’
/. with
capacity moving from
195,000 TEUs to
2 million,
and
containerized cargo from 47 million tonnes to over 225 million
- an annual growth rate of 127.. ^ Since these containers
will have to be handled at ports, at least a similar growth
rate in throughput can be concluded^
This

rapid and

rather

widespread

growth in

container

traffic is placing considerable pressures on port authorities
and port operators.
Not only in terms of providing new
facilities, adapting old ones or expanding present facilities,
but also in terms of operational organization, as
the
increased volume of cargo now being handled means that the

^ Improving Port Performance; Container Terminal
Development. A project of UNCTAD S< SIDA. Page 3.
13

possibilities for congestion is now magnified.
Under the conventional system where ship size
was
constrained, the depth alongside required was relatively
shallow, and ships were often equipped with their own cargo
handling gear, the port’s role was limited primarily to the
provision of stevedores, forklifts and warehouses for cargo.
Indeed the geography of ports in this era was characterized by
massive shed structures, some owned by consignees, from which
cargo was
facilities

sold.
Thus
was moderate

the level of investment
and extended primarily to

in port
land and

buildings.
Container

operations

on

the

other

hand,

are

highly

dependent on high capacity specialized equipment and therefore
high investment cost to port developers. This is not merely a
function
of initial
capital outlay but
operating and
maintenance costs as well (eg. approximately $ 6 - 9 million a
year for equipment costing say $30 million). ®
Further, the

features of conventional

berths with their

narrow aprons have disappeared and are replaced by the vast
expanse of land required for stacking containers. The fact
that ports lie in cities with vibrantcommercial activities
means that the cost of such prime and often scarce land for
port expansion is quite considerable.
This has frequently
meant large investments in land reclamation.
Also serving to increase the cost of container operations
relative to conventional,
is the increase in ship’s draft.
The newest container vessels have draft exceeding 12m and in
many cases this has meant extensive and expensive dredging

== Operating Maintenance Features of Container Handling
Systems.
Researched by B. J. Thomas & D. Keith Roach for
UNCTAD. Page 3.
14

tidal ports, maintenance dredging is also considerable.
These -factors have led

to the emergence o-F

new concepts

in the management and operation of ports:
(i)
The Terminal as a system.
Here the concept of the
port as a subsystem of the total transport system needed to be
developed further to embrace the new operational requirements
dictated by containers.
In order for the container port to
carry out its function effectively the entire operation within
the terminal needed of itself to be viewed as that of a system
with its own subsystem, complementary and interdependent.
This relationship is depicted below.

The type of quay transfer system used will determine the
quantity of storage space required, which in turn will impact
on the efficiency of the loading and discharging operation and
in turn be determined by the rate at which cargoes clear the
port.

The output of the whole system is therefore constrained

by the capacity of its weakest link.
(ii)
The Terminal Operator:
Cargo passing through a
conventional general cargo port was handled and facilitated by
several organizations, such as the stevedoring company for
shipboard activities, a cargo handling company for
transfer, port authority for transit shed and so on.
15

quay
Each

with
its
own
objectives,
management
structures
and
administrative procedures.
Coordination o-F activities was
there-Fore poor and duplication often occurred.
In order to
obtain the economies afforded by containerization and dictated
by the scale of investments, it became essential that the
integrated nature of the various activities be recognized and
a coordinated approach adopted - that is unity of command
should prevail in the management of port facilities.
The high level
of investment in
both infra
and
superstructure in most countries, and especially in the case
of the developing world,
meant that this responsibility has
fallen to the government. Thus government (central or local)
became owners of the port and can choose to operate the
facility. This was however not often the case. Operation of
the conventional facilities were often carried out by private
companies and thus the necessary expertise in port operations
resided with private operators. Therefore, they were often
contracted by governments to operate the container facility.
Thus the concept of the Terminal operator emerged where port
facilities were either leased out by the port authority on a
long term basis to terminal operators or an operating company
is established jointly
between the port authority
and
stevedoring companies.
Containerization necessitated changes not only in port
operational and management practices but had
far reaching
effect on the requirement for and the level of port labour
employed.
The conventional system of employment of often
casual labour was well suited to an industry of largely
unpredictable
activities
(due
to
unpredictable vessel
arrivals) fluctuations in trade, the relatively unskilled
nature of tasks and the general availability of labour in
excess of demand.
Liner services afforded some level of
predictability in traffic and thus labour requirements could
be calculated. So dock workers were registered, rostered and
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experiencBd some stability o-F tenure and earnings.
Later, in
order to ensure an economic level o-F earnings (especially in
some countries where registered dock workers numbered tens o-f
thousand) manning levels in excess o-F the actual required was
often laid down by unions.
The

combined unitization

of

cargo

and speciali

cargo

handling equipment served not only to increase productivity
per gang but reduce the number of men required per gang from
roughly 26 to something within the- range of 12 to 14.
Additionally, the introduction of the through transport system
has meant that much of the traditional dock work is devolved
to consignees/consignors, ICD's and other off—dock cargo
processing facilities.
The

social,

economic

and

political

consequences

are

enormous, and with the displacement of labour which .ensued,
labour discontent in the form of strikes and go slows can ruin
a port if proper management techniques are not applied to
manage this change.
The level of skill required of today's
dock worker is now of a high level and preferably multi
faceted.
This new breed of dock worker is remunerated
handsomely and it is frequently found that crane drivers are
among the most highly paid port employees.

2.1
From

THE TRANSHIPMENT DECISION: PORT PERSPECTIVE
the discussion in

chapter 1, it was

seen that the

decision to tranship was that of the carrier as a part of his
operating strategy.
The primary benefit to him being the
ability to serve a wider market, parts of which would not have
been economical to service via direct calls with mainline
vessels.
The decision to tranship was based on economic
factors such as load level, diversion distances and so on, as
well as characteristics of the various ports to be served.
In
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the discussion o-F the impact of containerization on ports, the
vast capital investment required to develop a container
terminal was mentioned and that in many developing countries
the only entity that can obtain finance on such a scale is the
government.
Containerized cargo is primarily manufactured cargo, and
the production centre for these is usually located in the
developed market economies and more recently in Asia’s Newly
Industrialized Countries (NIC).
Exports of the developing
countries tend on the other hand, to be mostly of primary
products such as ores and agricultural produce (most of which
does
lend themselves to containerization) although some
limited amount

of

manufacturing

exports does

take

place.

Thus in many cases the actual or potential level of container
cargo may not be sufficient to justify the level of investment
required in even a single container terminal facility.
Port planners

are

therefore faced

should the country construct a
attract transhipment traffic in

with

the

decision:

container terminal and try to
order to make it economically

viable and therefore justify its existence, or should they
allow their trade to be transhipped via another country/port
and feedered to them thus requiring relatively
minimal
investment. Obviously the decision will be based on a complex
mix
of
political
and
socio-economic
cost
benefit
considerations.
2.1.1

RISKS AND BENEFITS OF TRANSHIPMENT

Based on a UNCTAD report on transhipment ports, ® the
risks and benefits of a transhipment port may be said to
affect primarily shippers, shipping lines and in addition to
these, the

national economy.

The benefits

attributed to the

=* Development
Improvement of ports: Transhipment ports
TD/B/C.4/293. 1985
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shippers are:
a)

reduction in maritime transport cost will result in
cheaper services.
Here it is assumed that economy
o-f scale achieved by carriers will be passed on to
the shipper in the -Form o-F reduced rates and this o-F
course depends on the contestability o-F the market.

b)

greater sailing frequencies

c>

connections with a wider

range of foreign ports and

thus
d)

the possibility of new trade markets.

The primary disadvantages is that those on the

feedering

end of the service may have longer transit times,
increased
probability of cargo loss or damage due to multiple handling
and ports and that disruption at the transhipment port
imperils the security of supply.
These constituted the
primary grounds for shippers resistance in the beginning, to
having their cargoes transhipped.
The major disadvantage to national shipping lines is

the

possible inability to compete with the larger carriers calling
at the port, in terms of securing long haul cargoes.
In such
a case national lines may find their role relegated to the
feedering option not in terms of increased market opportunity
but for survival.
Local shipping lines can however, also derive some
benefits from transhipment activities of a port. The improved
efficiency afforded by modern cargo handling facilities and
dictated
by
the fast
turnaround
time
and increased
productivity
for vessels necessary at a transhipment port,
will also accrue to national lines and serve to strengthen
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their competitive position.
Transhipment also o-F-fers new
markets -For local lines
through the possibility to set up
■Feedering operations if the
their own feeder networks.

mainline carriers

do

not have

The foregoing merits and demerits of the transhipment
option will likewise impact on the national economy in varying
degrees.
Additionally, the existence of a transhipment
facility generating increased port activity and traffic growth
and establishing wide trade links, will serve to encourage the
development of industrial services within the port estate,
such as export processing zones, which in turn increases port
activity.
A transhipment port is also a very lucrative means of
earning foreign exchange and this is very important in the
developing world where this is often a scarce commodity.
Finally, the use of feeder* vessels allows access to
smaller ports thereby affording the option (as far as the load
centre country is concerned) of wider distribution of cargo by
the cheaper water means and relieving the pressure on inland
transport.
For countries on both end of the feedering
services, it also affords greater spread in the development of
the country and serves to promote intra regional trade.

2.1.2

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR A TRANSHIPMENT PORT

The previous discussion concentrated on the various
factors which influence the
selection of ports on the
itinaries of shipowners.
From a port standpoint,
it is
essential to be aware of, and understand the interrelationship
between these factors so as to be better able to predict the
response of ship operators to a given change in any of these
parameters.
With these in mind,
if a port’s decision is to
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try and

attract

transhipment traffic, the following criteria

are also relevant,
largely

within

more so because the majority of

the

ability

of

the

port

to

these are
furnish

or

influence:
a)
b)

The level of national trade
Potentially available traffic volume

c)
d)
e)

Physical location
Port facilities
Efficiency and Organization of port operations

f)

Competitive arena ( national and regional)

g)
h)

Pricing
Existence of Free Zone/Port, storage and assembly
processing of cargo

i)

Range

of

container

and -other

shipping

services

available
j)

Availability of feeder services to and from relevant
feeder port; level of hinterland development and
inland

k)
l)

m)

transportation.

Customs procedures (fast and efficient)
Freedom of trade
and the existence
of
market/preferential trade agreements with other
countries.
Government regulations.

These requirements are largely self explanatory.

However

the following points need to be made.
While a high level of
domestic traffic is not a prerequisite for being selected as a
transhipment port, it has already been shown that the cargo
uplift factor is considered by ship operators. Therefore a
good cargo base relative to neighbouring countries enhances
the potential of being selected.
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What

is most

important however,

is the

-Future tra-F-Fic

potential. Here the analysis is not limited to that o-F the
country/port hinterland under consideration, but the entire
region.
It is regional trade which creates transhipment
opportunities -For ports and not necessarily domestic trade.
This point is repeatedly demonstrated in ports such as
Singapore and Colombo whose actual trade relative to other
countries for which they serve as transhipment points (India,
Thailand etc) is quite small, yet today they are flourishing
regional transhipment ports.
Of course this brings heavily into play the factor of
government regulations which might adversely affect the ports
possibilities for developing the transhipment trade.
For
example, one of the reasons for Colombo being used as a
transhipment port for cargo destined for India is because of
Indian Government regulations re transhipment.
In an effort to minimize voyage costs, the port that will
be of interest to ship operators will tend to be that which
offers the minimum deviation from the major trade routes.
Thus port planners, especially in countries with large land
mass should also bear this in mind when deciding where to
establish a port.
Port .facilities

should

be

well

maintained

and

of

sufficient capacity to accommodate the expected vessel sizes.
This means that tugs, where needed should be available;
handling equipment, storage facilities, cranes and berths. . In
the transhipment business where the whole aim of the exercise
is cost reduction, this assumes even greater importance to the
success of the port.
This brings us to the requirement for a high level of
efficiency and organisation.
Port management must employ a
commercial approach to the running of ports. There needs to
be proper selection and training of employees and most
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importantly, a degree o-F -Freedom and -Flexibility in decision
making.
For example, the level of authority accorded to
management must not merely extend to the repetition of goals,
objectives and rates. Instead especially in the case of the
latter, they must be in a position to use discretion in
negotiating these rates in accordance with prevailing market
situation (charging what the market can bear). Of course to
implement such decisions without it being disastrous to the
company, the decision maker must be aware of all the elements
which

enter into play, namely the cost structure of the ports

and the basis of the established tariffs.

2.1.3

UNDERUTILIZATION IN CONTAINER PORTS

Notwithstanding the vast investment required to set up
container facilities and the general shortage of capital in
developing countries the number of world container ports have
increased rapidly since the 1770s. This is because following
on the rationale of cost justification in the face of low
domestic volume, many countries/ports have decided to bid for
the available transhipment traffic.
Obviously if several
ports within a region develop transhipment facilities then
there is that much less traffic available to each. Thus the
situation of overcapacity and underutilization (different
sides of the same coin) is evident in far too many ports.
A large part

of the reason

for overcapacity rests

with

port planners and decision makers.
In order to justify the
cost level very optimistic forecasts are sometimes used, or
competition understated,
if mentioned at all.
Also the lure
of scarce foreign exchange inflows expected from such a
service is enough to make the need for in depth analysis of
the market secondary.
In developing terminal

facilities, the level of increase
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in regional and
horizon
will

national trade expected over the planning
greatly determine the terminal
capacity

required. However, whilst trade projections may or may not
materialize, the -facility, once constructed can rarely be
altered. A fourth reason is the influence of shipowners.
In
deciding whether or not a market will exist for its proposed
transhipment facility, port
planners often rely on the
feedback it receives from the prospective users - the ship
operators.
The fact that it is in the interest of the
shipowners to have a wide choice of ports at which to call
will generally mean that the response received by the port
planners is very positive.
In fact it is in their interest
not to
discourage ports which are
willing to provide
transhipment facilities. The tendency is to encourage as many
ports as are willing to make the investment
and need not
choose from among them before they have all made the necessary
investment, and even the favoured one will find that the
decision, of necessity,
is not permanent, so the inter-port
competition can be exploited in the future. ^
While the
creation of such a cut throat atmosphere may impact favourably
on the efficiency of the competing ports, the same cannot
however be
said for the financial
performance of the
unselected ports.

2.1.4

ROLE OF AGREEMENTS
The only means of protecting port investment is to have a

guaranteed traffic
usage.
a)
involves

volume or

a guaranteed level

of facility

This may be possible through agreements between;
The port and the ship operator;
This normally
joint development of port facilities and therefore

spreads the investment risk and assures the port of a level of

^
ports'.

Development 8< Improvement
UNCTAD TD/B/C. 4/293
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of

Ports;

Transhipment

usage.

While

contracts/agreements

of

this

nature

are

widespread in the developed world, it is a rare occurrence in
developing countries (Singapore the major exception) and may
only occur if the port is in such a dominant position and
expected to generate much traffic.
In which case one may
argue that the port would not necessarily need the contract
and should probably go for a common user approach. From a
carrier’s point of view such contracts restrict flexibility
and endanger the competition between

ports on which they rely

for improved port efficiency.
b)
Agreements between ports. Ports compete not only on
efficiency but on pricing. Thus published tariffs and actual
charge will tend to differ from customer to customer.
While
this flexible approach is in accordance with that advocated
earlier, it is often found that the size of the variation is
dependent on how desperate the pbrt management is to secure a
particular line and not necessarily because this is what the
market will bear.
There is
scope therefore
for
competition among themselves through
dissimilar prices.
In
similar to conferences.

ports
to
restrict
the charging of not

effect the formation of a cartel
This approach has several drawbacks.

The effective functioning of any cartel assumes a similar cost
structure for its members so that there is little incentive to
reduce prices to lure cargo.
Unlike shipping lines, ports are disparate entities with
different management structures and policies which greatly
For example, a Terminal which does not
affect cost levels,
employ its stevedores directly but subcontracts this function
as, and when needed, will have a lower level of fixed costs
than that port which employs them directly. With a lower cost
the
base he can reduce prices and still make a profit, to
detriment of the next port.
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It can

be argued that

such an

environment will

-Force

other
ports to seek economies through cost reductions.
However the structure o-F port relationships is o-Ften dictated
by government and can take decades to change (as exempli-Fied
by the registered dock worker scheme in the UK).
O-F course,
assuming similar cost
structures and a
willingness to
cooperate, the problem of policing the actual rates charged
would also emerge.
Another alternative arrangement that can be made between
ports is the possibility for joint investment in return for a
share in both the control of operation and profit. This is
probably a more feasible
alternative to that presented
earlier, since it would avoid,
in the initial
stages,
unnecessary waste of capital while accruing the benefits of
transhipment.
This would however (like the price fixing
agreement) work best between ports of the same country in
terms of operational logistics.
It must be stated that while
the proposed agreements between ports has obvious advantages,
hardly any inclination at cooperation between ports along
these lines has been shown to date.
c) Agreements between Governments. Agreements could be
made between governments to either invest jointly in port
facilities or share different aspects of the transhipment
services between countries.
For example, one provides the
port facilities and the other the feeder service.
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CURRENT,TRENDS IN CONTAINER BHIPPINS AND IMPACT ON PORTS
The two previous chapters were concerned with presenting a picture
of the impact of containerisation on the evolution of ports.
In
particular, it was shown that historically the port’s role in the change
process has been typified by reactionary measures.
They were not
innovators but facilitators.
This behaviour may be seen as very much in
line with the generic function of ports, that is, as facilitators of trade
and the interface between maritime and other transport modes.
Thus the
impetus for change - technological and operational - resided with the
carriers, and the survival of the ports depended on their ability to
anticipate, and respond effectively to this challenge, in order to prevent
being marginalised and indeed survival was often at stake.
However, the all-powerful role of carriers in trade/transport has
been significantly diluted over the years due particularly to the decline
in conference power and the rise to power of shippers' organizations.
While the ports themselves have not really gained power, it may be said
that they are nevertheless in a stronger position by virtue of the
carriers being in a less dominant one. However, they are still a long way
off from, and may never be in the position of calling the shots.
.In this chapter,

based on recent trends, an attempt will be made to

forecast the general environment in which ports will have to operate in
the future and where appropriate, the response of some ports to the
challenge.

3.1 n-E ENVIRQM^ENT

The demand for shipping and port services is derived based on the
need and ability of geographically disparate nations to trade, and in turn
is affected by fluctuations in trade.
Trade, on the other hand, is
affected by a host of factors encompassing the more obvious economic and
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political, technological ones as well as the unpredictable, such as
natural disasters. Thus an analysis of the more predictable of these
*leading indicators' can offer invaluable insight to industry management
by not only indicating tsfiat future demand for port services will be, but
by offering hints as to where the markets are and how they may tailor the
port's services to respond to these changes.
By and large, it is agreed that the prospects for future trade is
one of sustained healthy growth in the 90s. It is expected that world
economic growth will average 3.2 to 3.5 percent per annum
While this
remains in keeping with the general growth of the '80s, the pjattern of
trade is expected to c±»ange mainly ckae to:
1. THE STATE OF THE US ECONOMY
The growth of the '80s was led by

US imports -

largely from the

Asian economies. However, with the yawning trade deficit and softening of
the Dollar, as well as the strengthening of the Asian currencies, there is
in progress a realignment of trade on a more bDalanced level. That is, US
imports are expected to decline while their exports increase.
2. REGIONALISATION OF TRADE
The impending economic integration of Western Europe will make it
into the single largest trading group in which there will be free movement
of persons, goods, services and capital, which is in turn expected to fuel
economic growth of the region. The removal of all tariff barriers between
the community memhers will mean that trade between them is more
competitive relative to non-members. This in itself constitute a barrier
to trade as far as non-members are concerned.
It has also resulted in
what is increasingly referred to as the globalisation of production, which
has the irresistible benefits of increasing investment inflows to the
region, thereby stimulating both production and employment.

‘World trade to the year 2000.
Shipbuilding in the 1990s Conference.
2.
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Implications for shipping:
Asian
By Ben Hackett S< Doug Beck. Page

The indirect disbenefit may well be that unless the tradeCDff
between technological efficiency in production (thus reduced costs) and
the relatively higher cost of European labour (especially in the more
northerly states) is positive, the European consumer may be faced with
higher costs for locally produced commodities. This will of course render
imports more competitive, given a constant level of tariff on imports. In
this regard one can expect the 'industrial banana' (great prodicing areas
of Europe) to shift to the south where labour is cheaper.
Not only has the EC been a catalyst to the decentralisation of
production, but the potential benefits of such integration has not
entirely escaped the notice of other regions.
There has been an increase
in the number of agreements - bilateral and multilateral - aimed at
accruing these same benefits.
Witness for example the USA — Canada Free
Trade Agreement and the proposed America's Initiative.
For economic
unions that already existed, new purpose has been added, thus
resurgence of activity in say CARICCM (Caribbean Cormion Market).

the

Other factors' besides collective political action are at work to
undermine international trade in favour of regional trade:
Namely, the
unequal development of the different countries within a region.
In almost
every region with maybe the exception of Africa, there exists a marked
distinction in the economic development of the countries.
For example
Northern Europe versus Southern Europe, West more developed than East; USA
and Canada more developed than Central, South America and the Caribbean;
In Asia, Japan and increasingly South Korea are ahead (in terms of econmic
development) of say China, ASEAN, India and so on. Granted, this position
has always existed, but its importance is now underlined in this movement
towards regional trade which it facilitates, by virtue of the presenting
the possibility for investors to exploit the various comparative
advantages of the different countries (sub region).
Thus 'the fastest
interregional trade growth should occur between Japan and the Asian NICs,
as the Asian NICs will increasingly become a feeder of the fast growing
Japanese appetite for imported products, and Japanese direct investment in
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that region and generate company trade’ =

The magnitude and importance

of intra-regional trade in the -future is tabulated below:

TABLE 3.1
LONG TEF31 OUTLOOK FOR INTERREGIONAL TRADE
($blllion, both ways)

EC4 - US
EC4 - JAP«\J
EC4 - f s i f m
US - JAPWM
US - ASIW4
JAPAN - ASIWM4
TOTAL
WORLD TRADE
Source:

growth

1988

1995

117.4
51.2
50.6
125.7
97.7
71.0

239.0
114.9
117.5
263.7
230.4
181.0

12.2
12.8
11.2
13.0
14.0

513.6
5,613.0

1,146.5
11,734.8

12.2
11.0

10.7V.

pa

Extracted form ’Overview of the world economy & trade
By S. Masuyama. Havencongress, charts 8 and 10.

While the above table ckDesn't prove conclusively the argument,

the

fact that the incidence of intra-regional trade (Japan-Asian4) is expected
to grow at a faster rate than both interregional and global trade
nevertheless underlines the point.
If the other regions chose to
facilitate intra regional trade based on
Japan, namely by pumping investment in
take advantage of reduced inputs costs,
e-fFect of raising the general level of

the model of the Asian NICs and
the less developed countries to
then this will have the positive
economic development regionally.

This will however, also reduce the demand -for sea transport.
3. EAST - WEST DETENTE
The end of the cold war which had created a bi-polarisation in the
world economy in -former years should serve to boost world economic growth
and a -further restructuring of trade.
Firstly, the COMECON barter trade has collapsed under the new free

^Overview of the world economy & trade, HavenCongress.
'S: Masuyama, page 5, para. 4
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By

market system, as the countries try to secure hard currency necessary to
survive and develop. This offers vast potential for trade in the short to
medium term, since their exports tend to be primarily of heavy industry
and natural resources while import demand is for manufactured goods and
services.
Potential t^'^ide will be limited, in the short run to their
ability to pay.
The reduced level of military spending now possible through the
warmer East-West relations has also the
effect, if channeled into
productive processes, to impact positively on world economic growth.
The
other side of this is that, the Developing countries will face stiff
competition from these emerging free market economies for the available
investments,

aids and loans. This coupled with the debt problems will

result in further weakening of their economies.
In general therefore, while the world economy and trade is expected
to record healthy growth in the future (3.5 and 11% p.a. respectively) the
demand for shipping services, by virtue of being depenctent not only on
quantity but also on the distance shipped, is expected to record less
growth due to the above mentioned factors.

TABLE 3.2
GROWTH IN VOLUME OF COMMODITIES SHIPPED
(Average Annual growth rate)
19S5-S9
CRUDE & PETROLEUM PROD.
IRON ORE
COAL
GRAIN
BAUXITE it ALUMim
PHOSPHATE ORE

5.8*/.
2.7
3.8
1.8
4.7
1.1

1 1989-95
1
i 2.1*/.
1 -0.3
1 2.3
1 1.9
1
1

1995-2000
1.5V.
0.6
2.7
1.7
0.5
1.0

___________
l_
Source; Extracted from JAMRI report on Medium to Longterm Analysis
of the Shipping Market (1990-2005)

The general trend of expected decline observed in the table above is
explained by Dr. Joon-Soo Jon as being attributable to ’...the decline of
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heavy industry in the developed countries, the localisation of natural
resources and the industrialisation of developing countries’
The
outlook for growth in the general cargo sector and in particular, the
liner trade seems brighter, although still not up to the level of world
trade.
Viz;
Increased demand for manufactured and semi manufactured
goods is rapidly increasing, facilitated by increased containerisation.
One forecast speculates that growth in the liner trade should average
around 5.1% per annum, reflecting strong growth in consumer demand and
globalisation of world production."^

3.2 n-E SHIPPING INDUSTRY
For the shipping industry the implications of the above discussion
can be translated as slower growth in the major arterial routes,

but

expansion in intra-regional activity:

TABLE 3.3
EXPECTED AWMUAL GROWTH IN CONTAINER TRADE
T------------------------------------------- 1--------------------------------------1

1

ROUTE

1

1

1984-89

1
I
I
I

8.4%
3 .4
9 .0
10.6
1
4 .6
1
I_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I. . . . . . . . .

iNorth America-Asia
1 "
"
-Europe
lEurope-Asia
1Intra-Asian
1 " Europe

1
1

1989-94 1

5.1%
1
2
.6
1
7
.7
1
9
.9
1
4
.9
1
1- - - - - - - - - - - - -

i
1
1
1
1
1

Source: Extracted from Containerisation International
1990. Based on T^/DRI forecasts.

Other factors which will impact on the industry include;
1. The trend towards increasing ship sizes. As of May 1989 around
38% of the capacity on order was for ships of 3000 TEU and more, many of

=^hanges in Shipping Environment & Counter Strategies of Korea
Towards year 2000. Page 151, para. 3
■^World trade to year 2000; Implications for shipping. Presented
to Asian Shipbuilding Conference, Busan, Korea in 1990, by
'B. Hecket & Doug Beck.
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which were to be delivered in the 1990s

This trend towards larger

mainline vessels has also influenced (for operational reasons)
required
size of feeder ships. Coupled with the existing overtonnage, then it can
be expected that the downward pressure on liner rates will continue in the
foreseeable future as carriers scramble for the available cargo to ensure
economic load factors.
2.

Adoption of differentiated marketing strategies_by carriers.

Through the 80s the industry has seen the emergence of two distinct
marketing strategies by carriers.
Dn the one hand there are those who
position themselves as global carriers offering customers not only door to
door transport but also more sophisticated logistics, thereby becoming an
almost indispensable part of the client's JIT distribution system.
In
contrast, other carriers adopted the approach of not vying for this global
integrated service, but have positioned themselves as niche operators,
specialising in a particular region or aspect of the total service
package. This has resulted, in both cases, in increased investment in EDI
- a necessity for logistics service - to provide shippers with accurate
and timely information.
3. The increasing trend towards customer-oriented services. This
is set to continue as shippers continue to demand better and more
sophisticated services and carriers are forced for competitive reasons to
comply. The rise of shippers power and outsiders have seen a weakening of
conferences which is expected to continue in the future. This is a result
of the conference's increasing inability to control tonnage and enforce
rate levels - the purpose for which they were created.
4. The changing pattern of carrier cooperation.
The emergence of
market strategies based on service differentiation led to, and increased
the importance of brand supremacy.
Under this scenario, the
inappropriateness of consortia, has therefore led to its decline in favour
of operating agreements. The latter, while ensuring economies of scale,
does not involve the loss of or a merger of carriers' identity in the

= Top 20 Carriers Consolidate.
June, T990. Pages 46-50.
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market place.
It therefore offers the possibility to engender the much
sought after customer loyalty.
Increased usage of non-ISO standard boxes. The philosophy
behind containerisation was to enable the packaging and transport of cargo
origin to destination with minimal handling to the cargo itself,
while in transit.
It means that the form used to unitize the cargo must
be interchangable between different transport modes and can be handled by
standard equipment. A standard for containers v^s therefore essential.
The creation of specific box sizes by the International Standard
Organization (ISO) has largely governed the container sizes in use today.
However, an increasing trend towards introducing different container sizes
is much in evidence. This will have serious implications for the ability
of existing port equipment to handle these new containers.

3.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR PORTS
Given that cargo handled in ports tend to grow at a higher rate than
trade (due primarily to double handling), it can be inferred that cargo
handled at ports in the coming decade or so will experience an average
annual increase in excess of 5.15(. This in turn implies an increase in
the demand for cargo handling services. On the other hand, falling liner
rates means that carriers are more sensitive to costs and therefore that
ports, in order to win the patronage of carriers will need to play their
role in recLicing carrier costs.
While the response is normally that of
tariff rebates, by far the largest contribution ports can make in the
redaction of the transport cost is through short vessel stay in port.
A
survey to identify what is most important to the ship operators from a
port standpoint reveals that port cost was by no means the top priority,
but rather fast and efficient service.
The trend of increased ship size holds several implications for
ports and their developmental plans. Obviously there will be the need to
increase the depth of channels and berths, and to accommodate the higher
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throughput per vessel per berth, there will be a need -For more stacking
areas to be made available -For each ship’s interchange and a given trade
volume.
The requirement -For -Fast turnaround will be stronger than ever
thus also implying necessary increases in number oT cranes per ship, their
speed and outreach.
In general, increased efficiency is required in
container cranes in order to enable reductions in ship’s capital costs,
operating costs and inventory costs of loaded cargoes, by shortening the
turnaround time in port and total time cargoes are in transit.*^

The degree of flexibility with which the port responds to the
challenges of change can be the decisive factor to its survival. Thus,
ports in responding to changes must select the appropriate strategy which
will satisfy customers while maximizing its returns on investment.
Beth

highlights two broad responses.

Dr. H.

Namely,

1) Capital widening, which involves the quantitative
improvement of facilities, and,
2) Capital deepening, which depicts a qualitative response
where strategies for the better utilization of current
resources are employed such as rationalisation and increased
productivity of existing facilities.
In practice it may
combination of the two.

iasII

be that the optimum strategy comprises a

For example,

a port responding to the challenge

of bigger ships will almost certainly need to deepen access channels and
so on. They will also need to invest in new cranes (post panamax). But
there may not exist the need to build additional berths since 'as was
already stated, there will be fewer ships, ceteris paribus. What may be
necessary is reallocation of berth lengths in keeping with the prevailing
vessel lengths.
^Changes in world shipping 8t counter strategies of Korea towards
the year 2000. By Dr. Joon-Soo Jon
Developments in l^torld Shipping - Effect on ports, page 2.
Presented at a Lecture to the World Maritime University in June, 1991.
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Also the need to provide additional transit area may be avoided by
the employment o^^ policies which engender more efficient utilization of
the existing areas, such as shortening of storage periods and strong
penalties for tardy removal of cargo, divesture of CFS functions to other
warehouses and the increased use of ICD’s (inland container depots).
In the era of containers computerisation of the port operations and
planning is vital to improved operational efficiency, and in order to find
the most feasible and cost effective solution to the issues of port
development, finance and management. The leading ports of the world have
sought and found the competitive edge in the various services they afford
clients through a comprehensivecomputer system, involving in some cases
linkages with ports at the other end of the trade route. Although this is
admittedly,a very advanced and complex undertaking, the logic is however
clear: By direct communication with the other end of the trade route
they are able to know, as soon as the vessel sails, all the various
details of the cargoes destined for their port.
Thus they are able to
plan well in advance for its arrival.
The rise of
individual marketingstrategies through service
dif-ferentiation aimed at customer loyalty, and the decline of consortia in
favour of operating agreements, poses both opportunities and threats for
ports.
One possible disadvantage is the need to widen the marketing
effort. For example, ports in their marketing activities could target
three or so lines through a consortia, since the decision as to ports of
call was collective.
Similarly, with the breakaway, ports which had
secured these lines may find they run the serious risk of losing a
substantial portion of business.
On the positive side, this resurgence of

independent carriers has

opened up the market of potential customers as far as ports are concerned.
Thus given equivalent efficiency in various ports and no great
geographical/trade disadvantages, there should be a trend towards a more
even distribution of carriers among ports. Ports can also seek to exploit
the increased powers of shippers to influence carriers, to their
advantage. This may be done by appealing directly to shippers who can use
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their clout to decide on the ports -from which their cargo should be
shipped.
Thus, in the -future, ports will undoubtedly need to concentrate on
development o-F services both qualitatively and quantitatively but on an
eT-Ficient and cost effective basis since it is unlikely that they will be
able to pass on all their' increased costs to carriers/shippers and remain
competitive. It will also mean that ports will need to be innovative in
both the provision of services and more active in influencing the ports
through which cargoes are shipped.
In addition, in the planning of equipment purchase, management has
to be cognizant of current trends which may render equipment prematurely
obsolete.

One significant example is the increased popularity of non

standard ISO boxes by shippers in order to secure cost benefits.
A
proposal was placed before ISO by A^BI (American National Standards

Institute) to legitimize such sizes as 48 feet boxes although the payload
is to remain the same as that of the 40 feet
This hasimplications
for the size of crane and yard equipment spreaders, the size of the slot
per box allocated in the transit areas, and, in the case of the former,
management will want to build in an option -For adjustment/extension when
purchasing equipment.
The proposal of increased size while maintaining
current allowable weight, raises the' issue of control to ensure that
overweight boxes do not damage costly equipment.
From the foregoing it would seem quite clear that ports .need to
register a voice in the organizations that take decisions which impact on
their activities.
For this there will be the need for unity. This will
undoubtedly be the determinant of how success-Fully ports will perform in
the -Future.

USA proposal for ISO series 2 High Cube container size.
104 WG.4 no. 28. Prepared September 23, 1988
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INTRODUCTION TO THE KINGSTON CONTAINER TERMINAL
In 1975
joined the
transhipment
Authority to

Jamaica and in particular the Port o-F Kingston
ranks of
countries vying for the container
business.
The decision was taken by the Port
construct a container terminal to facilitate the

growing containerised trade of the country and at the same
time capitalise on the lack of such facilities in the region
as a whole, by offering transhipment for the region and for
certain other trades. This was seen as being possible due to
the strategic location of the island, representing minimal
deviation from the trade routes utilizing the Panama Canal.
The
existing
port estate
was
extended by
land
reclammation and a f.our berth terminal was developed and
started operation
in 1975.
The strategy
to vie for
transhipment traffic has been largely successful as TEUs
handled at the Terminal rose steadily during the first 12
years of operations, to peak at over 253,000 in 1987.
Estimates by the Ocean Shipping Consultants projected that the
port of Kingston would have been handling over 265,000 TEUs by
1990.»
However,
several events
have
since
occurred
to
drammatically alter this picture. Namely, the destabilization
of the Panamanian economy and the resultant impact on its
freezone activities; the increasing use of the US land-bridge
for cargo movements between its East and West coasts; and the
stigma of illicit drug trafficking, from the port which was
largely responsible for the withdrawal of a major transhipment
line at the end of 1987.
Today, traffic at the Terminal

World Container Ports
Consultants, 1986. Page 166
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to

2000.

Ocean

Shipping

averages about 90,000 moves or just over 100,000 TEUs.
The Terminal is therefore facing a crisis.
In the face
of downward spiralling of traffic, the increased port costs
with its impact on
profitability, and the more recent
industrial relations problem, the Terminal faces the very real
danger of losing her present, if somewhat tarnished status as
one of the premier container facility in the region.
And
with the increasing competition now faced from ports such as
Cristobal, San Juan and Santo Domingo, any further loss of
business could affect its survival.
In this chapter, a brief history of the development of
the port is given,
the general operational structure of the
Terminal and in chapter 5 a situation analysis detailing
performance to date and problems faced by the Terminal.
It is
hoped that this will present the background for the subsequent
chapters in which it is suggested that the port may be able to
resolve some of its more crippling problems and improve its
declining transhipment market by adopting a comprehensive
marketing plan.

4.1
Since
occupation

BRIEF HISTORY

the early 17th
Century during
of Jamaica, the Kingston harbour

the English
has been the

centre of the Island's shipping and commercial activities.
With over 8 square miles of navigable water and depth of over
90 feet, large ships could berth safely alongside the shore,
discharge cargo and sail again quickly — a necessity during
the period when Port Royal
(the most easterly end of the
Harbour) served as a base for the activities of the reknowned
English pirate. Sir Henry Morgan.
The ensuing years saw
activities of the port being relocated from Port Royal (after
it w^s destroyed by earthquake in 1692) westerly, to what is
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today known as Newport West.
As the rapid increase in the demand -For sugar and other
agricultural produce increased profits and gave wealth to the
city, Kingston grew in size and importance to the Island. The
development o-F port structures within the harbour was hard put
to keep pace with that o-F the Island’s commerce.
The
prol i-Feration o-F -Finger piers to handle the rising tide o-F
goods -Flowing through the port, concentrated a large number o-F
ships on a relatively small area o-F coastline. This resulted
in acute congestion in the port, as the road in-Frastructure o-F
the city was not designed to take that level of traffic.
By the mid 1950s private developers began dredging and
reclamation operations on the shoreline west of the city,
resulting in the replacement of the pier structures with
modern lateral quays.
This was part of an integrated plan to
link the development of the port with the
that of the city and outlying areas.

general plan

for

The operation of the Newport West facilities (then
berths 1 - 9) was to be entrusted to two of the old wharf
companies, viz: Kingston Wharves and Western Terminals.

4.1.1

THE PORT AUTHORITY OF JAMAICA

Established in 1966 as a statutory body, it is directly
responsible to the Ministry of Public Utilities and Transport
for matters pertaining to the Island’s ports and is thus
entrusted with their overall supervision, and in general the
various shipping related facilities found on the port estate.
"As such it was empowered to:
a)

Fix and review wharfage rates for all public wharves
in the Island
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b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)'

Regulate the use of port facilities
Provide and operate port facilities
services
Operate and
in Ci13
Maintain and
Regulate and
the ports of
Provide for

lease such facilities as

and

related

•
may be vested

improve port facilities
control navigation within the limits of
the Island
pilotage.services in all ports of the

Island" *
In
-Future
modern

1972 the

Government assumed

responsibility -for

port development.
The decision was taken
transhipment
container
terminal and

•facilities.

"This was

conceived as a part

all

to build a
-Free port

of a coordinated

policy for:
i)

developing the

Port of Kingston to

meet the future

ii)

shift to container and transhipment traffic
attracting foreign investment; and

iii) expanding exports" ^
thereby contributing

to Jamaica's economic growth.

The idea

behind the double development of both the Terminal and
Freezone complex is that both should work in tandem.
The
responsibility for policy implementation was also divested to
the Port Authority.
Given this responsibility, the Port
Authority of Jamaica (PAJ), a relative newcomer to the port
business, recognised its lack of expertise in the area of port
operations. So in order to secure the loan necessary to build
the facilities, entered into operating agreements with the two

=KTD 10th Anniversary Booklet, page 7
.^Report
Associates

to

the

Port

Authority
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by

Public

Relations

existing' whar-F companies, whereby

it provides capital and the

private sector the expertise.
Between 1975-1979 the container terminal was

operated by

Kingston Wharves .and Western Terminals <KW & WT) on a joint
venture basis.
The container Terminal was subsequently made
autonomous
with
these
two
companies
becoming
equal
shareholders in the new company - Kingston Terminal Operators
Limited (KTO) . "KTO is a limited liability company with sta-F-F
taken originally -From the joint venture partners. This new
company was given responsibility -For the total operations o-F
the Terminal, and for advising the PAJ, the owners of the
facility, on the purchase of equipment." ^
Here
comprises

it should be noted that the container terminal
berths 8 - 11, but the PAJ owns only berths 10 and

11. It will be recalled that berths 8 and 9 are the property
of KW.
However, a special arrangement with the PAJ was
concluded whereby these berths are operated in conjunction
with berths 10 and 11 as the container facility at no charge
to the PAJ (this arrangement is claused in the Terminal
Operators Agreement, Appendix 4.1).

Such agreements characterise the relationship between the
PAJ and the private sector,
resulting in a conflicting
and
overlapping structure regarding the ownership and operations
of the public wharves (see figure 4.1).
obvious area of
conflict is the fact that private interests who own and
operate a portion of the port's facilities are being regulated
by the PAJ who not only set the wharfage rates but also own
and operate competing facilities. This situation is further
worsened by the fact that these private concerns have seen a
portion of their traffic diverted to the container facility.

■^KTQ's 10th Anniversary Handbook, page 7.
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G

under the direction o-F the PAJ, in order to increase the
utilisation o-f the Terminal.
As a means o-F compensation
however, a -Further agreement was entered into between the
parties, whereby "...wharfage on those containers directed
away (domestic cargo) from their facilities is remitted to
them in its entirety". =

4.2

THE OPERATING AGREEMENT

Although
the appendixed Operating
current (having expired in 1987),
it is

Agreement is not
not substantially

different frorrt the current one and thus is adequate for
purpose of illustrating the impact of certain clauses on the
Terminal’s operations.
Responsibility

for equipment and plant maintenance under

clause 7 falls to the Terminal Operators. However, clause 8
gives the PAJ responsibility for the provision of spare parts.
The obvious advantage of this arrangement is that the PAJ,
being a governmental institution has more ready access to
lines of credit and is therefore in a position to garner the
necessary scarce foreign exchange for the purchase of the
spare parts.
Although there exists an efficient means of
communication between the Terminal and the Authority regarding
spares needed, the fact that the purchasing entity
is
physically divorced from that doing the actual using, has
resulted in certain inefficiencies and time lag in ordering.
The problem of late arrival is often experienced and in some
instances it was found that the parts actually received were
of an incorrect specification - an expensive mistake.
For the above reasons it was often found that while there
existed shortage of some spare parts, very high inventory

“Kingston Port Development Study, Page Xl-6.
19 O-F Terminal Operating Agreement, Appendix 4.1
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Also Clause

the Terminal
levels existed -For others.
To this end
management recently devised an inventory system to calculate
the Economic Order Quantity (EDQ) -For some 0 "F the more crucial
parts. The success o-F this system will o f course depend on an
accurate assessment o-F the lag time between ordering with the
PAJ and receiving.
Another crucial i-F obvious -Factor will be actual usage
rate versus predicted. With the increasing breakdown of shipto-shore cranes being experienced, and thus the need for
constant repair, forecasting usage rate is not at all easy.
It is
worthwhile to mention this
experience of crane
breakdowns is a result of the continual postponement of a long
overdue refurbishing of
these equipment.
Such capital
expenditure is the preserve of
the PAJ and since the
refurbishing exercise will require outlay of foreign exchange
for both parts and overseas experts, it is delayed until the
PAJ is prepared to spend the money.
This is one of
inherent disadvantages in the present arrangement, since
PAJ is responsible for several port facilities and at any
time, the Container Terminal may not be number one on

the
the
one
its

priority list regarding the allocation of foreign exchange.
Clause 11 stipulates that the Operator
(KTO) is to
"provide adequate security for the container terminal and all
the plant and equipment thereon...".
At the same time it is
the regulated responsibility of the Shipping Association of
Jamaica (SAJ) to provide security for the entire port estate.
As such, operating within the Terminal are at least two
different security organisations.
The security provided by
KTO has largely been with regards to cargo security in the
container yard and freight stations, while that provided by
the SAJ covered the entire perimeter of the Terminal including
access and exits, security aboard vessels and container
security. In the mid ’80s the Terminal experienced serious
security problems which threatened its existence and has
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resulted in

a

wider

involvement

by

the

PAJ

in

Terminal

security matters.
This involvement has also seen
the
introduction of another security organisation on the Terminal.

Regarding

the

marketing

of

the

Terminal,

clause

22

establishes joint responsi1bi1ty between the parties for this
funciton.
However, in reality port marketing is spearheaded
by the PAJ and constitutes primarily promotional tours with
some members of the Terminal's management team being included
in the delegation.
To some extent the logic of such an
arrangement is overwhelming: since the PAJ is responsible for
other port facilities such as the freezone, it can best launch
an integrated promotional campaign. The great disadvantage to
the Terminal of not
having its own in-house marketing
department is that Terminal marketing activities is seen as a.
once-off activity, carried out a few times per year to try and
drum up business,
instead of an ongoing activity involving
constant

service improvement,

market evaluation

and forward

planning.

4.3

THE KINGSTON INDUSTRIAL FREEZONE (IFZ)

Although this
paper’s major • concern
is with the
transhipment terminal, it is felt that in as far as the
freezone constituted a part of the plan for overall port
development, a brief analysis of its success in terms of its
goals could serve to place in context any evaluation of the
transhipment port’s own performance.
The proposed twin
development of a freezone complex and a transhipment terminal
was viewed by the Government as being vital to economic
development of the country.
The primary goal of the IFZ was to foster trade expansion
and increased employment from the expected investment inflows,
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FIGURE 4.2

i

while transhipment would increase foreign exchange earnings.
A sort of symbiotic relationship was envisioned between the
port and the IFZ wherein the former, by providing modern port
facilities would attract regular scheduled service to the
port, thereby enabling
efficient transportation of
the
Island’s trade and make Kingston more attractive for Freezone
Investments. The IFZ on the other hand, would serve not only
to feed cargo to the port, but by the very fact that its
operation represents expanded trade for the Island, attract
more lines to the port.

One
operation

of

the

of a

location.

essential
freezone and

Here Jamaica

criterion
indeed

for

the

successful

a transhipment

has the benefit

of

being

port is
ideally

located (see figure 4.2), viz:

i)

Jamaica is strategically located between Europe
and South America and is directly on the route
via the
Panama Canal from the Far East to
Europe and to the East Coast of North America.

ii)

The Island is centrally located relative to the
rest of the Caribbean, Central America,
America and the Gulf area of the USA.

It was therefore
the

felt that with

Island could become

this natural

the hub for cargo

South

advantage

destined not only

for the region but also Europe and the Far East (this, as will
be seen later, materialised to some extent when the port was^
chosen by Evergreen as a hub in its round-the-wor1d service).
In fact, it was a widely held belief that if this natural
resource was properly exploited, the Island had the potential
to become to these various regions "what Singapore was to the
t
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Far East"

and indeed at

the time there was

no reason not

to believe this.
Basic Criteria For Success-Ful Operation of a Freezone
To successFully compete For Freezone investment on the
international market,
a wide
range oF
incentives and
Facilities need to be provided by the host country.
Using
Eric

Pollock's

classiFication,

these

need

to

be both

physical, and non-physical as set out below:
PHYSICAL
a) geographical location
b) availability oF appropriate port Facilities
c)

adequate land area (100 acres minimum)

d)
e)

availability oF labour
"
oF cheap power and water

F)

availability oF buildings

NON PHYSICAL
g) Favourable investment conditions and general
Financial and economic stability
h)
i)
j)

tax concessions
reasonable rentals For Facilities
minimum Fuss and bureaucracy.

The. Kingston Freezone Company Ltd. is a joint holding oF
the Port Authority and the Government oF Jamaica, established
in 1976.
Over 150 acres oF land is dedicated to its
development with just over a third being already developed
into

standard Factory

warehouse modules.

The area

is well

<*>Paper based on speech by Hon. Eric Bell (then Minister
oF Public Utility 8< transport) at the Opening oF the Port
Authority Seminar. 27/3/74.
■^Free Ports, Free Trade
Economic Develoment, page 15

Zones, Export Processing Zones
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served by electricity and water as well as the major motorways
o-F the Bustamante Industrial Estate on which it is located.
With well over a -Fi-fth of the Island’s labour force being
unemployed, investors in the Kingston Freezone have the
benefit of not only a vast pool of semi and unskilled labour
but also at a cheap cost, as these employees were normally
paid at the national minimum wage of US$18.00 per week for a
40 hour week. Jamaica’s favourable geographical location has
already been mentioned and it may be readily seen that with
the freezone being located adjacent to the modern container
facility the second criterion was also met, thus completing
the physical requirements.
A wide range of financial and operational incentives were
put in place, viz:
"TAX EXEMPTIONS

-

100’
/. tax holiday on profits

CUSTOMS PROCEDURES

-

waiving
of
requirements

import licencing
minimal
customs

formalities
DUTY EXEMPTION

-

no duty is levied on capital
goods,
consumer
goods,
raw
material
or
imports
for
construction,
extension
or
repair of Freezone premises
including office equipment

PROFIT REPATRIATION -

-

there are no restrictions on the
repatriation
of
profits
by
companies operating in the Zone
client companies are permitted
to
operate
foreign currency
accounts in accordance with the
Exchange Control regulations of
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the Bank of Jamaica.
WORK PERMITS

-

work permit applications
are
exempt from normal taxation". ®

In the marketing of the complex, a further selling point
was the benefits exporters of Jamaican made products would
receive from the various international Agreements that the
Island

was a

Signatory

to.

Such

as the

Caribbean

Basin

Initiative, Lome Convention, GATT, Caribcan and Caricom.
The Freezone targeted the full

scale light manufacturing

industry, thereby attracting
activities in assembly
of
machinery, production of packaging material, printing and
garment manufacturing. Over 90% of the‘labour employed on the
Zone are engaged in the latter activity.
Table I gives
performance data on the Zone for the periods 1982 -1989
TABLE 4.1
1
1 EMPLOYMENT
YEAR
1
1
ri
875 .
1 1982
1
960
1 1983
1
3,134
1 1984
1
5,085
1 1985
1
7,781
1 1986
1
11,049
1 1987
1
6,559
1 1988
1
7,441
1 1989
L.
SOURCE: Statistics

1 CONTAINERS
1 IN 1 OUT
1
1
407
1
163
1
1,100,000
1
167
331
1
1
1,700,000
1
1
2,400,000
1 456 1 205
1
7,000,000
1 542 1 381
1
10,800,000
1 727 1 596
1
30,500,000
1 945 1 914
1
28,700,000
1 750 1 879
1
27,700,000
1 684 1 650
L
J
Dept, at the Kingston Freezone
1 FDREIBN EXCHANGE
1 EARNINGS (US$)

____________ _________________

I

----------------------------------------------- —

_____ ____________

Employment rose impressively from the 1982 level of 875,
peaking at 11,049 in 1987. A similar trend will be observed
in the performance of the container port but it is reasonable
to

conclude

that

there

exists

no

significance

to

this

® Kingston Export Freezone. Produced by Communications
Consultant Ltd., 1987. For the PAJ.
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correlation.

As to the reason -For the drammatic reduction in

-Freezone employment -Following on 1987, it can only
be
speculated that this may have been a result o-F the widespread
industrial action by the Freezone employees in demand o-F
better pay and working conditions which led to some companies
pulling out, while others cut sta-F-F.
Un-Fortunately -Further
interviews with the Freezone Statistician was not possible,
and so it can only be assumed that this was the case.
Studies done on the implementation and bene-Fits o-F the
Freezone, where any attempt was made to actually quanti-Fy the
expected bene-Fits, were also unobtainable.
This renders the
task o-F concluding the extent to which its objectives were
achieved, difficult. What is obvious however, is that in more
than any other area the Freezone has been successful in
tapping a respectable portion of Island's unemployed labour,
force. Also in the light of the volume of containers entering
the country because of the existence of the zone, it may be
deduced that with the maximum of 1859 achieved in 1987 being
just over 1'/. of the containers passing through the Terminal
for the same period, the Freezone has largely not achieved the
goal of feeding cargo to the Terminal.

4.4

THE KINGSTON CONTAINER TERMINAL

Having briefly reviewed the performance of the Freezone
primarily in order to assess
impact on the Container
Terminal, the objective now is to present a brief outline of
the
facilities of the Terminal itself, the operational
structure and the current labour arrangement thereon.
It is
hoped that by so doing, a framework will be presented which
will enable a better undertstanding of the Terminal and
possible reasons for the level of performance discussed in the
next chapter.
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It will be recalled that responsibility -For the operation
of the Island’s only specialised container facility was
entrusted to
an operating company Kingston Terminal
Operators Limited (KTO). For the purposes of this paper, the
Kingston Container Terminal and KTO will be regarded as one
and the same, since for all practical purposes this body is
responsible for the operation of the Terminal on a profitable
and efficient basis. Although as have been shown, the ability
to do so effectively is constrained by the reliance on the PAJ
for.certain crucial decisions such as investment.
4.4.1

FACILITIES
The

Kingston

transhipment

container

terminal

(also

referred to as KTO) began operations in 1P75 with 2 Paceco
gantry portainer cranes for its shipside operations along
2,100 ft of berthing space.
These were complemented by a
tractov— trailer system for the quay transfer operation along
with medium span transtainers for stacking.
Shore-side
operations, namely receivals, deliveries and transfers to the
Container Freight Stations (CFS) were achieved through the use
of straddle carriers, tractors and forklifts.
By 1991 the equipment inventory of the Terminal included:
-5 gantry cranes
m 2 Paceco Vickers installed 1972
% 2
"
Dominion Bridge
1982
* 1 Post Panamax
-

1991

1 140ton mobile crane
12 medium span rubber tyred gantries
IB Valmet straddle carriers
16 Tractor heads
54 chassis
1 30 ton Kalmar Forklift and an assortment
of smaller forklifts
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- 72 receptacles for integral reefer units
- 16 reefer towers (accommodate 64 containers)
- 30 clip on units.
It is important to note the ages of the gantry cranes.
The two Vickers which were installed in 1772 are now over 18
years old and as far as shipping technology is concerned,
their inability to efficiently service the present generation
of vessels calling at the Terminal have rendered them more or
less obsolete.
Thus as will be later discussed, the problem
of frequent breakdown and thus replacement
options are
presently being considered by the Terminal’s management.
Recently, there has been a move to phase out the Tractortrailer relay system in favour of the straddle carrier direct
system to take advantage of a more speedier quay transfer
possibilities
and less space requirements afforded by the
latter system.
However, some problems are being experienced
since the question of the age of the gantries and thus 'air
height’ and clearance needed to ensure a safe operation.
Consideration is being given to the installation of sensors
on the cranes.
Constrained

by

depth

of

the

channel leading

harbour, the maximum allowed draft is 39’.
area is approximately 37 hectares, of which

to

the

Total Terminal
there is over

6,500 TEL) used for container stacking.
Other

facilities

provided

directly

by

the

Terminal

include transhipment cargo reconsolidation utilizing its two
Container Freight Stations (CFS).
Vessel storage planning
using the Terminal Information Control System (TICS) which is
an online system providing up-to-the minute information on
container movements in and out of the Terminal. This facility
is provided to the shipping lines as part of the general
service and as such attracts no direct cost to the users.
Indirect port facilities (ancilliary) include a network of
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Agents
cold

along the

entire water

storage, hauglage

-Front,

bunkering -Facilities,

companies, brokers,

container repair

-Facilities, warehousing and various banking institutions.

4.4.2

LABOUR
KTQ currently

employs about

IBO workers

allocated with

varying densities among the departments. The operations, CFS
and maintenance departments will on average be accountable -For
about BO’
/. o-F the total sta-Ff.
None o-F the Terminal’s
employees are engaged in stevedoring activities.
Instead,
this -Function is subcontracted to a stevedoring company —
Terminal Services Limited (TSL) — which in turn -Furnishes them
from a 'Port Worker’ labour pool maintained by the BAJ, while
itself supplying the supervisory personnel.
KTO’s staff are
used as far as direct ship operations are concerned,
in
longshore activities, that is, the location and carriage of
containers to and from stacking area to guay apron.
Thus,

working a vessel will

essentially involve labour

from three separate organisations: KTO, TSL and SAJ. Set out
below is the typical gang strength required to work 'a Lift-On
Lift-Off (LO-LO) vessel:
TSL:
1 Supercargo

- assigned to ship

1 Time keeper
1 Dispatcher
1 Foreman
SAJ:

2 Operators (crane)
2 Signalmen
13 Lashers
1 Bearsman
1 Waterman

-

4 Oangwaymen
24
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assigned to ship

The

above mentioned are in turn supervised by a KTO team

comprisi ng;
1 Asst. Operations Manager

-assigned to Terminal

1 Stowage coordinator

-

"

" Ship

2 Stack clerks

-

"

" Ship

2 Tally clerks
2 Karrili-Ft Operators
The orders for gangs are placed by KTO's operations department
which is in direct contact with the Shipping Agents.
A
typical gang strength
(excluding supervisors and
those
assigned to the vessel or Terminal) constitutes 27 men. This
is considered large and seem to suggest that the Terminal is
not accruing the benefits of reduced demand for labour
afforded by mechanization.
A very important

point which emerges is that KTO

is not

directly responsible for the recru-itment and training of those
persons who directly affect its ability to perform as crucial
a service as vessel operations efficiently, and therefore
respond to the needs of carriers for fast turnaround of
vessels.
Thus even with the most meticulous planning and
terminal arrangement, the desired increase in productivity is
not always attainable.
As will be discussed in more detail
later on, the Terminal is plagued with low productivity and
more recently, increasing labour unrest which is seriously
affecting its credibility as a

reliable and efficient port in

the shipping community.

4.4.3

OPERATIONAL STRUCTURE

To carry out its function KTO is divided into six
(6)
departments.
Viz;
Administration,
Accounts,
Operation/Planning, Maintenance, CFS and Data departments.
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A D M IN IS T R A T IO N :

It may be said that the

this department

carries out all the non—technical -functions o-F the Terminal.
Based on these activities it can be further divided into the
'Executive' Admininstration and Personnel.
The former is
headed by the Managing Director with whom the major policy
decisions rest.
General Manager

Under his office and in association with the
and
Deputy General Manager, the public

relations function of the Terminal is carr.ied out.
These
three also comprise the major link between the PAJ and KTD and
usually participate in port promotional tours. The Personnel
Department is run by a Personnel Manager and carries out a
wide range of functions traditional to personnel departments,
ranging from manpower recruitment to administration of the
employee health scheme.
Headed

ACCOUNTS:

by

the

Accountant/Dffice

Manager/Financial Controller, this department has a wide range
of

functions.

As

such, certain

functional sub-departments

headed by their respective surpervisors are evident. Namely,
Accounts
Receivable,
Accounts
Payable,
Administration,
Payroll, Statistics,
Inventory and Dispatch.
The Acccounts
department’s function is vital to the organization as it is
from the comprehensive records kept that information is
available for revenue collection and management control.
It
was not surprising therefore that not only did the Terminal
computerisation process begin in this department but it was
responsible for
the actual
spearheading
computerisation process.
The Administrative
department

is

responsible

for,

among

of
the
port
section of this

other

things,

the’

generation of the monthly accounts of the Terminal and
accompanying reports, cash flow management, budget preparation
and Tariff review computations.
The Accounts department,
because of its various functions therefore represents the
nucleus of the Terminal’s information system.
O P E R A T IO N S /P L A N N IN B :

The . activities of
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the operations

department

may

broadly

be

divided

into two

areas:

those

activities related to ship operations and those to the
receiving and delivering -functions.
On this basis, the
operations department, headed by 2 Operations managers, is
divided into sub departments under the direct control o-f
individual Assistant Operations Managers (AOMs).
Ship

Operations;

This

involves

vessel

preplanning,

ordering o-f stevedores, and during the actual vessel working,
the location and carriage o-f containers to and -from ship's
si de.
Receiving

&

Delivering;

The

two

sub

departments

concerned are responsible -for the receival and delivery o-f FCL
containers -from and to consignees.
It is the -function of the
Equipment
Control
department
to verify
the necessarydocumentat ion prior to releasing or accepting the containers.
The deliveries department is responsible for the mounting and
grounding of containers leaving or entering the Terminal and
which are not to remain on chasses.
Of course this is
normally done on the advice of Shipping Agents.
The foregoing activities are carried out with some degree
of efficiency by the use of computerised container
system and 2-way UHF radios and more recently

tracking
portable

terminal, enabling efficient communication and the rapid
storage and retrieval of containers as well as vessel storage
planning.
Df>TA

PRO CESSING

DEPARTMENT'.

The

Data

Department

is

responsible for the computerisation of port functions.
It
grew out of the Accounts Department where the computerisation
process was started and received departmental status in
1988/89.
To
date it has achieved a high
degree o,f
computerisation in all aspects of port activities with the
priority areas
of accounts and
Operations being fully
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computerised.
It employs the strategy of developing inhouse programmers
and utilizes two computer systems which operate in parallel.
The first and oldest is the IBM System 38 which is housed in
the central port computer facility for the entire port of
Kingston (Port Computer Services Ltd). On this system resides
the TICS system developed by HTDATA, Gothenburg, Sweden, and
modified by local programmers to fit the Terminal’s needs.
Software for the payroll department and in general the
Terminal’s accounting system is also housed on the IBM 38.
As just mentioned this system belongs to PCS, and the Terminal
(along with all other port users)
is charged for the use of
the service on a real time basis, and where applicable, for
programming services.
This arrangement was made at the
beginning of the computerisation process (early 80’s) when
neither the volume of traffic nor the inhouse expertise was
available at the Terminal to justify the investment in its
own computer facility on an economical basis. However, today,
the Terminal could justify having its own system and as will
be discussed later there may exist a case
management to actually opt for this.

for the

Whilst the first system is a portwide network

Terminal

system and

thus affords the interchange of information /data between the
port and agents, the second system - Xenix 3B6 - is an inhouse
network system which contains spreadsheets
management information softwares.

and various other

The CFS department
carries out those functions typical of container freight
stations.
That is, the consolidation and deconsolidation of
cargo into/out of containers.
Although this function is
performed primarily on domestic cargo, it is also carried out
on transhipment cargo. The Maintenance department in addition
CFS

AND

M AINTENA NCE DEPARTMENTS’.
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to being responsible for the maintenance of the Terminal’s
equipment, for which purpose it is staffed with engineers,
electricians, mechanics and so on, is the depository for the
Terminal’s spare parts inventory, which as mentioned above, is
administered by the Accounts Department.
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CHARXER

5

ANALYSIS OF KTO'S PERFORMANCE

The UNCTAD publication on Port Per-formance Indicators
^
highlights two broad categories o-F performance indicators;
those which answer the question of revenue versus cost
performance (Financial Indicators) and those which measure
output
and productivity
at the
Terminal,
(Operational
Indicators).
In this chapter, an analysis of KTO’s
performance
to date is
undertaken based
on available
statistics and an attempt will be made to highlight the
problems faced.
However, recommendations for
possible
solutions will be deferred to the final chapter in this
dissertation, since from the view point of the Author,
solutions require an integrated approach encompassing all
various terminal subsystems and not a piecemeal approach.

the

Applying the important
measures of cargo
handling
performance postulated by G. De Nonie =, the framework of
this chapter will look at the Terminal’s performance in terms
of:

and to complete

a)
b)

Output
Service

c)
d)

Utilization
Productivity
the picture,

the trend

in Terminal

tariffs

will be briefly analysed, the intention being to highlight the
possbile impact of all the above on the level of tarrifs. It

^

TD/B/C.4/131/Supp.1/Rev.1

system).

Basic Principles of Berth Operations
Iper, Lb Havre. Page 8.
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(Ship-to-Shore

will be readily appreciated that the four indicators listed
above are necessarily inter—related and the arguments for one
or the other will tend to overlap.
An evaluation

of OUTPUT entails not only the quantity of

work done in a particular period of time (throughput), but
also embraces an analysis of the quality of cargo handling
operation as manifested by such measures as moves per ship
working hour at berth and in port, and gang or crane output
per hour.
SERVICE quality tends also to be measured by
ship’s time in port (turnaround) and moves per gang hour.
Therefore, to prevent repetition, these two will be dealt
with together.
PRODUCTIVITY
will be analyzed separately,
while

the degree

of

UTILIZATION

will

be

mentioned

where

appropriate.

5.1
5.1.1

OUTPUT & SERVICE PERFORMANCE

THROUGHPUT
In

accordance

with

the

country’s

advantageous

geographical location relative to the trunk line shipping
routes, and her proximity to the Panama Canal mentioned in the
previous chapter, KTO targeted, as potential users of its
transhipment facility, the following services: ^
1.

Far East to US Gulf & East Coasts

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

US West Coast to Europe
US East & Gulf Coasts to Oceania
Europe to West Coast South America
Europe to East Zc Gulf Coast of North America
Eurpoe to Central America and Caribbean

7.

US to Caribbean & Central America

=*Kingston Port Development Study, 1985.
18.
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Pages V-1 to

V-

Obviously,
related to the

the potential traffic from each service is
degree of economic activity of the regions

concerned.
Thus given the burgeoning economic activity in
Asia and the resultant increase in trade between her and both
the developing and developed world, trade with the Far East
and between the US Gulf and East Coasts presented by far the
largest transhipment possibilities for Kingston.

The Terminal’s marketing efforts were therefore directed
primarily at the operators of these services. This strategy
was largely successful as the Terminal managed at a relatively
early stage to secure some of the largest operators on the
route such as ZIM and Evergreen Lines, which used Kingston as
their

only direct mainline port of call in the Caribbean; Zim

on its service between the Far East and Europe/Meditarranean
and Evergreen in its Round-The-Wor1d (RTW) service.
SeaLand,
another major operator used Kingston as a distribution hub for
regional cargo.
Appendix 5.1,
years (1980—1990).

shows throughput at the Terminal for 11
As depicted in figure 5.1 below, container

throughput experienced moderate fluctuations for the period
1980-1984 (average 5'/.) but enjoyed explosive growth for the
ensuing three years (rates of up to 54*/.) before suffering a
rather rapid decline (average 14%) to the 1990 recording of
88,113 - below the 1980 level of 95,273 !
It will also be observed that domestic throughput over
the period remained relatively stable, recording no dramatic
increases, except between 1987 and 1989 before declining in
the final year.
This is basically a reflection of the state
of the Jamaican economy for which very limited growth rates
(average 2%) were recorded.
The ’boom’ in 1988 can be
attributed to the influx of relief and reconstruction cargoes
following the 1988 hurricane.
Thus the norm in terms of
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Transhipment figures include.' restows.

Source: KTO Statistics.

OTHER

domestic tra.-f-Fic is relative stability.

A

look

at

-figure

5.2

detailing the

distribution

of

transhipment containers on a per line basis offers some
answers to the overall erratic performace observed.
In 1980
SeaLand accounted for over 78*/. of the transhipment traffic
handled at the Terminal.
It was already mentioned that
Kingston was of value to SeaLand as a distribution centre for
regional cargo. However, in the mid 80s the line transferred
its Caribbean distribution hub from Kingston to San Juan,
Puerto Rico (where it has leased its own Terminal) as the
latter was regarded as being more strategically located
geographically to merge the Line’s several services within
the
Caribbean Basin
Thus by 1987
there was no
transhipment activity from this line.
The

Terminal

however,

managed

to

stem

the

tide

of

decreasing transhipment traffic by securing Evergreen's use of
its facilities in its RTW service. Thus the remarkable levels
of growth experienced.
Again it will be noted that three
years after calling at the Terminal, Evergreen was responsible
for roughly 78*/. of total transhipment activity.
Whether it
was the nuisance of having its ships seized and fined (later
mitigated) by the US Customs for illicit narcotics or the
inefficiency of Terminal operations that led to the line
withdrawing its transhipment business at the port (the line
still calls for domestic traffic), the effect is the downward
trend in container throughput observed.
The point here is
that KTO has successively found itself in a position wherein
it relies on a single carrier (or a limited number) for the
bulk of its business and thus the loss of their patronage tend
to have a disproportionate impact on the Terminal’s traffic,
revenue and ultimately its profitability.

'^Kingston Port Development Study, 1985.
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Page IV-12

The only stabilizing
presence (in terms o-F volume
handled) has .been the ZIM Israeli Line which while exhibiting
comparatively modest growth (average IT/.)
has nevertheless
done so on a sustained level and is now, by virtue of default,
the port’s major carrier.

in

The question arises as to why Kingston has found herself
a position of relying heavily on a limited number of

carriers which subject to their

whims and fancies, results in

unstable throughput performance, and conversely, why hasn't
KTO sought to widen its base of users and so prevent such a
situation?
The rather obvious answer is that it has become
increasingly difficult for the port to attract new/major
operators due to:
1.

The impact of the US landbridge

2.
3.

Increased intef port competition, and,
Inadequate port facility ~ or rather poor
timing of investment .

Impact of the US landbridge
Initiated by American President Lines(APL), the use of
rail to transport containerised cargo between the Pacific and
Atlantic Oceans has gained popularity among other vessel
operators.
This is because sending the cargo by rail between
the US East and West Coasts saves upwards of 7 days ®
and
thus reduce costs and required fleet size, in comparison with
the all-water route via the Panama Canal.
This increased
usage of landbridge is highlighted by the fact that of the top
20 carriers in terms of TEU capacity (shown in the table 5.1)
only five (25*/.) do
not employ the use of the US land bridges
in their services.
If the fact that two of these ’non-users’

Structural Changes in Ocean Liner Transport: Prospects
S( Implications for Policy Formulation. UN Economic Commission
For Latin America & the Caribbean, 1987. Page 16.
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(Scandutch and SNCDV) have no service which would necessitate
the use o-f either the landbridge or the Panama Canal is
considered, then the percentage of these mega carriers which
have so far opted for the use of the bridge service jumps to
over BOY,.
TABLE 5.1
Top 20 Carriers in terms of TEU capacity as at March 25, 1990.
1
— 1in 1
No. of 1
1
1
CAPACITY
PANAMA!
U8
!
1
Ships
1
1
(TEU)
CANAL 1LANDBRIDGE!
I.
1
1
_
1__
1
1 EVERGREEN [
67
i
130,916
X
!
X
!
I
1 SEALAND
63
I
115,367
X
1
—
1
1
1 MAERSK
53
1
94,703
X
!
1
1
56
1 NYK
1
78,148
X
!
1
1
55
1 MDL
1
70,334
X
!
1
35
!
1 APL
1
66,380
X
!
1
1
30
1 OOCL
1
58,117
X
!
1
1
35
1 K-LINE
1
55,462
X
!
1
55
1 COSCC SHANGI
1
54,505
X
!
»
1
32
1 HAPAG-LLOYDI
1
53,178
X
!
1
1
25
1 HANJIN
1
49,621
X
!
.
I
26
1 P&O CDNTS. 1
1
49,368
X
1
1
|
20
1 YANBMING
1
46,817
X
!
1
46
1 ZIM
1
44,817
X
!
1
1
42
1 NEDLLDYD
1
40,335
X
!
1
1
59
1 BSC
1
36,760
1
—
j
1
• IS
1 NOL
1
35,294
X
!
I
—
1
20
1 SCANDUTCH |
1
32,948
—
1
—
1
1
40
1 SNCDV
1
31,204
1
27
1 CGM
1
29,040
X
!
1
JU
.
1
.
,1 _________ 1
SOURCES; 1. Containerisation International, June, 1990
Top 20 Carriers Consolidate, pages 46-50
2. Containerisation International Year book 1991

Another consequence

of the increased landbridge

usage is the

removal of restriction re vessel size which was formerly
dictated by the limits of the Panama Canal. Thus ships with
capacity in excess of 3,000 TEU are gaining in popularity and
it is significant that over 96% of such existing vessels
belong to these operators ^ and this could further explain

Containerisation International.
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June, 1990.

the preference for
as

KTO is concerned

landbridge usage.
however, is that

What this means

as far

a new approach

to the

marketing of the Terminal
will be required, since the
available business based on the port’s proximity to the Canal
is no longer a decisive advantage and there are precious few
mega carriers still utilizing the Canal service to get from
the one ocean to the next.
Increased Port Competition
Although the unit of measure in table 5.2 below is not
uniform among
the ports being reviewed,
the trend is
nevertheless obvious. While port activity at the Terminal has
suffered a decline over the 1988/89 period (and up to the
present) the trend among her major competitors has been that
of steadily ' increased traffic - with the exception
of
Cristobal which dipped from 128,000 TED in 1987 to 82,000 TEUs
in 1988 (most likely due to the political crisis at the time),
but has managed to stage a recovery in 1989.

TABLE 5.2
Containers handled at selected ports

1 '' ' ......... T—
1
I
1

1...

1 ........... I""*

1
1
1KINGSTON 1 12S,816i
1CRISTOBAL* 1
77,3011
ISAN JUAN* 1 940,4041
53,OSS!
ILIMON-MON 1
IMIAMI*
I 229,6141
1__________ ________ L.
IPDRT

19S5

19S6

“I

19S9
19SS 1
1
1
1
91,575
159,223i
lll,699i
S2,44 1
102,702
12S,5S2|
,107,77011 ,2S9,0011 1,334,053
N/A
67,1751
S7,27S|
337,961
223,6961 273,0771
1 ________ l_________ 1_

1
1
157,613i
102,7511
972,76611
60,6S3|
219,5241

19S7

* Reported in TEUs not containers.
Source: Extracted from Bremen Institute of Statistics 1990
It may be said that each of these ports, to varying
degrees, are also well located to carry out a transhipment
function. The argument also exists that Kingston has lost her
competitive edge due to the proliferation of ports in the
Caribbean now equipped to accommodate larger vessles, whereas
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as recent as 1985 Kingston was the only port with su-F-ficient
dra-Ft to accommodate the larger mainline vessels.
However,
there is strong evidence pointing to the -Fact that competition
is now, and will continue in the -Future to be, not so much
•From other Caribbean and 6ul-F ports but from an entirely new
range

of ports,

that is

those

on the

West Coast

of North

America.
This is particularly evident when it is borne in mind
that Kingston’s major transhipment business stemmed from cargo
which originated in the Far East and
destined for the
Caribbean
and this, based on the discussion above, has
largely been siphoned off by the rail services operating
between both coasts of North America.
Port facility and timing of investment
As hinted

at

earlier, the

loss of

Evergreen's

80,000

transhipment moves per annum was purportedly a result of the
rather costly inconvenience of having the Line’s ships seized
and fined by the US Customs, following the discovery of
illicit drugs in
containers originating from
Kingston.
However, based on discussions with a former associate of that
company
it would seem that the finding of drugs onboard
the vessel was merely the proverbial 'last
culmination of the general dissatisfaction with

straw’ - a
the level of

service and perceived commitment of the Terminal’s management
as manifested by the slow development of facilities.
This dissatisfaction may have had its origins not only in

■^Kingston Port Development Study, 1985.
IV-21.

Table IV-5, page

®
Prof.
E. Frankel was responsible for designing
Evergreen’s feedering network
in the Caribbean and had
occasion to visit Kingston. The Author held discussions with
him when he came to WMU in May, 1991 as a visiting professor.
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the relatively low productivity levels ( to be discussed later
on) but in the severe congestion experienced at the Terminal
during the 1986/87 period when Evergreen's activities were at
a peak.
The situation occurred where containers were being
stacked on every available pocket o-f space, which obviously
played havoc with their eTTecient retrieval and thus impacted
negatively on vessel productivity, translating into high
operating costs to the carrier. On a RTW service, a delay by
a vessel resulting in missed Canal appointment, is even more
costly than -for other services, since each ship and leg is
dependent on the other to ensure a high degree of cargo and
route linkages.
The rapid

throughput growth experienced

at the Terminal

no doubt would present difficulties for management to remedy
in terms of stacking space in the short term. However, the
fact that space for redevelopment was earmarked in the
Terminal's longterm development plan meant that it should have
been far easier for the Terminal to respond to this increased
demand.
This was however not the case.
After innumerable
petitions by the Terminal’s management to the PAJ (who it will
be recalled from chapter 4 has sole rights and responsibi1ty
for Terminal development) work was finally started on a new
area and completed in 1989.
By this time however. Evergreen
had already withdrawn its transhipment business from Kingston,
not favour^ing any other Caribbean ports, but instead using the
land bridge service for its eastbound service, using Kingston
as a feeder port though making direct mainline calls on its
westbound service before proceeding through the Panama Canal.

Thus with the now completed transit area the Terminal has
found

itself swinging form a position of congestion to one of

underutilization.
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5.1.2

SERVICE

According to the UNCTAD Monograph on Port Management
port per-Formance should best be assessed -For each area
activity. The major ones being:

0

"F

(i)
ship operations
<ii) cargo operations, and
(iii) inland transport.
Since the interest o-F this paper
concerns the transhipment
activities o-F the Terminal and Jamaica is an island, no
assessment of the performance of the Terminal re its inland
transport (receiving and delivery) function will be made.
The

most important

indicator of

the quality

of ship’s

operations in port, is the duration of their stay (Turnaround
time). It was mentioned in chapter 4 that the PAJ retains the
responsibility for such services as pilotage and towage. Thus
it has direct control over the time it takes the ship to reach
berth following its arrival at the pilotage station. That is,
phases 1-4 and 7-8 of the diagram displayed in figure 5.3.
KTO’s control is therefore at the point when the ship is at
berth.
An analysis of the number of hours ships spent
alongside for the period 1988-1970 are presented in Appendix
5.2. This can, in the absence of further data, effectively be
regarded as the vessel service time of the Terminal, even
though it is more probable that service was completed before
this time, but ship was awaiting outbound pilotage. Thus each
vessel spends on average, roughly 9.8 to 11.8 hours alongside.
Based on PAJ statistics, for the final quarter in 1989
(see Appendix 5.3) vessel turnaround time averaged .56 of a
day or nearly 14 hours.
Assuming their definition of
turnaround time

takes

into consideration

both

waiting

and

Measuring
&
Evaluating Port
Performance
&
Productivity, by G. De Monie.
UNCTAD/SHIP/494(6), 1987.
Para. 5.
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SBrvice time, then estimated waiting time -For the vessel is
about 3.7 hours or 38% o-F service time.
Given that the
optimal berth occupancy is one that gives a waiting to service
time ratio o-F between 20—30%
then the estimated waiting
time -For vessels would seem to indicate
some degree o-F
congestion. However, based again on PAJ statistics -For the
same period, we are given a berth occupancy averaging 28.16%
which, -For a 4 berth system entails <assuming random arrival)
an almost zero waiting time.
It is there-Fore logical to
conclude, based on these -Figures, that the waiting experienced
by ships in receiving a berth is not a result of berth
unavailability but rather delays in the provision of the other
port services
such as
pilotage or towage,
which are
compulsory.
Although the figures are not available to enable
an analysis of the waiting time for say pilots, suffice it to
say that if the prime concern of the Terminal’s management is
to reduce port cost to its carriers,
implying primarily
reduced turnaround time, then it must seek to influence the
various organizations in the port which affect the ship's time
in port.
The most popular and controversial measure of the level
of service to port users, is the moves per gang or crane
hours.
This is because it indicates the performance of
labour/equipment which has a direct bearing on the total
vessel service time.
A look at KTD's productivity report
for the period 1.01.90 to 28.02.91 for its major transhipment
carrier reveals that gross moves per crane hour (or gang hour)
averages just around
importantly,
in only

13 moves (see Appendix 5.4), or more
69.5% of the time can Zim expect a

performance rate in excess of 13 moves per hour of operation,
and only 2% of the time can the Terminal expect to achieve its
standard performance level of 20 moves per hour, depicted in
figure 5.4.

Therefore, if as the

Port
Development;
developing countries.

A
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statistics indicate, there
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FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION '

f ig u r e

5 .5

SCATTER PLOT OF PRODUCTIVITY
VESSEL SIZE:

Source:

ZIM (2 .1 .9 0 - 26.2.91)

KTO Productivity Report for period 1.1.90 to 28.2.91

is only a b u c c b b b rate of 2%, then an analysis of the reasons
for the divergence between targeted and achieved performance
levels is essential.
In

evaluating a

port’s performance

it is

important to

look at the various factors which may have contributed to the
observed level of productivity.
The relevant 1iterature’-^
suggests the following:
(i)
(ii)

Ship size & type
Total containers discharged/loaded per vessel
call
(iii) Weather conditions
(iv)
Port of call sequence in a given range
(v)
Balance or lack of balance between the
various terminal subsystems
(vi)
Motivation S< quality of container Terminal
personnel
<vii) Number, type & capacity of cranes employed on
a vessel
(viii) Stowage position in, 8< distribution over the
bays of the vessel
(ix)
Number of outsized containers
(x)
Lashing systems utilized for on-deck containers
(xi)
proportion of import/export/transshipment/transit
conta iners.
The factors which influence productivity of the ship
operations are therefore

primarily (a) ship related

and (b)

port related.
Ship related factors
Further analysis

of

the

productivity

levels

for

the

various vessels of call for Zim Line are as presented below:
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TABLE 5.3

VESSEL
NAME
-------------IZIM Haifa
Caribe II
Montreal
Ki ngstoniI
Genoa
Keelung
Savannah
Hong Kong
New York
Iberia
Tokyo
Pusan
California
Livorno
Amer ica
Ki ngston3
Canada

J

Sources: 1)
2)

All the

ROUTE
YEAR 1
SIZEI
DEPLOYED
BUILTl
(TEU)1
1
1972 i MED/EC-WCNA/FE
1,721 i
1983 1 Carib. Feeder
377 1
1973 I Med/EC-WCNA/FE
1,746 1
1979 1 Carib Feeder
431 1
1972 1 Med/EC-WCNA/FE
1,721 1
M
M
1981 1 n
2,224 1
1981 1
2,224 1
1973 1
1,746 1
1972 1
1,721 1
1982 1
2,224 1
1972 1
1,721 1
1981 1
2,462 1
1971 1
1,721 1
2,588 1 1976JB11
1
1
1990 1
3,039 1
II

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

It

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

II

AV GROSS
PROD./HR
9.4
13.0
10.6
11.6
10. 1
10.8
10.1
10.3
10.6
11.2
10.5
12.2
9.9
11.0
8.7
14.3
12.3

KTO’s Productivity Report 1.01.90 - 28.02.91
Containerisation International Year book 1990.
above listed vessels

are of the

Fully Cellular

type except the Zlm Caribe II which is Semi Cellular.
From
the Scatter Plot diagram
in figure 5.5, it will be observed
that vessels
of similar sizes tend
to record similar
productivity levels.
It will also be seen that productivity
for smaller vessels such as the Caribell are higher than that
for the mainliners. This may be explained by the fact that as
far as the smaller feeder vessels are concerned Kingston is
the first or
facilitating
operations,

last port of call in their itinerary, thus
easier
and
quicker
loading/discharging
while

as far

as

the

mainline

vessels

are

concerned, the Port represents the middle port in the range
(say the 10th) from the Mediterranean/East Coast/West Coast
North America/Far East.
Thus, high levels of restows are
evident regarding the mainline vessels with the complete
absence of any for the feeders.
The average of 10 to 11 gross
71

moves per hour on mainline

vessels is quite below average and considering that

these are

the more expensive ships (on a daily running cost basis), it
is important to look at the possible factors which affect
their

level of productivity.

It becomes apparent
• that these are primarily old ships
(first and second generation) with over 50*/. of them having
been built in the 1970s.
The result is a poorer level of
functional performance on areas such as hatch coamings and
lashing gears. Thus
a significant percentage of the delays
recorded are attributable to the ship.
The definition of
ship’s delay embraces dead gang hours (idle labour awaiting
vessel’s arrival) as well as delays caused during the opening
of bays, lashing etc. Popular figures for these ship related
delays run between 8-12 hours.
While this is in no way
conclusive evidence since it would be necessary to know
exactly how many of the hours stated are attributable to
defects in the vessel’s gears, the argument is
however
strengthened when the following is considered:
The feeder
ship Zim Kingston II was built in 1979 and averaged 11.6 moves
/hour as against the other feeder Caribell built in 1983 which
returns 13 moves/hour.
In 1991 the Kingston II was replaced
by the Kingston III, a newer ship and immediately productivity
jumps to 14.3 moves per hour.
While

theargument

for

the

correlation

between

productivity levels and age of vessels is no doubt valid,
it
is somewhat complicated by a look at productivity figures for
Evergreen (E/G) line (over
the same period) which has
substantially modern vessels,

reveals a very

low average

of

just over 11 moves with the modal being roughly 12-13 moves.
Here again, it must be pointed out that the report being
analysed indicates that of the 339 total hours delays incurred
in E/G’s 45 vessel calls, over bT.'/, was attributable to the
ship.
In order
then to have an unbiased view of the
Terminal’s productivity levels,
it is essential to take out
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%

the impact o-F

ship’s delay, the new level would

then re-Flect

the actual terminal per-formance.
Ideally, it would have been more profitable to be able to
deduct only the hours lost awaiting a vessel’s arrival, since
delays caused in unlashing and so on, while not being under
the strict domain of the Terminal, are indeed operational
delays and should be reflected in the productivity figures.
Further,

information

on

the

time

the

vessel

spends

awaiting pilots, tugs etc should be added to the dead gang
hours since such delays are the fault of the port if not
exactly that of the Terminal.
However, although these
refinements are not available in the data at hand, a clearer
picture of
the Terminal’s performance
is possible,
by
deducting the delay figures given as being attributable to the
ship.
The probability distribution depicted in figure 5.6,
shows that nearly

90*/. of the time

E/6 can expect

a handling

rate of 20 moves/hour with the average being about
certainly an improved picture if not exactly

16 moves the level

required.
Terminal related factors
Regarding

the

factors

pinpointed

above

as

having

a

possible impact on productivity, the Terminal has little or no
control. What the Terminal can and does have control over is
the performance level of its equipment, the balance between
the various Terminal subsystems and can certainly influence
labour productivity.

Equipment Performance
A high

degree of

equipment performance
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assumes minimal

&

downtime during operations and this in turn implies certain
preconditions, such as an effective preventative maintenance
programme, skilled engineering staff and availability of spare
parts on a timely basis.
The Terminal retains a highly
skilled and knowledgeable maintenance staff and a team of
these engineers are at the Terminal on a round the clock
basis.
There is also a preventive maintenace programme in
place.
It

is

found

however,

that

the

degree

of

success

attainable by this team is very much dependent on, or affected
by (a) the lack of spare parts and (b) the age of the ship to
shore gantries.
By the latter it is meant that the
maintenance of these cranes, due to their limited number,
tends to be carried out when they are free rather than when it
is scheduled. This is of course understandable, but added to
the fact that the machines are, as far as the ships calling at
the port are concerned, technologically obsolete (inability to
handle safely vessels with 5 high containers on deck), their
substantial ages and thus the performance condition, dictates
that a higher degree of maintenance is necessary to retain
historic performance.
During the 13 months examined, 26"/i of
the
delays reported
on
the productivity
report were
attributable to Gantry failure. The fact that these cranes
experienced reduced utilization (a result of reduced terminal
throughput) and thus should have more time for maintenance,
would seem to indicate that
difficult for the repair team

it is becoming increasingly
to keep them in operational

condition.
In contrast to the performance of cranes, less than 8'/. of
the operational delays were caused
equipment such as straddle carriers'.

by breakdown of yard
This is because these

are not only largely new, but are available in enough
quantities to enable rapid substitution in the event of a
breakdown. This brings home the importance of the existence

74

o-F some degree of excess capacity or slack in

the system.

To

be more explicit, the Terminal’s fleet of gantries falls way
behind the recommended minimum.
Given that 2 gantries are
needed for a single berth or on average 1.5 cranes per berth
for multi—berth terminals
it means for KTD’s four berths
the recommended fleet size is a minimum of 6 cranes. KTO up
until 1991 had only 4 cranes, averaging 1 per berth.
What
this means is that at no time can the berths be fully occupied
with any ship working more than one gang per ship. Given that
its a transhipment terminal, we should not only expect vessels
of a relatively large size, but in addition ensure them the
rapid turnaround they need to remain competitive.
This
implies the availability of at least 2 cranes per ship.
The
Terminal is considering extending its berthing
facilities by an extra berth but has recently only acquired a
single new crane, bringing the fleet up to 5.
But 5 berths
will dictate at least some 7 cranes.
It is very important
that the Terminal plans its development, not on an ad hoc
basis but taking into consideration the various elements which
make up the system - that is develop a model of the optimum
number/capacity
required for
each subsystem
bottlenecks and improve turnaround time.

to

reduce

Other factors affecting the ability of the Terminal to
produce a high level of service includes the layout of the
stacking area and the degree of illumination of the Terminal
at nights. In the case of the former, a few years previously
this was not

carried out

as would have

been desired by

the

operations team due to shortage of stacking areas coinciding
with surge in terminal traffic, and, as already been stated
severe congestion ensued which rendered any attempt at an
organized yard layout futile.
This' problem has largely been
solved by the

reduction in traffic,

Improving Port Performance
Development. UNCTAD S< SIDA Project.
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but more importantly

Container

by

Terminal

the paving

o-F additional area

to bring

the total

stacking

area to 6500 TEU.
The problem o-F

poor lighting has

been one plaguing

the

Terminal -For several years.
A use-Ful exercise would be to
plot the varying levels o-F productivity against the shi-Fts so
as to
see precisely, the impact o-F
illumination
on
productivity. Although one would normally expect lower levels
•For the night shift as against day even with perfect lighting,
the factor of poor lighting, in KTD’s case would undoubtedly
reflect itself in the observations of low productivity (below
13 moves) being recorded for the night shifts. Unfortunately,
the relevant data are not readily available, but suffice to
say that the Terminal’s managaement have long realised the
possible impact of inadequate lighting on the Terminal’s
performance and has been agitating for its upgrade. This area'
of investment
comes under the responsibility of the PAJ.
Work on this started in 1990 and it is hoped will be completed
in 1991.
Another nagging problem

suffered by the Terminal is that

of its surface condition. There seem to be the constant need
for repaving and remarking of the box slots. This undoutedly
has its effect

on costs,

service quality

and the

necessary

maintenance level required for the yard equipment.

5.2
The basic concept

PRODUCTIVITY

of productivity seeks

to establish

a

relationship between quantity and quality of goods or services
produced against the quantity of resources used in their
production.
The main indicator of improving productivity
being a decreasing ratio of input to output at constant
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quality ^= .
As a continuation in the analysis o-f KTO’s
per-FoKnianee, this section will be concet^ned, -firstly, with the
trend in Terminal costs and the various factors impacting to
produce the observed levels, and secondly, productivity of
both labour and equipment and the impact of these on Terminal
costs.
It is expected that from these analyses and
suggested reasons, a clear picture will emerge which will
indicate the measures which need to be taken to reduce costs
and improve productivity. .
If figure

5.1 showing

trend in container

throughput at

the Terminal is taken in conjunction with figure 5.7 showing
trend in total cost, it is immediately evident that while
throughput experienced differing degrees of fluctuation, costs
were for the main, constantly rising. Also, the period of
most intensive cost increases (19B4-1987) coincided with that
of increased traffic, which on a global scale tends to imply a
high degree of variable costs.
However, the fact that
plummeting traffic levels following the 1987 period recorded
only a slight decrease in total costs before it reverted to
the previous level, seems to suggest the opposite.
It should
be noted that for the peak year 1987 really represented
15
months spending pro rated and presented for 12 months for
comparative reasons.
It is therefore conceivable that
1987’s 12 month approximation could be more within the range
of say $55M and thus we would be faced with a constantly
rising cost curve, further solidifying the impression of
primarily fixed costs.
The breakdown of costs as displayed in figure 5.8 reveals
that of the five elements comprising the total cost the one
exhibiting the widest variation and one which is consistent

1=*
Productivity Management - A Practical
Joseph Prokopenko.
ILO, 1987. Page 5.

Handbook by

KTQ changed its financial year from Jan - Dec to
Apr-Mar in 1987. Thus the Audit covered 15 months.
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FIGUEIE 5 .7

TREND IN TOTAL COSTS
BY LINES (1980 -1990)
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FIGURE 5.8
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exhibiting the widest variation and one which is consistent
with the behaviour observed in total costs is the Direct
Expense category.
It represented the largest area o-F Terminal
expenditure,

standing at over

J$23M in 1986 or

47/i o-F total

cost.
The
represents

Direct
all

Operating
those

cost,

costs incurred

as

the
by

the

term
port

implies,
in

't:he

provision o-F its service to users and which would not have
been incurred i-F there was no tra-F-Fic at the Terminal, that
is, container handling costs.
It there-Fore encompasses costs
such as stevedoring, stripping & stuf-Fing o-F containers,
mounting and grounding and repair and maintenance costs among
others. As such this essentially represents variable costs
and by de-Finition should vary with the level o-F Terminal
activity.
Variable costs (vc)
seem only to be -Flexible
upwards and recorded only a
substantial one in throughput.

marginal decrease despite a
Thus the VC component o-F the

Terminal’s costs may be said to have evolved overtime into
-Fixed costs.
The reasons -For this are manyfold, and can be
partly attributed to constantly rising labour and equipment
costs fuelled by high inflation and the basis
of the
stevedoring arrangement in effect with TSL.
In chapter 4 it was mentioned that stevedoring operations
at the Terminal are carried out on a subcontract basis by TSL.
It was also mentioned that the straddle carrier relay system
was employed by the Terminal in the quay transfer operation.
What was however not stated was that the
leg of the quay
transfer involving movement from the apron to the stacking
area was also carried out by TSL with KTQ’s personnel being
utilized in the actual stacking. It is not clear whether this
arrangement is union dictated.
However, what is clear is
that KTD paid nearly J$7M in 1990 to TSL for this service.
This underlines the fact that substantial savings may
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be

carrier direct system -For its quay trans-Fer operations, as
this would
eliminate the need to employ TSL labour and
trucks.
Again, it is not quite clear .what the prevailing
arrangements are -For work allocation on the Terminal as there
exists some complex associations. For example, several o-F the
a-Forementioned trucks used by TSL are actually owned by the
PAJ and bought for use on the Terminal.
One would therefore
expect that these would represent equipment at the disposal of
KTO in much the same way as the straddle carriers and cranes.
KTO is however billed for their usage by TSL.
Before proceeding further, a brief description of the
basis of stevedoring charges will be instructive.
To repeat,
TSL is contracted by the Terminal’s management to provide
stevedoring labour which it in turn recruits (on a need basis)
from a central labour pool run by the SAJ. The labour engaged
by TSL from the SAJ are paid at the union negotiated rates.
TSL
itself provides the supervisory
personnel for the
stevedoring and switching operations. Therefore in the case
of stevedoring, KTO's payment to TSL has to cover wages and
fringe benefits of both these categories.
TSL bills KTO, based not on hourly basis, but at a fixed
cost per box moved. In the case of stevedoring it is the cost
per shift divided by the estimated number of moves per shift
(20 per hour for Lo-Lo and 10 for Ro-Ro)
The cost of
TSL supervisory personnel which represents a fixed annual cost
is recouped by charging KTD a rate based on their total cost
allocated over the estimated annual moves.
This charging practice is analogous to the Sliding-Scales
method.
According to the theory, the main advantage of

Internal Report on cost of services provided by KTO
.
Port charging practices by B.J.
Policy & Management 1978, vol.5 page 124
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Thomas, Maritime

t

this method is that "a productivity agreement is built into
the contract based on the knowledge that as per-Formance
measured in Cmoves/gang/hourl increases, so average total
costs -Fall".
Thus the rationale is that since revenue
received by the stevedoring company is based on box moves and
not hours, while its costs (primarily labour) are incurred
largely on a hourly basis, then by increasing the moves per
hour (higher productivity), that much less stevedoring cost
will be incurred by them -For a given revenue.
However,
interests o-F

the system breaks down simply because
the stevedoring company and
that o-F

the
the

stevedores themselves are diammetrica1ly opposed:
It is in
the interest of TSL to improve productivity but from a wage
point of view not beneficial to the stevedores.
This problem
is a result of the fact that the labour institution and thestevedoring company per se are separate entities and that
stevedores are wage earners and not salaried employees. This
of
course explains the
relatively
productivity achieved by the Terminal

stagnant
levels of
to date — around 13

moves per gross gang hours.
The Terminal's management to some extent attempted to
protect itself against this low productivity level by building
in the calculation of the stevedoring rate, a higher level of
performance (20 moves per hour) thereby penalising TSL for non
performance, and the intention being to create an incentive
for improved performance. However, the degree to which this
is

actually effective

is questionable.

It

is conceivable,

even logical, that TSL, faced with this situation and knowing
quite well the more
probable performance level of the
stevedores,
would make
allowance
for this
in
their
presentation of the overheads used in the calculation.

17“

Ibid. 16
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presentation o-f the overheads used in the calculation.
The

present

stevedoring

arrangement

offers

benefits for the Terminal. The primary being, it
carrying of stevedoring costs
as overheads.

certain
avoids the
This was

especially important during the
formative years of the
Terminal's life when keeping fixed costs to a minimum was
important.
Thus fluctuations in throughput would not result
in surplus or shortage of .labour nor in the Terminal incurring
huge losses. Maintenance of stevedoring labour as a variable
cost was therefore important. This strategy has backfired, in
that stevedoring costs are variable
upwards but highly
inflexible downwards and KTO may have to revise this strategy.
In

addressing

the

question

of

productivity,

it

is

essential to look at the efficiency of resource use, where
efficiency is from a port standpoint synonymous with cost
sffectiveness, usually measured as the cost per container
handled.
For the years between 1985 and 1990 cost per
container handled at the Terminal are as below:

TABLE 5.4
1985

I

I-----IDirect
IStaff
IPromotion
IA dm in.
IF inance
IProperty
I---------ITotal (J$)

1986

1987/88

1988/89

113.36
62.22
44.52
9.95
0.34
20.44

144.58
72.41
52.54
15. 13
0.37
22.10

188.02
108.85
73.34
34.90
0.37
29.16

261.IB
178.13
62.86
55.70
1.06
60.35

250.83

307.13

434.13

619.28

I---------------11ndex

173
247
122
I 100
1
KTO Audited Accounts for Years 1985-1990.

'"I
1989/901
283.351
253.521
61.141
70.221
1.781
72.631
------ 1
742.641
.. ^
296
I

I-------------

Source:

Basic Principles of Berth Operations,
Iper, Le Havre, 1985. Page 19.
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G. De Monie.

From a

cost standpoint

it

may be

said that

during

this

period the e-f-Ficiency o-f the terminal in terms o-F
cost
e-F-Fectiveness worsened dramatically with cost per box displaying
steep increases, re-Flecting in 1990 an almost 300% increase over
the base year 1985.

5.3

IMPACT OF COSTS ON TARIFFS AND PROFITABILITY

Be-Fore remarking

on’the impact o-F

port per-Formance on

the

level O-F tari-Ff, a brie-F commentary on the structure and
allocation o-F revenues is necessary.
The allocation o-F the
various port costs incurred by the Terminal’s users is shown in
Appendix 5.5. Except in the cases o-F wharfage (see discussion of
the Agreement in chapter 4) and stripping and stuffing, KTD is
not involved in the collection or billing for services which do
not constitute a part of its revenue.
Thus Harbour Fees,
Pilotage, and Towage are contracted by carriers directly with the
PAJ.
The general

structure and content of

the container tariffs

is simple.
Regarding the loading and discharging and quay
transfer activity, a single rate is quoted for domestic and
transhipment boxes respectively, regardless of box size.
The
rate for transhipment is a onp way rate, that is, discharge is
billed separately from loading. The loading/discharging rate per
box covers all activities from ship's side to transit area. Thus
there is no separate contract between the stevedoring company and
the carriers.
The flow

diagram

below summarizes

the container

handling

charges associated with various stages of the handling process.
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FIGURE 5.9
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HANDLING TARIFF

The PAJ regulates all tari-F-Fs used in the common user
o-F

the Island.

In

the case

o-F the Container

ports

Terminal, these

rates are reviewed biennually, jointly between KTO and PAJ.
The
approach taken in deriving the tariff may best be viewed as cost
based: The annual costs for the coming two years are estimated
and then
a form of sensitivity analysis is carried out,
increasing the existing rates by various increments so as to
ascertain the expected profit.
Here due concern is given to
continued competivtiveness of the Terminal’s pricing.
As with
all terminals competing for transhipment, the Terminal’s tariff
policy is one in which the domestic traffic subsidizes the
transhipment. The degree of subsidy tends to hover around 65/.
According
the

to the internal cost report

currrent cost

of handling

a box

carried out in 1990,

(including administrative

overheads) exceeds the transhipment
tariff.
This is not
surprising as, as can be seen in the appendix 5.6, while the
biennual increment of container handling tariff is relatively
modest (averaging 6 to 8 percent per review, or 3 to 4’
/. per
annum), increases in costs tend to be pretty dramatic.
For
instance, using 1985 as the base year,'transhipment and domestic
tariff recorded a 19’
/. increase for the 1987-1989 period while
total cost per box soared by 91’
/. for the 1988/89 fiscal year.
Naturally this has a deleterous effect on the Terminal’s profit
position and therefore investment returns.
In the same appendix
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a

steady

decline in

unit

profit

is evident,

almost

without

exception, for the years 1985-1990.
Given the need to remain competitive in the transhipment
arena, the Terminal’s first priority must be to restrain and
reduce costs along with improving service quality.
It may well
be that both can be achieved through more
efficient and
productive use of resources.
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MARKETXI NO

progressed

from

a

general

discussion of the impact of the trends in container shipping
on ports, to a more specific analysis of problems encountered
by a container terminal, KTO.
This chapter aims at
presenting an approach that can be, and indeed has been
adopted by many ports, in meeting the challenges of the
dynamic container shipping
environment - the
marketing
approach.
The aim is not to present marketing as a panacea
for all the port's problems.
Instead,
it is hoped that by
presenting a systematic yet integrative plan of action, the
marketing approach
applied
to ports,
and indeed
any
organization, represent an invaluable tool for analyzing the
market.
It therefore places the port in a better position
respond to or initiate changes to its benefit.
After looking at a definition of marketing and some
general marketing concepts, the focus of this chapter will be
to highlight the need for a marketing approach in ports.
By
so doing, it is intended that the ground work will have been
laid for the final chapter concerned with hov-j to develop a
marketing plan for KTO.
Therefore, the current chapter will
be dealing with the role and scope of port marketing while the
final will concentrate on the 'how to' or 'doing' aspect.6.1

A DEFINITION OF MARKETING AND GENERAL MARKETING CONOEPTB.
The term marketing usually conjures images of advertising

and other promotional efforts. While this is undoubtedly a
marketing activity,
it is not itself marketing.
Broadly
speaking marketing may be defined as "...the part of Cthel
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business concerned with the way in which a product is sold..."
This

implies

that

there

are

two

prerequisites

in

marketing the company’s product or services, namely
(1) a structure or
marketing department with
the
responsibility -for organizing, -Formulating, and executing
the -Firm’s marketing strategy, and
(2) the method or strategy itself.
Modern marketing

theory

which traces

the evolution

of

marketing from the periods of a role primarily restricted to
selling and distribution, today would tend to disagree with
this basic concept of marketing as "part of the business"
activity and instead advocate that "marketing is so basic Cto
the firml that it cannot be considered a separate function ...
it is the whole business seen from the point of view of its
final result, that

is, from the customer's point of

view". ==

The implications are that the organization of the various
activities of the company should be centered around and be
interrelated to the marketing department which then constitute
the hub ~ a modern marketing company.
Similarly,
there
are
distinct approaches
to the
arrangement or method of marketing.
These concepts may be
classified as
a)
b)
c)

the product concept
the selling concept and,
the marketing concept or more recently, the
social marketing concept.

Under the
efforts

on

the

product

concept

creation

of

the
a

firm

good

concentrated

product

^Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary
^Marketing Management by Philip Kotler, page 3
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under

its
the

assumptions

that, given

a good

product,

reasonably priced,

little marketing effort is required to achieve desired sales
and profit levels. The emphasis was therefore not so much on
the utility of the product to the consumer as a marketing
tool, but on quality/price trade-off.
This approach typified that taken by most port management
wherein, having developed their facilities, they resolved to
compete based on pricing and quality of service.
This
approach

was and still is to a

large extent valid.

But gone

are the days when the availability of well equipped and
competitively priced port facilities were hard to come by , or
conversely, when cargo belonging to the port’s hinterland
could be regarded as captive, and the demand for services
seemingly endless.
In addition to increased competition, this
approach is rendered further incomplete by the fact that while
cost/quality trade-off is still important, it now comprises
only one
process.

of the

many considerations

in the

port

selection

With the manifest deficiencies of the product concept
approach in meeting the firm’s goals, another concept was
developed, that is, the selling concept.
Here in contra
distinction to the product concept, the firm took the view
that its products would not be sold unless it approached
customers with a substantial selling and promotional effort.
Unfortunately, this approach normally meant a shift in
focus, with the creation of a quality product becoming
secondary.
For this strategy to work it would mean that
customers were
not too concerned with
quality and if
dissatisfied would not communicate this to other potential
users, and most importantly from a port stand point, that the
company was not dependent on repeat business.
In

the

above

two

approaches
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to

marketing,

the

product/service was developed with little consideration as to
the speci-fic needs o-F customers, and the predominant ■factor
was to achieve profit objectives. The marketing concept still
maintains this profit objective,
but sees it as being
achievable not merely through the development of high quality
reasonably priced products or through intensive selling and
promotional efforts but instead the emphasis shifted from
company-based to customer-oriented.
The key task of the organization was geared at the
identification of customer needs, wants and values and to
fulfilling these satisfactorily and more effectively and
efficiently than competitors, on a profitable basis. Customer
satisfaction was seen as the key to that of the organizational
goals.

Such an approach has several implications:
i)

the organization conceives of its mission in
terms of satisfying a defined set of wants of a
defined set of customers

ii)

active marketing research is undertaken to
determine these wants

iii)

a recognition that all customer-impinging
company activities must be placed under
integrated marketing control, and

iv)

the company believes that doing a good job
of satisfying customers, wins their loyalty,
repeat business and favourable word of mouth
promotion - all of which are crucial in
satisfying the organization’s goals.

The
element,

social marketing concept takes as an additional
the consideration of general public welfare in

responding to needs and wants of the market.
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Having

outlined the

evolution o-F

the

various concepts

under which -Firms carry out their marketing activities, it is
now possible to move -From a generic definition of marketing to
a more specific and practical one.
Marketing or more
accurately marketing management, can be
defined as the
analysis, planning, implementation and control of programs
designed to bring about desired changes with target markets
for the purpose of achieving organization goals.
Three
elements emerge as being essential to successfully marketing a
company;
i)

a product oriented to the customer’s needs and » ’

ii)

wants
a marketing organization or department, effective
in bringing the product/service in contact with the

iii)

potential customers, and,
a marketing plan, which identifies strategies and
responsibilities for implementing action programs
to

achieve organizational objectives.

Marketing

management thus

presents

a

unified plan__of

action for the achievement of organizational goals.
benefits to

be gained from such a unified

The major

plan of action are

threefold;
i)

It

engenders

activities within the

coordination

between

organization and thus

the

various

strengthens

it.
ii)

It allows

for the organization to

specify expected

development in the industry and thus use them to forecast
and plan.
iii)
As a concomitant of i) & ii) strategic marketing
planning eliminates surprises, and creates an effective
climate for managing change.
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and process o-f
strategic
The elements comprising,
marketing planning is set out in flow diagram below:
FIGURE 6.1
ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC MARKETING PLANNING.
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|
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{Execution of plans
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{fcllots up 4
Adjustssfit
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{Satisfactory
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Source: Rarketing Strategy & Ranagesent by P. Kotler, page 69, Prentice Hal!, 1976.

The essence

or

end product

of the

marketing

planning

process, is therefore to arrive at the optimal marketing mix
(that combination of
price, service range,
distribution
methods and promotional activities) with which to capture
potential clients. It represents all the organization’s plans
and policies towards and through which it seeks to influence
the market.
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6.2

THE ROLE OF MARKETING IN PORTS

Changes in ship size, transport cost and the need -For
intermodal interchanges have significantly affected the port
routing decisions of ship operators. The tendency is for a
large percentage of a region or country's traffic to be
concentrated at a few ports, especially in the deepsea trades,
from

which other

ports where

locations are

served.

well in excess of 50/4 of

There

exist mega

the traffic handled are

often not destined to or originating from their immediate
hinterland or even country. Witness Colombo, where 70/4 of its
containerized cargo is transhipment * .
The corollary is that
there are ports which will
experience undef— utilization by virtue of their traffic being
handled in another country's port.
In the case of non-island
states, the need for a port can all but disappear.
Based on the manufacturing concept of using marketing
techniques to stimulate demand, port management often tends to
view the role of marketing in ports as being limited to
increasi no the utilization of port facilities. While this is
no doubt a very important function, it nevertheless represent
a rather narrow perspective.
A more liberal view may be to
regard marketing in the light of imorovi no the utilization of
port facilities.
The distinction is subtle, but nonetheless
important. The former bears the connotation of increasing the
throughput, while the latter places•emphasis on the efficient
utilization of port facilities, including
a)

more efficient allocation of resources

b)

attracting new traffic

^
Sweden.

Lecture on Port Marketing by
August, 1991.
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E. Pollock.

WMU, Malmo

c)

Ksducing unl't cost of opsratlons and Ltlt,i(nat.elyy

d>

Improving the port's profit position.

An additional

and important function

of port

marketing

can also be identified. Viz:
e> Improving customer and worker relations.
It is within the context of these functions that the
relevance
of the planning process (or marketing scope)
described earlier, will be discussed.
r,.

6.2.1

.

- •

IMPORTANCE OF SETTING PORT OBJECTIVES
The existence

of a port selection

process (discussed in

chapter 1) implies that the choice of ports of call is not
fixed, but
subject,
in varying
degrees, to
external
influences.
This means there is scope for the port’s
management to influence the carriers and cargo interests
decision as to the ports to be used. The means by which it
seeks to influence their action must however be based on the
overall objectives of the port as derived based on a situation
audi t.
The need for clearly defined port goals and objectives is
very basic to its long term existence, since it represents the
company’s mission translated into precise targets and thus
serves as a powerful management tool.
It provides (a) the
people in the company with a specific sense of their role in
the company’s overall plan,
(b)
a basis for consistent
coordinated decision making
and planning among the various
echelon of management and stimulate or motivate action for
their achievement, and
(c) a basis from which to measure
actual performance and thus represents a vital control tool.
(5iven the

port’s mission, formulation
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of objectives (in

terms o-F what markets to target and with what services) should
include :
a)

Environmental Analysis & Forecast

b)
c)

Industry Analysis and competition
Analysis o-F Organizational Strengths & Weaknesses

d)

Development o-F Market in-Formation system

The analytic process just

described may be summarized in

the diagram below:

FIGURE 6.2
PROCESS OF STRATEGIC PLANNING
^

»

-

'

<

•*

'•

SDurcE! UNCTAD Sesinar papers on Strategic Planning for Senior Shipping Hanagers

The

mission oF ports may

often not be stated explicitly

but may be deduced based on the policies
adopted.
R. 0. Goss identifies three

or
objectives
frequently stated

objectives of seaports
Namely,
i) to increase employment in the locality
ii)
iii)

to maximize profits, and,
to create added value through economic efficiency.

Moving from the

broad policy objectives,

•^Economic Policies &
Management 1990. vol. #17.

Seaports: 1.
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ports need _ to

Maritime

Policy

&

analyze
the market
opportunities lie and

to determine
where the
in order
how to respond to them. Based on the

process outlined above, the first step is an analysis o-F the
present environment and -Forecast o-F its -Future behavior.
6.2.1

ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS

FORECAST

The demand -For port services is derived based on the need
to transport goods -From one country to another or within a
country through the use o-F maritime transport.
There-Fore key
•Factors which in-Fluence the demand -For port services are
necessarily those that a-F-Fect trade in general.
Such as
general state O'F the national regional and global economy,
commodities traded, shifts in pattern of trade, political
events, currency fluctuations and so on. These were discussed
in chapter 3 and may be summarized as follows:
-

World economic growth is expected to average around

-

3% annually to the year 2000.
The trend to the organization of regional trade

-

blocs.
New trade opportunities in Eastern Europe.
A shift in trade flow between USA and her trading
partners in an effort to reduce the balance of
trade

deficit.

-

Weakening of the US dollar.
Trend in larger ship sizes, and non-standard ISO

-

boxes.
Liner trade is expected to average a rate of
growth, half that of the 11'/. expected for trade in
general (see chapter 3, page ).

Another

factor to be

added is the short

term impact of

the increased oil prices as a result of the recent Middle East
war, on
the economies
of oil
dependent non-producing
countries.

It

can

be

expected
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that

this

will . impact

negatively on their economic growth and there-Fore trade.
The above macroeconomic environmental conditions hold
several implications for ports, which was also underlined in
chapter 3.
The most significant however, is the fact that
cost efficiency will in the future be emphasized as the
decisive factor in port survival, especially in the face of
declining freight rates and the regionalisation of trade which
can render the use of larger ships not as cost effective from
a carrier stand point, as originally anticipatedThe port’s
management has to decide whether the objective should be
towards say, providing the highest possible service, or the
most economical — being a trade off between, service and
quality.

6.2.2

INDUSTRY ANALYSIS & COMPETITION

"The essence of formulating
competitive [marketing!
strategy is relating a company to its environment. ...the key
aspect of the firm's environment is the industry or industries
in which it competes." ®
An industry analysis includes
therefore, a look at the company itself as well as the various
actors in the industry which shapes its performance.
These
analyses will therefore look internally to pinpoint the
organization’s strengths and weaknesses, then externally to
identify opportunities and threats in order to formulate the
appropriate strategies so as to minimize the impact of threats
and or maximize the opportunities.
The internal analysis includes:
a)

identification of the company’s major activities and
its

customers

=Note on the Structural Analysis of Industries by Michael
E. Porter Harvard Business School (376-054). 1975. Page 1.
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b)

customers' requirements "From the organization and
the price they are willing to pay. From a carrier
standpoint, the decision to transship is based on
the trade-o-F-F between the cost o-F making additional
call (with a larger more expensive vessel), loading
and discharging relatively small volumes o-F cargo,
and the cost o-F discharging a series o-F smaller
consignments at one port and using smaller ships or
inland
transportation to convey them to -Final

\

destination.
the choice
combination

Therefore as discussed in
of transhipment
of operational

chapter 2,

port must represent a
efficiency anxd
low

overall port costs. Indeed it is the former which
by impacting on vessel turnaround time that is of
great importance.
Cargo interests

are concerned with speedy

and safe

transit of cargo through the port at minimum cost. .
Operational efficiency itself assumes the provision
of adequate port facilities and a well trained and
highly
services
secondary
virtue of

motivated labour force.
Price of port
must
be
distinguished
from and is
to port costs to the users. The latter by
including ship’s time, reflects to a great

extent operational efficiency.
c)

the company’s aspirations in the market place

d)

identification
weaknesses in

of the
meeting

company’s strengths
and
customer needs relative to

competitors
e)

Legal/political constraints which will affect future
growth and development.

An assessment

of the

other
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actors in

the

market

who

compete with the company present invaluable guidelines as to
what approach, in
terms o-F marketing strategy, is to be
pursued.
However, since the determinants o-F
pro-Fitabi 1ity are
the various -Forces
which
industry’s competition it is important not to

the -Firm’s
drive
the
con-Fine the

analysis only to competitors, but all the forces which affect
the port’s ability to compete. Michael E. Porter identifies
five major forces
which drive industry competition, as
diagrammed below: ^
FIGURE 6.3
COMPETITIVE FORCES OF AN INDUSTRY

Threat of Entry
New

entrants

to

an

industry

adds

new

capacity

and

reallocate and or reduce market shares. The threat of entry
depends on the barriers to entry.
Six major barriers to
entry:
a)
b)
c)
d)

economies of scale
product differentiation
capital requirements
access to distribution channels

Ibid 4.

Page 2.
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e)
-F)
Based
concluded

other cost advantages
Governmen-t policy.
on

the

six

-Factors

that there are no

listed

above,

it

may

be

substantial barriers to entry in

the Port Industry. In that, it is di-Fficult to use a strategy
based on di-Fferentiation and while capital requirements are
substantial, governments and international
are
willing to give ’so-Ft loans’ -For

lending agencies
port development.

Government intervention through subsidies can also render a
cost ine-F-Ficient port, price competitive. Government policies
regarding permission to develop port -Facilities, by virtue
limitation o-F jurisdiction, tend to deter new entrants only in
the domestic arena.
The port industry is in a no
regard, since
while there exists

win situation in this
relatively
low entry

barriers, the market is still not contestable.
This is so
despite the -Fact that there exists possibilities to sell port
equipment and reutilize port lands (often prime land), because
governments usually prefer to continue subsidizing a port than
have it closed.
This attitude is often a function of the
importance of the port
and port related industries as
employers of labour as well as the fear of depending on
another country/port to handle its trade.
Competitive Rivalry
Rivalry

occurs because

one or

more

competitors either

feels the pressure or sees the opportunity to
improve
position.
It normally takes the form of price competition,
advertising battles, product introductions
and increased
customer service."
The degree of competition in the
industry is dependent on:

■^’Ibid 4.

Page 8.
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a)
’ b)

number o-F competitors, their size and relative
power
rate o-F industry growth'

c)
d)

level o-F -Fixed costs
degree to which product di-F-Ferentiation is

e)
■F)

possible
high exit barriers
capacity

The port industry is

characterized by a prol iferation o-F

ports o-F varying sizes with the top 10 accounting -For over 40%
o-F total throughput in 1989 . ®
The port recording the
largest throughput (TED) in 1988 was the port o-F
Hong Kong
with over 4 million TEUs representing a market share o-F 5.5%.
KTO was itself ranked 42nd in the world container port traffic
league, with over 180,000 TEUs representing a .25% market
share.

The big

ports in the industry do

not compete overtly

on the basis of price, but rather on service innovations and
performance standards. Relatively speaking, the dominance of a
port

is limited largely to the region

it is in and the trade

of that region.
After recording double digit rates of growth in the 1980s
liner traffic growth is slowing considerably - a result of the
declining possibilities for further containerisation of trade,
especially in developed countries.
This coupled with the
larger number of container facilities in existence and those
coming on stream, is a recipe for increased competition
especially for transshipment traffic. The highly mechanized
nature of container port operations dictates a high degree of
fixed costs which in turn affect pricing strategies. Added to
(d),
(e) and (f)> it is evident therefore that the port
industry is a highly competitive one.

®Containerisation International Yearbook, 1991.
99

Substi tutes
While there are no direct substitutes for port services,
ports by virtue of being the interface between land and sea
transport

are nevertheless affected

by factors

which reduce

the need for this interface.
In the case of KTO., the use of
the US Landbridge as against the Panama Canal has resulted in
the restructuring of trade routes and decline in the demand
for KTD’s services.
Bargaining Power of Users
.

•‘

i.'V

,

'Buyers or customers compete with the industry by forcing

down prices, demanding higher quality or more services, and
playing competitors off against each other - all at the
expense of industry profitability'
.
This quote aptly
describes the position of
ports today with respect to
carriers.
The fiercely competitive nature of the port
industry gives port users and in particular carriers, enormous
leverage in terms of dictating the service quality and
significantly influencing the price the ports charge.
That
this erodes port profitability is evident.
Huge investments
are undertaken by ports to achieve or retain the competitive
edge.
At the same time
significantly increased to

the level of tariff
provide a reasonable

investment, relative to cost of capital.

cannot
return

be
on

For example during a

study tour to the port of Rotterdam, it was mentioned by a
speaker from a stevedoring company that one of the biggest
stevedoring companies on the port records a turnover of
several billion US dollars, yet makes a profit of a couple
million. This would seem to indicate the cut throat nature of
the competition which forces such high cost levels, or a need
for cost controls. Carriers are made even more powerful when
their contribution. to the port's traffic is a large proportion

Note on Structural Analysis of Industries by Michael
E. Porter. Havard Business School (376-054). 1975. Page 12.
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d

-F

total Terminal tra-F-fic.

Bargaining Power o-F Suppliers
From a

port stand point, the most important and power-Ful

suppliers are the stevedoring bompany and labour unions.
Terminal Operators rely on stevedoring companies to provide
well trained and motivated labour -Force at an economic cost.
Thus both its operational and cost e-Fficiency relies heavily
on the stevedoring companies. Also the power o-F unions cannot
be overemphasized. Tightly unionized labour can bargain away
the competitive position o-F ports as demonstrated by the. UK
experience under the Dock Labour Scheme. It was shown that
with the present labour arrangement on the Terminal, KTO -Finds
itsel-F in a position o-F dwindling pro-Fits in the -Face o-F high
labour costs, while increasing labour unrest is serving to
undermine
the credibility
of the port
and ultimately
throughput.
By

setting port objectives, it

not only provides a plan

of action and means of management control, but by virtue of
dictating an analysis of the port’s current position and the
prevailing
environment in which it operates,
it forces
management to make assumptions and forecasts of the future
behavior of the market. They are therefore in a position to
better

seize any

market

opportunities

that

may

arise

or

mitigate the impact of any threats. This assessment of the
competitive position of the port is referred to as the SWOT
(Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) approach
and is an essential step in formulating port objectives and
therefore, marketing strategy.

6.2.2

MARKET OPPORTUNITY ANALYSIS IN A PORT CONTEXT
Market opportunity analysis aims at identifying scope for
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•future growth and development of the port, by examining trends
in the market and evaluating whether opportunities exist which
can be exploited on a profitable basis.
Generally speaking,
the opportunity -for a port to grow will depend on the vibrancy
o-F the national economy’s trade and the existence o-f good port
infrastructure at competing ports. It will also depend on the
region’s trade and the efficiency of the transport link
between the various countries.
It is the latter which will
provide transhipment possibilities for ports.
In searching for transhipment opportuni.ties the following
considerations are applicable:
_

#

•

i)
ii)

what are the transhipment motives of carriers,
and,
how the port can cater to these needs.

E. Pollock
highlights the following as being the
major driving force behind a line’s decision to transship:
-

rationalization of services, reduction on costs and
increasing operational flexibility

-

logistical
advantages such as the
containers between different services

exchange
operated

of
by

the same line or consortia.
This also widens the
market
served,
by
increasing the
number ' of
destinations that can be reached from one port.
sufficient reduction
size can be reduced
-

of ship’s

time so that

fleet

where
the geography of certain countries, for
example
those with long coastlines and high inland

Based on a discussion with Prof. Pollock during
authors visti to London, March, 1991.
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the

transport

cost,

ports, so
each port
-

may necessitate calling at several

-Fragmenting

the cargo

when an existing service is
for extra cargo

availability of

operating with capacity

-

when extra capacity is planned either in the form of
larger vessels and or additional vessels, making
possible increases in service frequency.
Such
situations increase the need for extra cargo, hence
, the search for additional markets

-

possibilities also arise when lines are introducing
new services, which may still be at a formative
stage of development

-

conditions
direct calls
concerned.

at

other ports

which preclude

less favourable as far as

or make

the line is

Additionally, the trend in shipping services offered by
carriers to shippers can offer a port scope to carry out a
transhipment role. More and more carriers are catering to the
needs of shippers in other respects than mere transportation.
Thus keeping

abreast of the latest developments in this area,

will also indicate the future role expected of ports.
6.2.3

DEVELOPING A PORT MARKET INFORMATION SYSTEM

In order to carry
out the foregoing analyses, an
efficient and up to date' market information system
is
essential. Decision makers must constantly be on the alert
for leading indicators of business activity, signals and signs
that will alert them to possible changes, new markets, changes
in competitors’ strategy, or general development in the
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overall environment holding dangers or opportunities -For the
•Firm. Because marketing is the firm’s response to external
opportunities, marketing decision making is disastrous without
accurate information to evaluate those opportunities.
Marketing research can be defined as the systematic
gathering, recording and analyzing of data in order to assess
problems and opportunities related to the marketing of the
s services.
Diagrammed below are the components of a
market information system.

*
'

6 .4

■

■

‘
PORT MARKET INFORMATION SYSTEM

EIWIROISMENT

IIVFDRMATION SYSTEM

Macro Environment
-

■ figure

economy
technology
legislature
politics

Port Industrv
- customers
- competitors
- suppliers
1

Flow

^

STRATEGIC USE

Port
Statistics
data

-St*'

PLAN
data

Intelligence
system

EXECUTE
Flow

Marketing Research
system

CONTROL

_____ I L J '
COMMUNICATION FLOW

Adapted from: Marketing Management by P. Kotler page 421

,A good port data base will need to provide information to
enable management to pinpoint:
its major customers and traffics, in
volume and profitability
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terms of both

general -financial per-formance o-F the port
operational data regarding capacity and manpower
-

activities or developments planned by ' competing
ports which can a-F-Fect
demand -for the port's
services

~

current and -future changes in the pattern and volume
o-F

.

trade -for particular countries and a regions

operating strategies . o-F major carriers, including
present and targeted users of the port’s facilities
financial position and market share of current and
potential customers
governmental
port.

regulations

that

will impact

on the

Some of these data are available from the port’s
accounting system, while others will dictate the need for
external market research.
Appendix 6.1 tables some important
sources of shipping industry information, while Appendix 6.2
provides some considerations in carrying out a frequently used
market research technique in the shipping industry - postal
market surveys.
Having reached the point of identification of objectives
in the context of market opportunities versus the port's
present position, the next step is to devise the strategy
(plans) to achieve the objectives.
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6.3

DEVELOPING THE MARKETING STRATEGY

The development o-F a marketing strategy or plan o-F action
involves two basic steps.
The -First is the selection o-F
target markets and the second, the development
marketing proarama to win these markets.
6.3.1

o-F e-F-Fective

MARKET SEGMENTATION & TARGETING

Market segmentation is • the process whereby management
tries to identi-Fy di-F-Ferent user groups who would probably be
most receptive to using the port’s -Facilities, and so target
them -For their marketing e-F-Fort. By selecting target markets
the port is able to utilize its resources more e-F-Ficiently by
-Focusing on a specific group’s needs and wants.
In the
selection of market segments the following criteria must
apply:
i>

measurable

ii^

access ible so that the firm can focus its efforts at
it. Chances of success must take account of, and.
identify how satisfied the target is with their
present port of call.

iiiJ substantia1 enough to be exploited on a profitable
basis. This is important since it would not be cost
effective nor profitable to develop the service for
a segment too small to offer favourable return on
required investment.
Market segmentation also
involves selecting
target
markets, since it . is not possible to pursue all traffics due
to resource limitations; there is little point in winning new
business only to lose existing customers due to congestion or
lack of capacity.
In selecting
target markets.
due
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%

consideration

must

be given

to

the

existing (and

planned

increase in ) capacity.

Rasas o-F Port Market

Segmentation and Ta>"netlnfl

Market segmentation -for ports will -Firstly be geographic,
based on trade patterns and the port's proximity to the
various trade routes. This will then be narrowed according to
the type and

-form o-F commodities being traded, and

those the

port is interested in pursuing.
Dividing the

market on

a-commodity basis

is especially

useful in the port development phase, since the type and form
of the commodities to be handled would largely determine the
type of facilities required.
Similarly, it provides a useful
indication of the types and probable sizes of ships that can
or are expected to use the port facilities.
Commodity
classifications which will
affect and dictate
terminal
facilities and thus serves as a useful basis of segmentation
are;
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)

dry bulk cargo
liquid bulk cargo
general cargo break bulk
containerized cargoes: dry and refrigerated;

Ro-Ro

and Lo-Lo.
Since the port cannot take its services to the lines, the
factor of deviation distance (and therefore cost) to call at a
port will influence the carriers decision and so must also be
considered by port management.
Another factor is
the
strategic location of

the port to blend in with

the carriers-

overall operational strategy -does the port afford smooth
connections between the various inter-1inking services of the
carriers?
Based on these, specific carriers and cargo
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interests may be targeted.
^t
was previously mentioned that a market segment in
order to -Facilitate success-Ful targeting without wasting
resources must be viable.
the various possibilities

This means that
is essential.

an evaluation o-F
Estimates o-F

potential tra-F-Fic volume and income level, the port’s cost o-F
pursuing and servicing
this market and ultimately, the
expected contribution o-F this market segment to the port s
overall pro-Fitabi 1ity is essential.
6.3.2

CONSIDERATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PORT MARKETING
MIX
The marketing

mix represents

the various

media through

which any organization seeks to secure the patronage of the
target market.
In general, these are identified as being the
price, product/service, distribution channels and promotionalefforts.

In

a port

setting, these

therefore comprise

the

combination of:
i)

service quality and range

il)
Hi)

tariff levels, and
selling and promotional activities.

Distribution refers to, the various channels through which
the product or service reaches the customer. The simultaneous
production and consumption of port services necessarily means
that the distribution is embedded in, and a part of the
service.
For this reason, considerations regarding the
service, incorporates that of its delivery.
6.3.2.1

PLANNING PORT SERVICES

Planning the range and level of port services in the
marketing mix entails ascertaining whether the present quality
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This -Fact would have
level is as desired by customers,
emerged -From the analytic process based on market research.
It a ^ o involves setting targets -For service quality, in terms
of (a) productivity levels and (b) maximum vessel waiting
time.
Since
productivity levels
are
functions
of
the
performance of labour and equipment, due consideration needs
to be given to labor motivation, remuneration and training,
and

equipment supply

and maintenance.

Other

factors which

impact on productivity such as imbalance between the various
subsystems of the port will need to be taken into account and
plans made to address these.
It may be that changes will need to be made in the
operational planning.
Especially in the container shipping
industry where the vessel's
daily cost is high, rapid
turnaround is vital.
This is not only a function of
productivity alongside berth, but of total time in port.
It
therefore becomes essential to also minimize the time spent in
port before receiving a berth. Other services which impact on
the ship’s stay in port such as pilotage, towage and customs
documentation may need to be considered for improvement.
Additionally, it

may

be

that

there

exist

inadequate

berthing space, which may indicate the
need for
new
investment.
At this point the need for targets being set
cannot be over emphasized. While the ideal situation from a
carrier perspective is zero waiting time, which means the
availability of a berth at all times, it is not feasible to
provide the needed numbers due to investment cost to the port.
The port needs to establish the maximum time it can afford
to have ships waiting, bearing in mind the need to satisfy
customers so as to retain their business. Based on this, some
notion of the required number of berths needed can be gained.
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Improvement o-F service to users may also be looked at
through more involvement of the port in the through transport
'Hk

process. It may be through providing information to users
about alternative modes of transporting cargo to and from the
port (feedering services, rail and road) and some indicative
costs. It may be that there is a need to get involved in the
actual arrangement of on-carriage either through contracts or
direct investments.
The decision will need to

be made as to whether the port

should seek to increase customer satisfaction and entice new
users by offering new services,*
such as EDP logistics and
distribution services.
Some ports have seen the benefits in
terms of improved customer service and operational planning,
of establishing links with ports on the opposite end of their
trade. Ports such as Hamburg, Bremen and Rotterdam have set
up EDP links with their opposite number in Asia and the United
States (Singapore and the port of New York).
This ’data
bridge’ gives instant information to customers on,cargo flow,
while by providing data on the number and type of containers
to be shipped to the port, the identity of consignees and a
breakdown of the status in terms of FCLs and LCLs, it affords
the port a higher degree of operational pre planning.
The cost benefit trade off needs to be considered as well
as whether the existing level of port competition requires it.
Clearly,
if
the major competitors have gained an edge by
offering this facility, it may be that it will constitute an
important service improvement feature for the port, in order
to avoid loss of business, and so the benefits will outweigh
the cost. On the other hand, if it does not already form a
part of the existing competitive arsenal, then the decision to
pursue its development must rest on the financial costs to be
incurred versus additional revenues to be gained.

no

6.3.2.2

PORT PRICINB POLICIES

Port tari-f-Fs represent the remuneration to the port -for
its various services, and in the case o-f ports operated on a
commercial basis, represents the means o-f achieving its
-Financial objectives.
While the prices o-F the various port
services are usually stated in a published tari-f-F (see
appendix 6.3), in addition to planning the tari-f-f level,
consideration should be given to the need -For a -Flexible
pricing policy.
<i)

This may be in the -Form o-f:

incentive rebates -For large throughput customers;

(ii) lower rates to encourage new tra-F-Fic and
(iii) incentives or penalties to encourage e-f-Ficient
utilization o-F port -facilities.
A prerequisite to employing

a flexible pricing policy is

a knowledge of port costs.
It is important to know how low
charges can go if necessary, without being uneconomic.
If it
is desirable that each traffic/customer make a contribution to
the overall profitability of the port, then this will dictate
the minimum price be at least above direct costs.
A position on the desirability of special agreements with
individual customers re tariffs will- need to be taken:
some
customers may prefer the simplicity of a consolidated rate
while others prefer detailed breakdown-so that they have scope
to arrange their operation in order to minimize outpayment.
It is important for the port's management
to have policies
that respond to these needs, since it may affect the user's
confidence in the port. Considerations as to special charges
to encourage different traffic is also necessary. For example
lower charges for transhipment versus domestic cargoes.
Due note must also be taken of the charges at competing
ports (if available).
This will indicate the scope for
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•further increases, especially

regarding increased charges

in

light o-f additional investment in improved port -Facilities.

6.3.2.3

SELLING & PROMOTION OF PORTS

Before

looking at

the factors to

be considered

in the

port selling and promotional effort, a distinction needs to be
made between marketing and promotion.
Marketing has been
defined as the analysis, planning, implementation and control
of plans aimed at satisfying port users. It involves devising
that combination of service variety and quality, price and
promotional activities, that will do so effectively.
This
means that promotion and selling is only one of the activities
necessary in marketing the port.
Promotion

and selling

involves

the

overt

efforts

to

increase customer and the public awareness in general, and
usage of the port. Typically, a port will consist of several
companies - competing and complementary.
It is here that the
distinction becomes important since it also dictates the
division of the marketing effort. the role of promoting the
entire port is normally the function of the Port Authority or
an
association of
port companies
(terminal operators,
stevedoring companies, Agents, forwarders, truckers etc.).
The
port

task of promoting and
company,

say

a

securing business for a particular

terminal

operator,

must

be

the

responsibility of the latter.
Port authorities and
and

associations increase awareness

of

generate interest in the port and can secure business for

the port in general but should not allocate it to the port
companies. For this, the individual companies should compete.
While this arrangement does not preclude individual companies
carrying out their own promotional activities to secure
business, it does save costs and provide an integrated picture
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o-F all the various port services to potential users.
Such
port bodies as the Port Authorities are therefore, allowed to
solicit business but cannot conclude contracts or set rates
though they may regulate it.
Whether promotion and selling efforts are being carried
out at the port or company level, consideration has to be
given as to whom the effort is to be directed at : shipowner,
shipping agents, exporters,
importers, forwarding agents,
marketing boards and so on.
This will depend on their
perceived power (based on market research
influence or control port routing.
f

information)
,

to
■
.r

The effectiveness of
different target audience
cannot be over-emphasized,
point. For example the use

the various media type for the
is also important.
This point
from both a cost and impact stand
of television advertisements might

be appropriate in a public relations effort but
quite
inappropriate compared to say trade journals, for reaching
potential users.

6.4

ROLE OF THE MARKETING MIX IN ACHIEVING PORT OBJECTIVES

The next phase of the planning process is to develop the
actual marketing strategy for the port."
This involves the
development of the marketing mix based on the objectives, and
markets targeted. The final marketing plan must also consist
of:
a)

targets and projections (in terms of TEU or tonnage)
by traffic types

b)

a budget of both financial and human resources to be
expended in the marketing effort, and
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c)

a

statement

allocating

the

marketing

actlvitlBB

among the various elements of the mix.
As

can

be

seen,

this

represent

the

actual

plan

formulation phase, which, as stated earlier, is the concern of
chapter 7. In this section, the role of the marketing mix in
addressing some of the concerns of ports will be explored.
Earlier, these concerns were identified as (a) more efficient
utilization of facilities and (b) improvement of customer and
worker relations.

6.4,1

The role of the marketing mix in improving efficient
port utilization

Inefficient usage of facilities may occur as a result of
excess capacity or too high a level of usage, which results in
congestion or alternating situations of peaks and troughs in
usage.
In the case of the existence of excess capacity the
aim will be to attract new, and of course, profitable cargoes.
In the case of the latter, the need may be to increment
capacity.
Judicious manipulation of the marketing mix can
delay or reduce the need for new investments or attract new
traffic to the port.
The fact that port services cannot be produced and stored
ahead of demand, and that ship arrivals are not always
predictable and will often tend to bunch, means that port
facilities will experience periods of under-utilization and
congestion. Seasonal demand for port services may be smoothed
by pursuing a pricing policy wherein lower rates are charged
for usage during the off-peak periods. This should serve to
shift or spread some of the demand and so reduce congestion
and the need to increase capacity.
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Alternatively, it
turnaround o-F vessels;
i)

may be possible to

by calculating

encourage a -Faster

ship related charges

based on

time

spent alongside.
Increasingly, this is being used
and is more e-F-Fective the shorter the time -Frame -For
the charge.
For example, charges based on hourly
rates would be more e-F-Fective than a daily charge.
ii)

higher tari-FFs may be levied on vessels lying
alongside port facilities and not working cargo.

iii) higher rates may also be levied for vessels working
slower than average -'
iv)

incentives
despatch:

can also be given to encourage rapid
For example, port Klang in Malaysia

offers a reduction in wharfage charges for vessels
of certain size which leave the port in under eight
or six h o u r s . A n o t h e r
basis which might be
more fruitful from a port management point of view,
is
to offer
similar reductions
to different
categories of ships, but also based on the quantity
of cargo worked per call,
since the time spent
alongside is also a function of the cargo volume to
be handled.
Another example, is the strategy used
by Singapore and Kaoshung <Korea) wherein ships not
leaving berth within say two hours after completing
work, pay extra charges, which can amount to five
times normal charges.
All these represent
effective methods of persuading more efficient usage
of berthing space.

*‘
Lecture
August, 1991.

on

Port Marketing

by

E . ' Pollock.

WMU,

Similarly, more
made by shortening

efficient usage of storage
the free periods

areas can be

and using an

escalating

rate for succeeding days above the free period.
Where situations of underutilization (not attributable to
seasonal fluctuations) exist, the task is to use the marketing
mix to attract new traffic. In this context it has already
been shown how port marketing can serve to pinpoint new market
opportunities.
For a port pursuing new traffic,
it is
important that its tariffs be flexible in order to enable
negotiations.
Increasingly the trend is away from standard
tariffs, in favour of individual contracts based op what the
traffic will bear.
This also means that there must exist
proper knowledge of the carriers' revenue base.

6.4.2

The role of the marketing mix in improving customer and
worker relations.
'Improving

customer

relations’

is a

somewhat nebulous

objective, but a practical one nonetheless.
The port's
success in maintaining or improving these relations will
depend on its awareness of what is desired by the users, which
is in turn a function of good market research.
However,
broadly speaking, the port can increase its ’popularity’ among
its users

by

maintaining

importantly, by offering

a

high market

profile

practical assistance when

and

more

and where

necessary, through:
Keeping in touch. It is through constant dialogue
with customers that port management can isolate
problems in both its operation and that of the
customers,
and
can
make
corrections
or
suggestions/accommodations. Customers’ problems are
often good sources of market opportunities.
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-

Providing

-Facilitiss

(where

-Feasible)

that

are

necessary to the customer’s operations, but which it
might not be economical -For them to invest in. A
good example
o-F this is
an electronic
data
processing service, especially with
regards to
vessel cargo planning and container tracking. These
are now provided by many ports -For a nominal fee.
Another example is the provision o-F storage space
and processing zones -For manu-Factur ing, along with
computerized logistics system to e-F-Fect the accurate
and timely

distribution o-F cargo.

It caters to the

manu-Facturers need to reduce inventory and transport
cost while
market.
-

still

being

able

to respond

to

Market surveys carried out by ports can
indicate
possible sources
o-F
cargo.

the

serve to
Such

in-Formation is invaluable to carriers, and with the
prior approval o-F the companies surveyed can be
copied to shipping lines. ■
-

The port's promotional e-F-Fort is also important.
While the previous steps are well known by the
recipients o-F the assistance, promotion through
trade journals and trade fairs are
useful in
broadening the awareness among other sectors of the
market.

Increasingly,

journals

are no

advertisements

longer limited

to

in

trade

detailing port

facilities and using catch phrases, but to explain
how the port has solved a particular customer's
problem - a testimonial form of advertising. Trade
fairs are also invaluable sources of market contact,
as well as well as advertising media, in order to
increase port awareness.
The

level of

productivity.
management

It

to seek

staff motivation
is

therefore

means

of

correlates with
necessary for

improving
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the

the

that of
port's

motivation

of

workers. Methods such as incentive schemes and profit sharing
schemes are in place in most ports.
However, a significant
influence to staff motivation and morale, is to receive public
acknowledgement for good performance. The port of Singapore
has found an effective (if not novel) means of doing this.
That is, through its fortnightly port magazine. Port View.
Here pictures of staff who achieved high productivity (often
bannered as 'performance above par') on a vessel, are shown
along with details of the vessel, the performance level,
difficulties encountered and overcome during the task, and
some group (eg. trophy) memento received for the performance.
A port magazine can also serve to increase staff awareness and
interest in the port's performance, competitors and the
industry as a whole.
Thus it
achieve

can be seen that the scope of the marketing mix to
port objectives are many and varied and limited only

by management's ingenuity.
It also demonstrates the need
a designated group of people to be responsible for
planning and coordination (a marketing department) of
these activities, since they impinge on all the aspects of
port.
6.5

for
the
all
the

CONTROLLING THE MARKETING STRATEGY

While planning is concerned with deciding what needs to
be done,
the emphasis of
control is on the setting
of
standards, measurement of performance against these standards
to evaluate achievement level and take corrective action.
There are three levels of marketing control;
Strategic Control: This is the responsibility of top
management and entails an evaluation of whether the company is
pursuing the best markets, offering the right products and
using the
determine

most effective means of communicating it.
To
this a marketing audit is carried out, the aim of
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which is to examine the organization's marketing environment,
internal marketing system and its marketing activities, to
determine problem areas and recommend a corrective action plan
to improve e-F-Fectiveness.
ii)

ftnnual Plan

management
objectives

Control

Involves

various levels

o-F

in determining
whether the company's
annual
are being
met,
using
various
per-Fprmance

measurement tools such as
(a) revenue analysis, which tries to identify the various
factors which contributed to the observed variance.^^,
■V

’

^

'

(b)
marketshare
analysis..
Since the
level of
throughput does not itself indicate how well the port is
performing relative to the industry, a market share
analysis is often used. It suggests whether the changes
in port performance were due to uncontrollable outside
forces or

whether

there is

a weakness

in the

current

marketing program.
c)

Expense-to-revenue ratio.

This aims at

keeping tabs

on
costs so
as to ensure that the port
is not
overspending to achieve its
objectives.
Different
ratios may calculated for the various expense categories
so

as to detect which area of expenditure is causing the

problem. Of necessity, some fluctuations will be random,
so it is up to management to be able to distinguish these
form 'real' fluctuations.
Management needs to observe
changes over several periods and plot these on a chart in
order to detect the underlying trends.
d)

Attitude

tracking

involves

monitoring

customers'

attitudes to the port's services. If it is found that
esteem for these services is falling, this can be a
signal for management to take immediate action to restore
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image or expect a downturn in its terminal usage
■Future and ultimately in its pro-fitabi 1ity.

in the

iii) Pro-Fltabi 11 tv and Control. It is not enough that
the port is making a profit, management needs to know what
specific areas of activity are making the profit, and how
much. It is essential to gauge the profitability of each of
the port’s services.■ A good costing system and a sound basis
for assigning common costs are prerequisites to useful profit
centre analyses.
'

4.,

,

,

-

.
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The objective of the previous chapter was to highlight the
role and importance of marketing in the achievement of various
port objectives.
It concentrated mainly on outlining the
marketing planning process and its relevance, or justification
for its application to ports.
Assuming that it was successful
in establishing the desirability of the marketing approach, the
natural progression is to move from the planning phase to the .
'doing' phase.
That is, how to actually prepare a marketing
plan.
Since the principal aim of this paper is to develop a
marketing strategy for KTO, this seems the ideal point at which
to merge the somewhat geheral discussions in chapter 6, with the
company background and analysis of chapters four and five, sind
move towards a marketing strategy for KTO.
Three ingredients were mentioned in the previous chapter as
being essential to any successful marketing endeavour: Namely, a
service oriented to customer needs and wants; a marketing
department with the responsibility for detecting these needs,
developing the required services and devising effective means of
establishing customer awareness for the port and its services;
and finally, a marketing plan which identifies strategies and
responsibilities for
their implementation.
The
first
requirement can be dealt within the actual marketing plan.
Accordingly this chapter will consist of two broad sections. The
first will be in the form of a recommended marketing department
structure for KTO, while the second will detail the steps in the
preparation of an actual marketing plan or strategy, using KTO
where possible, as a case study.

7.1

RECOMMENDATIONS OF A MARKETING DEPARTMENT FOR KTO

It was shown in chapter 4 that KTO does not have a marketing
department and that marketing, was carried out on its behalf by
the Port Authority of Jamaica (PAJ).
While this had certain
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benefits <also mentioned), given the PAJ's involvement in and
responsibility for all the Jamaican ports, it is inevitable that
enough attention is not given to marketing of the Container
Terminal.
Thus such marketing activities as research and
analysis are often carried out on a 'once off' and rush basis,
immediately before a promotional tour.
It has been demonstrated
that marketing
is a continuous process of monitoring and
evaluation of market developments, so as to identify growth
opportunities for the port and devise strategies for exploiting
them successfully.
It is therefore vital that KTO establishes its own marketing
department, with the requisite responsibility and authority to
carry out these functions.
A division will need to be made
between the future marketing role of the PAJ and this new
department.
Since the container terminal operated by KTO is
actually owned by the PAJ,
the Terminal's management will need
to convince the PAJ that such a change is not an attempt to shut
them out, but is critical to the future success of the port.
It
may be that the PAJ will continue to carry out the promotion and
public relations functions, but KTO the other marketing aspects.
r
Given the constraints on costs and the current low level of
business at the Terminal, the proposed department should be as
small as possible without impairing its functionality.
The
following functions are identifiable:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Market Analysis and Forecasting
Identification of new services and markets
Strategic Planning
Customer relations
Promotion and Public Relations

For this the minimum requirement in terms of
five to seven, with responsibility for:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)

personnel is

Planning (the manager),
Information Gathering
Statistical analysis andforecasting
Customer relations
Department administration (the secretary).
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The above manpower program
assumes that the PAJ
in
conjunction with KTO's executives, continue to carry out the
actual promotion and public relations function of the Terminal.

Planning
The Marketing Manager should have at least a first degree in
the social sciences (marketing, management or economics), plus
experience and broad based knowledge of the shipping industry.
He should report directly to the Managing Director.
It is
important that he be given the necessary level of autonomy and
authority to plan and carry out the port's development . It is
essential for him to have good communication skills, since there
will be a need to liaise with and win the cooperation of the
various departments.
The support of top management also plays
a vital role in his ability to solicit the degree of cooperation
needed from other departments.
Ideally, plans will need to be
developed and approved on a team work basis, incorporating all
the other members of the management team. The emphasis here is
teamwork.
Top
management will also have
to ensure his
accountability in terms of plans as against achievements.

Information Gathering
Information gathering is indispensable to good analysis and
planning. Relevant information will surface from any and varied
sources.
Therefore the person responsible for this task must be
patient and thorough. Since it involves a great deal of reading,
extraction and classification of data, the candidate for the job
should possess a literary background.
Perhaps a degree or
diploma in the arts or social sciences.

Statistical Analysis and Forecasting
The job of statistical analyst involves evaluating the data
gathered in order to identify possible threats and opportunities.
The person employed will need to make assessments of the likely
impact of economic and political policies on the port; to
evaluate
the
environment,
look
at
current
trends
in
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cargo/commodity flows and services and forecast future ones. The
Marketing Manager will need to rely heavily on his skills and
ability in devising the actual marketing plan. For this task, a
specialist in economic analysis is necessary - whether he has a
port background or not.
The possession of at least a first
degree in economics or statistics is essential.

Customer Relations
Customer relations involves maintaining contact with current
customers so as to ascertain their problems and the degree of
satisfaction with the service quality of the Terminal as well as
contacting and monitoring potential customers.
This is also a
task for the Marketing Manager, that is keeping in contact with
the customers.
But in order to give more time to the planning
function, he will need assistance in this respect. The person
assigned this job must have excellent communication skills, as he
will need not only to speak on the phone and through the mail,
but also make and receive personal calls to and from customers.
An important element in his ability to deal effectively with the
customer will be his knowledge of their relative importance to
the Terminal, in terms of traffic volume and profitability.
In
such a case, this individual will need to possess information on
the status of the accounts of the different clients.
In fact, he
can be
very useful in assisting
the Accounts Receivable
department in their collection, efforts.
This function may
conceivably require more than one person, depending on the
customer base and the level of attention required..

Department Administration
For the daily administration of the department, a secretary
is essential.
She will have the responsibility of the usual
secretarial duties. At this point it must be stressed that the
preferable combination is a typist and a secretary. The former
would have the responsibility for preparing the various external
and internal communications, manning of telephones and so on, for
all members of the department.
The secretary would be aligned
primarily
to the
Manager . and ensure
the administrative
functioning of the department in terms of meetings, appointments
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and budget monitdring. She would report directly to the Manager.
An experienced secretary is needed.
A diagram of the proposed functional
marketing department is as below:

7.2

relation

for

the

TOWARDS A MARKETING PLAN FOR KTO

The marketing plan is the actual written document which
details specific marketing actions to be taken to achieve
specific marketing objectives.
It should pinpoint the strengths
and weaknesses of the port in meeting market demands, while
identifying future market potential, and thus facilitate an
organized approach to their achievement.
It is a plan of action.
Preparation of the marketing plan is therefore a most important
activity.
This section relies heavily on the work^of Robert K. Skacel
for the methodology involved in preparing the plan.
An attempt
will be made to lend relevance to the methodology in a port

it.

^ The Marketing Plan: How to prepare it, what should be in
Published by MPM Associates.'
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context by using KTO as a study.
It is intended that by so
doing, the initial step in devising a marketing plan for the
improvement of KTO's performance will have been taken.

Six broad steps in the development
be identified. Viz:
1)
2>
3)
4}
5)
6)

of a Marketing Plan can

Preparation of the fact base
Identification of Strengths, Weaknesses,
Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) '
A statement of specific objectives
Development of the market strategy
Establishment of a marketing budget
Forecast of throughput and profit-

The first four will form the focus of the rest of this chapter,
while the guidelines for the establishment of the marketing
budget is presented in Appendix 7.5.
Forecast of profit is a
function of throughput, price and costs.
The latter two are
internally decided to a large extent, and are therefore more
predictable. The real task is therefore to attempt a forecast of
terminal throughput.
A methodology for forecasting container
traffic is presented in Appendix 7.6.

7.2.1

PREPARATION OF THE FACT BASE

The first step in developing the actual plan is to establish
the basis for the plan.
This is achieved by using the
information gathered from the market information system discussed
in the previous chapter. The fact base, so created, must give a
thorough account of all the current conditions and situations in
the marketing environment, pertinent to the current position of
the Terminal,
what is now being proposed as a solution and why.
Since everything else flows from this fact base, it therefore
represent a most crucial part of the entire plan.
Based on the analytic classification for the port fact base,
presented in Appendix 7.1, the relevant fact base for KTO could
be as below:
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IFACT BASE FOR KTO____________
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
The Kingston Container
services to port users.
1.

Terminal

offers

cargo

handling

THROUGHPUT

- For the years 1988-1990, a declining trend in throughput
is observable.
This is a result of a decline in KTO s
share of the transhipment market. Recently, the domestic
traffic also suffered decline due to worsening economic
situation of the country. ^
- In the
transhipment market KTO's customers
consist
entirely of the shipping lines, while for domestic cargo
there is a combination of cargo interests and shipping
lines.
Their contribution to Terminal throughput is as
below:
DOMESTIC
TRANSHIPMENT
78.7%
26.6%
ZIM
27.0
SEALAND
14.0
EVERGREEN
16.7
20.0
CAROL
11.7
OTHERS
-

— Kingston serves a transhipment point via Zim for Miami,
Houston, San Juan, Santo Domingo and Port-au-Prince.
Domestic traffic flows are centred primarily around the
USA, Far East and Europe and more recently the CARICOM
countries.
2.

MARKET

- Regional container throughput
is increasing
therefore the
potential market for transhipment
growing.^
- Liner trade is expected to increase
year 2000. ^
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by over 5.1%

and
is

to the

2

FACT BASE FOR KTO (CONT'D)

- KTO's market share is falling.
- The Terminal is
because of:
a)
b)
c)
d)

losing ground in

transhipment primarily

low service quality in terms of productivity and
unreliability due to stormy labour relations.
poor security image re contraband in containers
increasing use of the US Landbridge
increased port competition

“ The trend towards disintegration of consortia continues
(Scandutch consortia will separate after January, 1991,
for example).
This has created new opportunities for
ports, since these now independent lines are seeking hub
ports for their operating networks.^
- Increased landbridge usage can be expected to
the future.
“ Increased container penetration
expected to continue. ®

for tropical

continue in

produce is

- The latest trend in port services, in addition to storage
facilities, has been distribution logistics.
Cargo
information service using international EDP linkages has
also been introduced by some of the leading ports in the
industry.
- The trend in larger ships sizes necessitating required
depth alongside of over 13m compared with 11 or so metres,
increased crane outreach (post panamax) and air height to
serve 5 high containers on deck, is now established in the
industry.
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3FACT BASE FX)R KTO <CONT'D)

- Productivity levels in ports are on the increase with
market leaders such as Singapore recording average moves
in exxcess of 40 per hour ^ . Increased productivity is
also a function of newer equipment technology.
- After relative stability during the 1987-1988
period,
vessel operating costs have experienced steep increases
exceeding an annual rate of 10%.^
. Shipowners will need
to continue to exert tight control on costs in order to
remain competitive.
-i

3.

fi.

,

■!

'a

^

9

'

THE MACRO ENVIRONMENT

- Expected change in the direction of trade due to:
*

closing of gap in US balance of trade deficit and
softening of the US dollar.
Imports to US exxpected
to decline while exports to increase.

^

creation of economic intra-regional trading blocs.
In
particular the reduced preference status of
countries signatory to such trade treaties as LOME
etc., following the European Community integration in
1992.
Therefore a reduction in exports to these
countries, from the developing world can be expected.

*

decentralisation of production

«

new market horizons for trade in Eastern Europe

scarcity of financial loans to developing countries
expected in the future due to emand from Eastern
Europe.
- World economic growth is expected to average between 3.2
g
to 3.5 percent.^
^
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4 FACT BASE FOR KTO (CONT'D)
4.

KTO'S SERVICE

- Slow vessel turnaround time, averaging 14 hours per call.
- Poor operational performance of ship-to-shore cranes.
Also a shortage of cranes to serve vessels adequately.
Increased downtime attributable to age and unavailability
of spare parts.
- Abundance of container storage areas. Over 6,500 TEUs now
available.
- productivity averaging 13 moves per hour.
- increasing industrial unrest has marred the reliability of
the
Terminal's service.
Especially
following the
protracted strike in September, 1990, during which the
major transhipment carrier threatened to pull out.
- Offering storage and distribution service (under free port
status) to cargo interest has the potential to increase
the Terminal's transhipment performance.
- Involvement of the Terminal in through transport movement
(on-carriage via feedering) can serve to enhance the
port's attraction as a transhipment centre.

5.

COMPETITION

- The major competiting ports are on the one hand, those
along the coasts of the United States. However, since the
economics in favour of land
bridge usage is quite
overwhelming, KTO is not in a position
to compete
successfully for the cargoes so moved.
The second source of major competition is from those vying
for ccargo transported on the all-water route vi the
Panama Canal. These include San Juan, Cristobal, LimonMoin and Santo Domingo.

................ ... .

m
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5 KTO FACT BASE (CONT'D)
San Juan has the largest market share, but in general all
competitors have been experiencing increased market share.
The San Juan
Terminal seems to be well developed.
Cristobal's weakness is seen in terms of future scarcity
of facilities relative to KTO:
CRISTOBAL

KTO
4
Berths
640m
length
10.4 -11.9m
depth
Cranes
5
__
6,500
Storage <TEU)
72 plus
Reefer points
64 con air

2

426m
10.7 - 12.2m
2

3,000
40

In 1969 Cristobal handled over 100,000 TEUs.
This means
that to avoid congestion, an average dwell time of 11 to
12 days per container is necessary.
It is therefore
evident tliat Cristobal might face capacity problems in the
future, not only in terms of transit areas, but maybe
also, berthing facilities. Two cranes serving two berths
also imply slow vessel turnaround and probably high vessel
waiting time.
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.

See figure 5.1
Table 5.2 chapter 5.
Chapter 3, page 5.
During a field trip to Rotterdam, a visit was paid to
Nedlloyds headquarters. The view of the Network
Planning Manager was that, the next 5 to 10 years will
determine the ports that will survive in the face of
the reorganization of shipping networks, which, in his
opinion, shipping companies will be making in the
future.

5.

Trade Horizons; Annual Issue, 1990. Published by Port
Import & Export Reporting Service (PIERS). USA. Page
3 of the report states that in 1989 15,000 more
northbound containers of bananas & coffee accounted for
more than 50% of trade increase from Central America.

6.

Port Views. February, 1990.
Singapore Authority.

7.
8.

Chapter 3, page 2.
Lloyds Shipping Economist, Sept. 1991.
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7.2.2

SWOT ANALYSIS

The SWOT analysis utilizes the management's perceptions of
the various market trends, competitor's weaknesses and the
company's own strengths in order to identify opportunities which
may be exploited profitably.
The analysis flows naturally from
the prepared fact base.v/ Table 7.2 presents some guidelines in
identifying problems and opportunities and these may be used to
present a SWOT analysis for KTO as below:
6 SWOT ANALYSIS FOR KTO
STRENGTHS ,
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Location of the port of Kingston relative to
a) the major trade routes utilizing the Panama Canal
b) the rest of the Caribbean, Central and South
America (see appendix
7.1 for
comparative
distances from Kingston and Cristobal to Major
ports in the region).
Adequate availability container stacking space.
Location of the Kingston Freezone adjacent to the
port with adequate storage and factory space.
Adequate facilities for refrigerated cargoes.
Modern EDP system offering container tracking and
cargo preplanning of vessels.
Proximity to the US Landbridge makes
it ideal
consolidation point for cargo between Far East and
West Coast USA from the rest of the Caribbean,
Central and South America.

WEAKNESSES
1.
2.

Poor labour relations and low level of motivation.
Slow vessel turnaround due to ;
a)
b)

poor ancillary services such as pilotage and
towage, and
an imbalance .in the cranes to berth ratio

7

SWOT ANALYSIS (CONT'D)
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

High operational delaysdue to crane breakdown
High operational costs
Inability to respond to investment demands due to PAJ
regulation
Poor Terminal surface conditions hampering operations
and impacting on equipment performance
Dependent on a narrow base of customers for large
portion of throughput
Poor
image regarding container security
against
contraband
.
^
High labour cost due to high gang strength.

OPPORTUNITIES
Scope exists to strengthen KTO's transhipment position
by:
1.
Arranging feeder service for users interested in
transhipping
2.
Offering storage,
distribution and processing
service to cargo interests due to the existence of
the IFZ and the abundance of stacking areas.
3.
Actively vying for tropical produce from Central
and South America to utilize the cold storage
container facilities.
4.
Using the existing EDP system to offer logistics
services to customers for a nominal fee.
5.
Further involvement in cargo consolidation for
small shippers and so reduce the imbalance re
empties and loaded, containers.
6.
The possibility to allocate some of the existing
container stacking area to container
leasing
companies for repositioning of boxes.
THREATS
1.
Increased usage of the US Land bridge
2.
Development of numerous container facilities in
the region
3.
Possible reduction in regional trade following a
reduction in the US export market and the European
Community .Integration in 1992.
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7.2.3

STATEMENT OF SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

Objectives represent desired solutions to existing problems
or the exploitation of perceived opportunities and therefore
represent a natural outgrowth of the SWOT analysis.
Because all
previous steps in the plan led to the formulation of the
objectives and all subsequent steps are geared at achieving them,
the objectives represent the core of the marketing plan.
In as
far as is possible, objectives should be specific and measurable,
with a time frame for achievement.
This allows for more
efficient control.
Objectives are not revenue and profit goals,
but desired results which lead to their achievement.
Appendix 7.3 outlines some basic considerations in
port objectives. Possible objectives for KTO:

setting

6 KTO PORT OBJECTIVES
WBWBBiaiWBBawwitwwniniiiwiniiiiiiiiiiiiiwiim

1.

Improving the service quality
operations by reducing overall
through:
a)
improved productivity
per hour, and,
b)
reduced waiting time of

of
the vessel
turnaround time
to say

20 moves

vessels

2

Increase customer base by
a)
attracting new traffic
b)
expanding the service range to include
storage and distribution logistics
c)
attracting smaller lines to enhance the
port's on-carriage
possibilities and
therefore serve to attract larger lines

3.

Restrain/ reduce cost per container

4.

Improve the port's image in the market place.

IHHHWWfllllUlill
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7.2.4

KARKETING STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

While objectives specify desired end results, strategy outlines
specific marketing programs aimed at achieving item. As will be
recalled from the previous chapter, a marketing strategy consists
of two basic elements:
1)

Market Targeting, and,

2)

The Marketing Mix.
The mix can be internally
directed and or market directed.
Internally
directed strategies aim at service and tariff
development, policy formulations and so on. While
externally directed strategies are those presented
to the customer in order to win his patronage.

Based on the guidelines for strategy development
Appendix 7.4, KTO's strategy is presented below,

outlined

9 STRATEGY FOR KTO

MARKET TARGETS
With a view to broadening the Terminal's customer base,
a)
KTO should continue to'target:
(i) container shipping lines using both the Panama Canal
and the OS Landbridge.
Emphasis should be placed on
attracting a broad range of carriers of different sizes.
(ii)
regional shipping lines
carriage to these countries.

in order

to facilitate on

Where formerly the great strength of KTO
was
location relative to the Canal, and therefore ideally

its

in

10 KTO STRATEGY (CONT'D)
placed to serve as a transhipment point for the Europe Far
East, US
Gulf and East Coasts to Far East and
US West
Coasts, this is- no longer the case since these trades are
now largely being landbridged.
A review of the map
presented in Figure 4.2
will show that KTO is also ideally
placed to serve as a hub for Central and South America and
the Caribbean. Further, in terms of marine distances saved
KTO is better placed, relative to the major competitor,
Cristobal, to act as a transhipment point for southbound
cargo to the regions specified.
This sub-region was
originally assessed by KTO but not pursued.
It has also been noted that RTW operators still tend to use
the route through the Panama Canal on at least one leg of
their service. However, the preferred choice to act as hub
has been Cristobal.
For example the
Tricon group
comprising
Senator Line,
Cho Yang and
DSR
call at
Cristobal
on both their East
and West bound
service.
Barber Blue Sea uses Cristobal as a hub for the Caribbean,
Central and South American cargo.
Evergreen, on its
eastbound
service
now
feeds Kingston's cargo
over
Charleston but on its westbound service, calls at both
Kingston and Cristobal before continuing through the Canal.

This implies that there is still scope for KTO to attract
business from some of the original routes targeted (Europe
& US to Far East), but that this will involve a lot of
marketing expenditure since they are already settled at
Cristobal.
And
the degree of publicity
with which
Evergreen
terminated
its
transhipment activities
at
Kingston
has greatly tarnished the port's reputation and
created some degree of skepticism among potential carriers.
Since it easier to try to keep customers than to regain
them after they have left KTO may want to wait until it has
secured a broader base of clientele and reduced the stigma
currently attached to the port before pursuing this market.
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11 KTO STRATEGY (CONT'D)
A more rewarding strategy may be to pursue the second
segment of the market.
That is to act as hub for
southbound cargo destined for Central and South America and
the Caribbean.
In addition, KTO has the advantage of also
being strategically located relative to the land bridges
(primarily those
to the Gulf
Coasts) to act
as a
transhipment point for both imports and exports of these
regions.
KTO will need to undertake market research to assess these
possibilities and what strategies to pursue.
Although
these markets are smaller than those of the Far East trade
now, if "a better economic climate among the West Coast
South American nations is expected to boost container
exports seven percent this year C19913 and a further 18% in
1992." ^ , then by getting involved in this market, KTO
would have the possibility to grow as this market does. In
total, exports to Central'America are forecast to grow 20%
per annum in the near term.
Whether KTO would need to target the smaller and or
national lines for the northbound journey to Kingston and
then the bigger lines for the trip from Kingston to say
Charleston, would largely depend on the current operating
pattern of both sets of lines and whether there is any
advantage for them
to make an intermediate
stop at
Kingston.
b)
<i)
(ii>

1.

Efforts should also be focussed at cargo interests.
Namely,
major exporters/importers of the region regarding
using the port as a storage and distribution centre
the producers'
association of
regional farmers
regarding the need
for cargo consolidation and
containerized
cold
storage.
facilities
for
agricultural produce.
1990 Annual Issue of Trade Horizons.
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12 KTO STRATEX3Y (CONT'D)
£iii}

container leasing companies.

As shippers spell out the criteria for service and carriers
try to respond, vast opportunities have opened up for ports
whose management are willing to capitalize on them.
The
latest shipper's preoccupation has been with the need to
reduce inventory costs while still preserving their ability
to respond, with minimum delays to market demand.
This
gave rise to the Just In Time (JIT) concept.
As a research
by Nediloyds
revealed, large producing companies have
changed their approach to international trade.
This is
mamifested in:
a)
a concentration primarily on production and sales
b)
production being organized internationally and on
a decentralized basis, and,
c)
a reduction in the period between product manufacture
and delivery.
This Nedlloyd interpreted to
mean that these companies
would need
another company '• ^to handle logistics
and
distribution. Not only
is
there opportunity here for
shipping lines to offer logistics services, but there
exists a real market opportunity for ports to act as
regional distribution centres.
KTO will need to target and actively canvass shippers, and
not only the lines. The question of necessary space to be
used for storage arise.
In this regard, the use of the
neighbouring
freezone would be an advantage.
In other
words, part of the task of getting business for the
Terminal, will involve that of securing business for the
Freezone.
The likely shippers to be targeted are the ones who are
still
in the process of
developing thueir trade and
distribution
channels.
In
this regard, the greatest
potential rests with the ASEAN countries such as Thailand,
Indonesia and Malaysia.
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nSBB

The
1990 annual issue of the PIERS report on Trade
Horizons, forecast the following growth in containerized
trade to the US from these countries:

THAILAND

MALAYSIA

INDONESIA

158,456
19.7%

65,121
16.5%

56^720
19.0%

1992 (TEU)
GROWTH RATE

188,629
19,0%

76,908
18.1%

67,587
19.2%
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The major commodities and the dominant
engaged in this trade are as below

II
II
II
II
It
II
11
11
11

1991 <TEU)
GROWTH RATE

shipping

line

IMPORTS TO US FROM SOUTH EAST ASIA (1990)
LINES

APL
MAERSK
EVERGREEN
SEALAND
OOCL
OTHERS

COMMODITIES

SHARE
(TEU)

SHARE
(TEU)

34,794
FURNITURE
CANNED FOODS 29,774
21,804
APPAREL
ELEC. PROD. 15,451
WOMEN'S &
INFANT WEAR 14,782
293,902
OTHERS

65,028
60,263
51,797
42,099
41,968
149,352
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The degree to which KTO would be able to tap this market
will largely depend on the lack of distribution facilities
within the US, since the first pprt of call of the major
carriers in this market is the US west coast ports, from
which cargo is bridged to the East and Gulf ports.
It
would also be a function of savings in shipping costs as a
result of bulk shipment, against the additional cost of
shipping cargo to Kingston and storing it. Further market
research will need to be carried out to
determine which
market segments to choose.
Further market development opportunities exist for the
Terminal in the area of repositioning, storage and
repair
of leased containers.
Nearly 45% of all containers in
operation are leased.
The major leasing companies are
listed below along with their fleet size in 1990.
FLEET(TEU)
GENSTAR/ITEL
TIPHOOK GROUP
TRANS AMERICA LEASING
TRITON CONTAINER
TRANS OCEAN LTD
SEA CONTAINERS LTD
INTERMODAL EQUIP. ASSOC
TEXTAINER GROUP
INTERPOOL
SCANDINAVIAN CARGO SYSTEMS
MATSON LEASING
Source:

920,000
420.000
290,000
200,000
130,000
90,000
80,000
75,000
70,000
40,000
20.,Q00

,

HEAD OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO
LONDON
NEW YORK
SAN FRANCISCO
SAN FRANCISCO
LONDON
SAN FRANCISCO
TRIESTE/ITALY
NEW YORK
STOCKHOLM
SAN FRANCISCO

Containerization International Yearbook, 1991.

The port of Kingston already has a company (Equipment Care)
which carries out container repairs. This experience is an
added advantage if KTO chooses to target this market.
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2.

THE MARKETING MIX

Tlie service:
<i)

(a)

INTERNAL STRATEGIES

The objectives: To improve service quality especially
re vessel operations, through improved productivity
and reduced waiting time and to increase customer
base. This requires:
a solution to the problem of obsolete cranes and the
increased operational breakdown being experienced, as
well as a deficiency in the berths to cranes ratio.

Historically, the drawback to renewing or increasing port
investment has been the reliability of KTO's management on
the PAJ, resulting in considerable lag time between
identification of the need and response. One solution may
be for the Terminal's management to negotiate a new
agreement with the PAJ, wherein a percentage of the
operating surplus is not remitted to them, but retained by
KTO to meet investment needs.
The PAJ might wish to
retain the right to approve the investment. But the fact
that they are not required to fund it, should serve to
speed up the process.
One basis for the percentage of earnings to be retained
could be the annual depreciation cost, based on projected
replacement value and port development need.
A second
solution is for KTO to look at the possibility to lease
cranes.
The European and Japanese markets might offer
possibilities.
The older cranes can be sold as there
exists a market for these equipment.
<b)

Solution to the problem of other port services such
as pilotage and towage will depend on Management's
efforts to
influence the performance of
these
entities.
The system of payment for these services
on a 'work done' basis .should be implemented, with
penalties (loss of revenue) for delays in performing
the service.
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(c>

Measures to improve the motivation and performance
of stevedoring staff need to be taken.
The primary
reason for the poor productivity
level on the
Terminal was ascribed to:
- ' the fact that KTO had no direct control over the
hiring, training, and therefore motivation of the
stevedores
the fact that stevedores, being paid hourly and not
per
box,
had
little
incentive
to
increase
productivity.
/Some incentive scheme was put in
place, but the rate of incentive is not high enough
to compensate for the wage loss by executing their
job with dispatch.
One strategy is for KTO to adopt the approach most
container terminals are today using. That is, employ
crane operators directly on a salaried basis, and
utilize the labour
pool only for aboard
ship
activities, such as lashing. Unions need to be made
to recognize that containerization has changed the
definition of 'dock work'.
Crane operators are no
longer dock workers but highly paid and skilled
technicians.
An alternative strategy is for stevedores to be paid
on a box rate and not a hourly basis. This has the
obvious advantage of giving workers a vested interest
in the level of Terminal throughput as well as afford
them the knowledge that it is no longer in their
interest financially, to prolong the job, since their
wages would be the same.
This principle has been
employed in several British Ports and has been
successful in improving productivity.
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(ii)The objective:
container handled.

To

restrain and

or

reduce cost

per

An essential step to restraining and reducing Terminal
costs is to accrue the benefits . of mechanization in terms
of labour reduction.
The current level of 27 men -per crane
(excluding supervisory personnel), closely approximates to
the situation that obtains for breakbulk terminals.
A
survey carried out by the author into this matter of gang
strength, revealed that in the ports of Rotterdam, Colombo^
New York, Malmo, Copenhagen and Los Angeles, the average
gang strength ranges from 12 to 17'men. KTO cannot -expect
that investments
in terminal equipment will have the
desired cost savings if they are over manned.
Another factor of Terminal cost is that for tractors used
to move containers between ship's side and the stacking
area.
One area of cost reduction could be to have a
trailer to each tractor. That is, each tractor/driver crew
would take two to three containers instead of one.
This
would not only serve to reduce labour cost, but enhance the
vessel operations.
The other solution proposed by the
Terminal, of using the straddle carriers for this purpose,
would also achieve the cost savings objective.
MARKET DIRECTED SERVICE STRATEGIES
The objective:
customers base.

To

attract new

traffic

and broaden

the

(i)Throuah Transport.
The objective may be achieved by
offering a wider range of services to new and existing
users.
Different customers require different services,
therefore a customer needs-oriented approach will possibly
entail the port positioning itself to handle everything
between the production and selling of cargoes.
It will
necessarily
involve
the use
of
partners, such as
forwarders, short sea vessel operators and so on.
This
will enable the port to offer through transport to clients.
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M

On carriage arrangements will represent an essential part
of KTO's service improvement strategy. The existence of a
wide
network of feedering possibilities can serve to
attract larger lines, that would otherwise be unable to
enter the relatively fragmented regional market.
<ii)
Storage and Distribution services
The essence of the distribution logistics service is to
meet the 'Just In Time' needs of cargo interests. On the
'one hand, efficient port services regarding feedering
arrangements will ensure that importers receive cargo on
time and on short notice, therefore reducing the need for
stockpiling. While the manufacturers are able to produce
on a short term basis to meet customer demand and also
reduce cost of inventory build up.
Essential to this service is a reliable EDP system.
In
addition to facilitating easy storage and retrieval of
information the EIDP system will need to enhance the port s
logistics function by providing information on different
routing options and costs, in the distribution process.
The essence of logistics is to optimize time and cost of
distribution. This means that there will be the need for
a data base on the various operators on the different
routes, in order for KTO to select the best partners for
each route.
The aim of the storage function is to meet the need of
cargo interests
to reduce
transportation costs, by
shipping in bulk, therefore achieving economies.
The
■cargo can then be shipped to the various destinations as
demand arises.
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The Tariffs
INTERNAL STE?ATEGIES
This involves
<a>
establishing the cost base or minimum charge that can
be levied for KTO's services, without accruing a
loss,
(b)
comparison
of the port's charges with those of
competitors to ensure competitive a price level and,
<c)
policy decisions regarding the Tariff in general,
such as flexibility of the published tariff, and so
on.
These can be crucial in meeting the objective of
new customers, while retaining existing ones.
(a)

'

attracting

KTO has
ahigh level of fixed costs, therefore
in
order
to
minimize
unit
cost and
increase
profitability, it needs to pursue a pricing strategy
aimed at gaining high volume throughput.
One basis
for setting the price is to establish the different
throughput and price levels at which the Terminal
will break-even. The selection of one of these price
levels as the minimum charge will
depend on the
probability of
achieving these
volumes.
This
provides
minimum
targeted
throughput
for the
Terminal, above which, at a given charge it will make
a profi t .

This does not mean that this minimum charge will be that
levied at customers, rather it establishes the degree of
freedom
management
has in
negotiating
rates,
by
establishing the floor.
The difficulty in using this
approach is that it tends to establish a composite rate,
not one for each service and would be more useful if the
Terminal is pursuing a strategy of providing consolidated
rates.
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An alternative approach is to base the miniitium rate on the
direct cost of each service. The pricing policy will be
to charge^ at a rate at least above the direct cost, so
that each service will contribute towards fixed costs and
profitability.
Assuming
the
establishment
and
apportioning of the various costs to their costs centre,
some degree of accuracy in calculating the direct cost can
be achieved. However, while this approach is invaluable
•in underlining the minimum charge that management can levy
for each service area, it does not take into considerai:ion
the overall profitability of the Terminal, as it neglects
the consideration of the volume of traffic needed at
particular rates, to cover fixed costs.
The ideal strategy is to combine both approaches. Thus,
based on direct cost established for each service, a
sensitivity analysis can be carried out by incrementing
this direct cost and calculating the necessary volume to
achieve break-even point.
The choice of rate will
therefore be based on that level of traffic which is most
achievable. The price so determined is the minimum charge
for the particular service.
(b>

In determining the final tariff level, consideration
as to
continued competitiveness has to be made.
Many ports do not publish container handling tariffs,
so it is difficult to acquire comparative data.
However, a judgement can be made. For example, the
comparatively low investment level at the port of
Cristobal might mean that their fixed costs are not
as high as KTO's and therefore charges might be
lower.
Consideration has also to be taken regarding
vessel operators concern over escalating costs.

146

21 KTO STRATEGY (CONT'D)

EXTEEWAL PRICING STRATEGIES
— Instead of having a single published container handling
tariff,
KTO may
conclude
separate
contracts with
customers.
The rate agreed on depending on the volume,
size of
ships, service required and
the level of
productivity desired.
These charges should be founded
upon an understanding of the carriers position in terms
of revenue base.
This requires an approach of charging (within limits) what
the traffic will bear.
Thus for carriers with a market
dominated by low valued- cargo, the approach will be to
generally be willing to charge a lower rate than for those
which move say electronics.
This means management will
need to know the basis on which each carrier charges his
freight. The approach proposed is applicable when freight
is levied on a commodity basis.
The objective of this
approach is to encourage a variety of traffic so as to
broaden the customer base, and reduce the Terminal's
dependency on a narrow range of trades and customers.
- Lower rates might be levied to encourage vessels to call
at off-peak periods or when there is not a heavy demand
for cranes.
For example. Appendix 7.6 shows that the
demand for berth and crane usage at the Terminal is
heaviest on Mondays, with Saturday being the lightest. By
reducing the overtime charge on weekends it might be
possible to spread the demand and therefore reduce the
possibilities of congestion.
- In order to attract the business of storage for container
leasing companies, it might be useful of offer free
storage for a certain percentage of their containers.
Thus storage charges can operate as a 'loss leader' the
real objective being to gain substantial revenues from the
container handling activities and not necessarily directly
from storage.

KtO
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- Increased vessel calls can be encouraged by giving a
reduction in port dues, pilotage or towage charges, after
a certain number of vessel calls per customer per year has
been achieved.
This should be directed at transhipment
carriers.
However, since these areas are not revenue
sources for KTO, some arrangement will need to be made
with the PAJ regarding compensation.
The basis of the
reduction must be in terms of additional calls (and
traffic) expected as against revenue loss from the rate
reduction.
- A most important price strategy in securing t,ranshipment
might be to offer a through (consolidated) tariff. This
makes it easier for those cargo interests, wishing to
tranship. The rate would need to cover all the various
activities, including feedering.
KTO would then pay the
various partners accordingly.
The Promotion
The objective of the promotional strategy is to increase
customer base and improve the image of the port.
In order to broaden the customer base, KTO needs to create
awareness among current and potential users of its various
services.
It needs to have access to the right people and
then communicate to them its services.
KTO's
current
promotional strategies take the form of printed brochures,
advertisements in trade journals and personal visits to
customers or potential customers.
In addition, access to
cargo interests can be gained by visiting or participating
in the various trade fairs (such as EXPO), forwarding and
other industry conferences.
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^

Initially, the stance might be for the Terminal to send one
or two members of ' the marketing staff, to observe and
recommend whether the port should take part the following
year.
Participation
is normally in the form of booths
' displaying the Terminal's
facilities, services and present
customers.
It is essential in promoting the Terminal's
facilities that a. distinction be made between planned__m l
existing facilities.
It was very surprising to this author
to meet a top ranking official of CGM at the Port of
Bremen, and be asked about our Freezone facilities.
His
understanding was that we have plans to build a facility,
but he was quite unaware that the facility was in existence
and operating for about a decade!
A crucial part of KTO's promotional strategy will be to
repair its image in terms of container security and labour
stability.
To this end activities will have to be focused
on detailing the various security measures which are now in
place and highlighting their effectiveness by pointing to
the fact that, since their implementation, no further drug
finds were made by the US Customs.
The effect of the
degree
of
publicity
with
which Evergreen
withdrew
transhipment activities
in Kingston,
and the
reason
published (drug finds) must not be underestimated.
It is
much better for the marketing team to bring up the subject
of Terminal security than to be asked about it.
One
strategy in promoting the security of the port might be to
look at the possibility of having the US Customs come and
appraise our security measures.
An approval might be
invaluable in eradicating the current stigma.
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TE k MINAL OPEEULTOR'S a g r e e m e n t
I

;

An Agreement made the 30th

day of July, 1982

A^|OMG .-i ?HB PORT AUTlIpRITY, a body corporate established and
»
,
ex|istid)<f under and by virtue of the Port Authority Act and
haying

tts offices at 15-17 Duke Street in the parish of

Kihgstoii (hereinafter referred to as "the Authority") of the
ONt ‘PAFT

and

KINGSTON

WHARVES

LIMITED,

a

company

interpolated under the laws of Jamaica and having Its
reglstajed office at 64 Harbour Street in the parish of
Kiigston of the SECOND PART

and

WESTERN TERMINALS LIMITED,

a iompaEftr incorporated under the laws of Jamaica and having
iti registeredr office at 64 Knutsford Boulevard, Kingston 5
in *the parish' of Saint Andrew of the THIRD PART

and

KINGSTON TERMINAL OPERATORS LIMITED, a company incorporated
un4«r th» laws of Jamaica and having its registered office
at |64 Harbour Street in.the parish of Kingston (hereinafter
re^rredito as "the Operator") of the FOURTH PART

W H Ei R E A S :

1.

The

Authority

has

the

responsibility

for

regulating the- use of all port facilities in the Port of

%

Kingston including the Container Terminal at Newport West in
the|pariiih of $aint Andrew
:

2. !
•

'w

St Af A

L

i

./

The Authority owns^ part of. the Container Terminal
i

:

^

t3ac|afli3i<.torths,.

and is in the process of

‘

expanding the facilities of the Container Terminal,
3. •

Kingston Wharves Limited owns Berths 8 and 9 at

Newport lest and has agreed to make such portions of these
as kay b» required and as may be capable of having the
Paceco ’Pcrtaine(r cranes operate thereon available for use as
I

an jntegxated part of the Container Terminal.
4. j

The Operator is jointly owned by Kingston wharves

Limited and Western Terminals Limited who were parties to an
agxrecent dated 23rd April, 1975 with the Authority for the
opefatlos of the Container T e r m i n a l T h e Operator has been

i

•[

!

estibllshnd by those two companies at the request of the
}

AutHorityj to enter into a new agreement with the Authority

809 92391950
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-

to operota the Container Terminal upon the terms' and
and with a view to

condit^ns hereinafter mentioned,
avoiding the

several deficiencies

experienced

in the

operation .of the said Container Terminal under the agreement
dated 23rd April,

1975, .particularly in the area of

management and staffing.

.

NOU IT IS HERESY AGREED:

1

.

This Xgreement is for the management Cf the
Container Terminal and any new berths as from time
to time are available for operation as pert of the
Container Terminal and as are made available for
that purpose. '

2

.

This Agreement’shall come into force on the 1st
day of danuary, -1982 and shall, subject to the
provisions of Clause 23, continue for a period of
five (5) years.

3.

The operator, during 'the

continuance of this

Agreement, shall manage and operate the Container
Terminal and any

expansion

of

the

existing

facilities as one operation.
4.

Kingston Wharves X<imited shall make available for
use as an integrated part of

the Container

Terminal such portions of .Berths 8 and
required and as may be capable of having the
Paccco Portainer cranes operated thereon and save
for any

consideration

Agreement,)^no charge

as' set out

shall be made to

Authority for such use of
facilities.

in

this
the

these Berths and

Kingston Wharves Limited shall be

responsible for maintaining at its 'own cost Berthe
8 and 9 in a suitable condition for .use as part of
the Container Terminal aforesaid.

5.

The Operator shall in respect of the opere^tion of
thf Container Terminal charge and collect-for all
services rendered thereat at the rates specified
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' phrts as and when used by the Operator and

t h e

^

cost of such spare parts and the personnel
eiqployed to ensure their safe custody shall <be
‘ treated as part of the direct operating cost of

^

t

the'container Terminal.

The Operator shall take

stock of such.spare parts not less than once in
■ ■ Ae
every, three Cil) months and the costs of any spare
' parts found missing shall be reimbursed to the
Authority by the Operator,
9,

The

Insurance premiums 'In

’ facilities^

respect

of

all plant and equipment,

dock

including

^ spare parts owned by the Authority and made
; available to the Operator for use at the Container
Terminal shall be paid by the Operator when due
i and shall be treated as part of the direct

10,

; operating costs of thie Container Terminal. .
i
■
' The Operator shall take out such policies of
t

insurance in respect of such liabilities and upon
such terms and conditiohs in the joint names of
the Authority and the Operator as shall be agreed
with the Authority as being necessary and adequate
with such insurance company or companies as the
' Authority may in each case and from time to time
^ direct or approve and the cost of such insurances
shall be treated as part of the direct operating
’ cost

of

the

Container

Terminal, |it

being

I understood and agreed that any insurance premiums
: payable in respect of Berths 8 and 9 shall not be
. treated as part of the direct operating cost of

V

.V
y

the Container Terminal,
11,

] The Operator shall provide adequate security for
the Container Terminal and all the plant and
equipment thereon, and the costs and expenses of
i such security shall be treated as part Of the

I

direct operating cost of the container Terminal.
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12,

The Operator shall maintain a separate harih
account for the

operation of

Terminal and all .income

the

Container

and expenditure

in

relation thereto shall be passed through this
account.

The Operator shall prepare a monthly

statement of accounts within thirty (30) days of
the. end of the month to which the statement
relates and shall within sixty (60) days of the
.presentation of the relevant accounts > pay over to
the Authority any surplus shown on that account.
•Any deficit shown by the accounts referred to
herein shall be paid by the Authority into the
abovementioned bank account within sixty (60) days
of the presentation of the relevant accounts.

As

soon as possible after the expiration of each
year# the Operator shall cause the accounts to be
audited by a recognised

firm of Accountants

acceptable to the Authority.

The audited accounts

shall be presented to the Authority within Ninety
(90) days after the end of the year to which the
accounts relate or
possible thereafter.

failing this as soon as
The cost of such audit shall

be treated aS a direct operating cost of the
Container Terminal. " Any adjustment necessitated
by such audit shall be effected immediately.

The

Authority shall have the right at its own cost to
have the accounts of the Operator audited from
time to time and shall be entitled to conduct such
investigations into the operations and management
of the Container Terminal#

as the Authority

considers necessary from time to time.

13.

The accounts referred to in the preceding clause
shall be in such form and context as may be agreed
f^m*'''.time to time by the Authority and- the
Operator.

!
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!The Operator shall confine its expenditure in
' relation to the management and operation of the
I

^

»

' Container Terminal within such limitations as may
; be agreed with the Authority or failing such
«

agreement, then within such limitations sis may be
*

specified by the Authority provided, however that
■ it

is

clearly

■ specifications
'
.

15.

‘

r e a s o n a b le

j

■

understood
shall

e f f i c i e n t
•

be

that
geared

any

such

towards

a

o p e r a t i o n .■
.

■

a /

'

•

•

‘ The Operator shall maintain an efficient operation
'■

and Ithall satisfy the Authority that planning and

J

'

■

y

management is' adequate to ensure such operation
.

1

*

' and shall co-operate with the Authority to this

i end.
16.

’ The Authority shall provide or arrange for the
I provision of all plant and equipment required for
'
■ the operation of the Container Terminal after
■ consultation and agreement with the Operator and
shall take into account the availability of any
equipment purchased by the Operator prior to this

n
-

Agreement or with the knowledge and consent of the
Authority for the operation of the facilities.
17.

(a) ' Should
1

the

Operator

not

conclude

with

the '

Authority an Agreement to operate the Container
Terminal after termination of this Agreement, the
Authority shall immedlatiely after such termination
notify the Operator whether any equipment owned or
controlled by the Operator is required and the
Operator shall then make available to the
Authority or to such other operator as the
Authority may nominate, such equipment owned or
controlled by the Operator at such rental charges
as may be negotiated between the parties not being
more than the current sums being paid for the use
of such equipment by the user receiving most

V

favourable terms for their use, or within thirty
(30) days of the commenceiaent of such hireage the
: Authority may purchase such equipment at cost less
depreciation at the'rate or rates approved by the
I

Authority, i f being the intention of this Clause
'

to ensure the ability of the Authority to secure
i the continued operation of the Container Terminal
I with as much equipment as was available for its
; operation during the period of this Agreement, end

1 the Operator shall be obliged to deliver such
' dguipment to the purchaser and the purchaser or
; the Authority shall make payment within thirty
! -{30) days thereof.
17.

(b) I Should

the

Operator

not

conclude

with

the

.■Authority an Agreement to operate the Container
\

!Terminal after termination of this Agreement the
iAuthority

shall

indemnify

and

reimburse

the

Operator in. respect of any eunouhts paid by the

I Operator

under the provisions of The ISmployment

:(Termination and {Redundancy Payments) Act or any
icolleotiva Labour Agreement in force at that time
ibstween the Operator and a Trade Union to its
'employees working at the Container Terminal at
. tsuch date of termination of this Agreement with
£uch indemnity however being limited to the period
Of employment with the Operator.
*.

18.

!

(There the Container Terminal is not sufficiently
equipped to carry out any of

the functions

normally carried out at a container terminal and
contemplated by this Agrecanent, the Operator may
frcKB time to time sub-contract such operations as
may be necessary in. the circumstances but only
after consultation with the Authority on the need
for and the terms of any such sub-contract as may
be necessary in the circumstances.
I

I

In exceptional

609 92391959
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circumstances, vhere such consultation is not
possible, a sub-contract
nay

be

entered

a specific purpose

f o r

Into, by

the

Curator

and

notification thereof to the Authority, shall take
4

place at the first possible opportunity.

*

In any

event, the conclusion of any such sub-contract
I must be notified promptly and in writing to the
j Authority.
I

19.

Kingston Wharves Limited and Western Terminals
Limited in their respective capacities as wharf
operators snaxi' subject t.o the provisions of the
Wharfage Act, collect and retain all wharfage
payable (save as containerised transhipment cargo)
for cargo passing over the Container Terminal on
condition

that

all

costs

and

expenses

in

'

connection therewith shall, be borne by them and
that none of such costs and expenses are charged
to the operating cost of the Container Terminal.
Should the Authority decide that wharfage or any
part thereof on Containerised Transhipment Cargo
is to be payable, then Kingston Wharves Limited
and Western Terminals Limited shall collect same
and the amount so collected less the direct
expenses incurred Iti such collection shall form
• I f * ''

'Mtr/- -it,,,

part of the earnings of the operations o f the
Container Terminal.
20.

Kingston Wharves Limited and Western terminals
Limited each agree that it will pay to the
Operator for the sole account of the Authority the
sum of 10 cents per ton (tonnage assessed on the
1

same basis as is used for the fixing of the tariff
}

of wharfage rates) for every ton of cargo imported
I

or

exported .in

roll-on-roll-off

containers
cargo

and

excluding

all

containerised

'transhipment cargo which is handled by or over the
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Container Terminal in respect o£ which wharfage is
collectable pursuant to iJhe tariff of 'wharfage
rates.

It being understood and agreed that such .

amounts paid by each of Kingston Wharves, hinited
and Western Terminals Limited shall not be taken
•*

into account by the Operator in’determining either
the Gross Revenue of the Container Terminal or the
Net Revenue.

21.

The Operator shall pay over to the Authority the
residue of the .total earnings frcnn'the operations
■of the Container Temlnal after deducting from the
total' earnings during any accounting period the
following expenses attributable to that accounting
period:
(a)

all

salaries,

wages

and other costs of

personnel employed by the Operator; .
(b)

maintenance costs;

(c)

costs, if any, of renting equipment used, at
the Container Terminal;

(d) . the cost of spare parte;
(e)

interest on working capital which may be
borrowed for the operations of the Container
Terminal;

(f)

insurance premiums for spare parts, the dock
facilities and ail plant and equipment as
provided for

in Clause

premiums payable

in

provisions of Clause
(g)

9 and

insurance

accordance with 'the^
ID;

ahy other appropriate direct costs and should
there be any dispute as .to whether any cost
is a direct .cost, then normal accounting
principles will apply in determining same; .

(h)

capital charges, comprising interest payable
by the Authority and depreciation on the
plant, equipment and dock facilities owned by

the Authority

A t

the rate or rates set out in

■letter of the ■same date as-, this agreement
.between- the Authority and the Operator.;
(i)

depreciation at the rate or ra.tes set out in
letter^ of--the.-same date^Jis— thi-s— ag*4aaignt
between the Authority— and- the—fipeeator on
plant and equipment purchased and owned by
the Operator and in respect of -which no other
charge by way of rental or hireage is being
made as o charge to the Container Terminal.
Where such, equipment is used partly in
respect of the Container Terminal and partly
for other purposes,

depreciation thereon

shall be apportioned according to use;
(j)

a management fee calculated to reward the
Operator for its efforts as operator of One
■ and one-half per cent

(1H%)

^he Gross

Revenue of the Container Terminal (less the
.lO^ rental) plus twelve per cent (12%) of the
Wet Revenue.

The terns -"Gross Revenue" and

"Net Revenue" shall be calculated on the
basis agreed by letter of the same date as
this agreement between the Authority and the
Operator.
The Authority and the Operator shall Work closely
together for the promotion of the Container
Terminal in order to aim at increasing the volume
of containers now passing through the Container
Terminal.
v;ithout prejudice to any other rights of the
parties, and notwithstanding the provisions of
Clause 2, this Agreement may be terminated by
either party at any time after the expiration of
three (3) years from its commencement by six (6)
months' previous notice in writing.
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■

Should the Operator be desirous of continuing the
management of the Container terminal after the
termination of this Agreement* the Operator shall
not less than nine months before the expiration of
this Agreement give to the Authority .notice in
writing of such desire* whereupon both parties ’
shall forthwith enter into negotiations so as to
determine
I

the

terms

and

conditions

of

.

the

■

.

agreement for the continuing management of the
^ntainer. Terminal by the Operator.

In the event

I

that such an agreement is not boncluded three
months before, the expiration of the period of this
Agreement

then unless the Authority and

operator shall otherwise

the

agree this Agreement

shall upon the expiration thereof be terminated.

25.

The. Authority

may

determine

this

Agreement

forthwith by notice in writing to the Operator if
the Operator shall go into liguida'tlon (whether
. compulsory or voluntary
voluntary

liquidation

not

for

being merely

the

purposes

a
of

. amalgamation or reconstruction) or shall become
insolvent or enter into an agreement with its
creditors generally or shall have a receiver
V

.

■

ajppointed of its assets ^or undertaking or any part
.thereof.
26.

.any dispute arising under this Agreement shall be
referred to a single arbitrator nominated by the
President for the time being of the Public
Accountancy Board of Jamaica in accordance with
the provisions of the Arbitration Act or any
statutory modificationa or re-enactment thereof
fox the time beipg in force.

27.'

Nothing in this Agreement shall constitute a
.. partnership

between

the

parties

hereto' nor

constitute any of them the agent of any other.
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28

.

No variation waiver or modification of any of the
terms of this Agreement shall be effective unless
in writing and signed by or on behalf of the
parties hereto.

29

Any notice required by this Agreement to bo served
on any party hereto shall b e well and truly served
if posted by prepaid registered post in any post
office in Jamaica addressed to the. party at the
address hereinbefore appearing and any such notice
shall be deemed to have b e e n 'received within
Scvchtytwo (72) hours of the time of posting.

IN NITNBSS NHBREOF the parties hereto have caused
this Agreement to be executed as of the date hereinbefore
written..

..

•

E
of KINGSTON TERMINAL- OPERATORS)
LIMITED in accordance with its)
Articles of Association in the)
)
presence of:-

.M IV

EXECUTED under the Common Seal)
of THE PORT AUTHORITY by
)
Lucien M. Rattray, (Seneral
)
Manager
and H. St. John
)
Secretaryl..
Iffoodham
in the presence ofx-
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EXECUTED urjder the Conunon Seal)
of KINGSTON WlARVES LIMITED in)
accordanceiwith its Articles )
of Association in the presence)
ofI- ■
)

^

f;-**

I

ii— ~r--

EXECUTED upder the Common Seal)
of WESTERN TERMINALS LIMITED )
in accordance with its
)
Articles of Association in the)
presence oft-‘
)

T

TOTAL P.05

APPENDIX 5.1
TRAFFIC AT TERMINAL (CONTAINERS & VESSELS) FOR 1980-1990

I

YEAR

!
{
{
{
{
{
{
:
{

:
1

1980
1981
1882
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990

{

DOMESTIC

{TRANSHIPMENT
{
{
{
{
{
{

72,029
64,288
50,570 11
58,636 1
1
58,888 11
103,185 11
126,489
126,117 11
1
66,578 1
42,344 11
47,512 11

{
{

t
I

{
{

:

23,244
29,564
30,777
31,564
26,133
28,180
34,241
35,091
. 48,195
51,901
. 40.601

{VESSEL •
: CALLS

TOTAL

1
1

1
1

{
{
{
{
:
{
:
{
:
{

95,273
93,852
81,347
90,200
85,021
131,365
160,730
161,208
114,773
94,245
.{ 88.113

{
{

507
-543
506
560
515
618
548
496
530
529
412

{
:

{
:
{
:
J
{
!

Source: Kingston Terminal Operators Ltd

APPENDIX 5.2

KTO BERTH OCCUPANCY
FOR PERIOD 1988-1990

1990
-----------------------

MONTH

NO. OF
VESSELS
—

37
34
29
31
32
34
31
32
28
32
40
41

JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE
JULY
AUGUST
SEPTEMBER
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER
TOTAL
AVERAGE
Source:

{

I I
» I

„

:!

1988

I

— — —— —

I

----------------

■“ II

1TOTAL HRS 1!NO. OF
{ALONGSIDE: ‘
.VESSELS

:TOTAL HRS!1NO. OF
:a l o n g s i d e :{vessels

I
I —

I

{
{
{
{
{
{
{
:
{
{
{
{

______ » > ________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
—
I 1

----

321.5
371.9
364.6
380.2
380.3
341
268.4
396.2
423.2
.327.7
627,4
540.9

401 { 4743.3 {{
.

1989

i!

:

KTO Statistics

11.83 {{

41
38
46
41
48
48
46
46
39
43
38
38

:
{
{
{
{
{
:
{
{
:
{
{

______________ I

430.1
301.7
453.3
412.6
511.3
434.6
492
406
405
404.5
387.4
385

I

{
{
{
{
1
{
{
{
{
:
{
•{

512 { 5023.5 {{
{

9.81 {{

________

:
—

— —

I

J

{TOTAL HRS:
{ALONGSIDE:
— II----- — —

40 {
37 {
42 {
46 {
38 {
53 {
44- {
50 {
41 {
45 {
50 {
41 {

696.2
402.6
545.9
475.4
413.5
576.7
387.3
544
400.4
440.1
747.3
528.8

I

,

{
{
{
{
{
{
{
{
{
{
{
{

527 { 6158.2 {{
{

11.69 {{

APPENDIX 5.3
KTO TURNAROUND TIME (DAYS)
FOR OCTOBER - DECEMBER 1989
NO. OF
SHIPS

MONTH ■
OCTOBER
NOVEMBER
DECEMBER

43
38
39

0.53
0.57
• 0.57

120

0.56
===='=••===

SS88SC SSC S8B X SB S

SOURCE:

TIME

TABLE 27. PORT STATISTICS
OF JAMAICA. 0CT-DEC’89
PREPARED BY PAJ. JAN. 1990

APPENDIX 5.4
DISTRIBUTION OF MOVES PER GANG HOURS FOR ZIM
VESSELS FOR PERIOD 1. 01.90 TO 2£
MV/GRS HR

0-2
2-4
4-6
6-8
8-10
10 - 12
12 - 14
14 - 16
16 - 18
18 - 20
20 - 22

CUM. F

FREQ
MIDPOINT
(F)
(X)
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21

XF
1
0
3
1
15
33
57
33
15
5
4

1
1
4
5
20
53
110
143
158
163
167

0.6

1

0.6
2.4
3.0
12 0
31,,7
65,,9
85,.6
94.6
97.6

0

,

100.0

167
AVERAGE
Source:

KTO productivity report

15
7
135
363
741
495
255
95
84
2191
13.11976

APPENDIX 5.5
RECIPIENTS OF REVENUE
PAJ
KTO

TARIFF

PILOTAGE
TOWAGE
WHARFAGE
CONTAINER HANDLING
RECEIPT 8c DELIVERY

-

STORAGE
STRIPPING 8( STUFFING
MOUNTING 8( GROUNDING

KW/WT
—

-

X
X
—

X
X

-

X
X

—

—

—_

—

-

X
—
f -

'

X

-

APPENDIX 5.6

REVENUE:
DOMESTIC
TRANSHIPMENT

(1R85 BASE YEAR)
'87/88
'86

'88/89

100

619
5.5

742
6.5

79

113

114

95

134

191

194

70,

55

73

68

COST (J$)
RATE OF EXCHANGE

251
4.25

307
5.5

COST (US$)

59

56

INDEX

100

PROFIT

100

435
5.5

II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II

II
II
II
II
II
II

II

II
II

II

II
II
II
II

II

II

II
II
II
II
II
II
II

'89/90

119
119

111
113

100

II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II

CD
LH

INDICES OF REVENUE, COST It PROFIT PER CONTAINER

85
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COMPONENTS OF A PORT INFOE?MATION SYSTEM

REQUIRED DATA

DATA SOURCE

ENVIRONMENT
1.1

Macro Environment

a) Economy:
Historical
and
forecast economic data on
regional trading and partners
focussing on:
GNP
« Industrial production
* Inflation
^ Investment & economic activity
Foreign trade (Imp & exp)
it Balance of Payments and debt
* Exchange rates
Political stability
* International trade agreements
b) Technology: Developments whi ch
are likely to affect the intransport modes and ship
sizes
Port & terminal cargo
handling facilities
c) Legislature:
* Government policy regarding
imports and exports.
a Imposition and removal of
tariffs or export subsidies
etc-

Data

can be
found in
various publications:
DRI, World Bank, IMF etc.
However, the port can
best keep abreast of the
economic conditions of
the various countries and
regions through the local
and international press
as well as industry trade
journals.

Industry journals such as
Cargo ware, Container
isation International,
Port Development
International, etc.

Press and trade journals.

1.2
a)

*
*
*
*

^

Port Industry
Customers
Trends in customer service
requirements
Trading patterns and their
trading partners over time.
Their share of the total
Level of freight rates for
main commodities carried to
and from the port on specific
routes.
Concerns: costs, service speed
and efficiency, etc.
Financial performance.

In addition to sources
previously quoted, such
publications as PIERS,
and Trade Horizons are
useful. Also Market
surveys.

b) Competitors:
Information on
existing and potentially competing
ports:
* Capacity : over or under
See above sources,
utilization.
* Service quality
* Throughput performance and
Containerisation
market share
International Yearbook
^ Financial performance
* Port development plans
if Pricing
* Main Customers
if Labour relations
2.

PORT DATA.

The UNCTAD manual on Port Statistics outlines the needs and
sources of port data and information.
It tables each data item
of information and this is attached for reference.
The table
tries to identify or classify information according to the degree
of importance.
It is recommended that a port setting up an
information system, or improving an existing system, might find
it useful to work out the essential data and then, as resources
permit or needs demand, add first the important data and then the
useful .

Classification o f p o r t d a t a a n d i nf or m at io n

Recording

Afotn ca leg o rla o f data

Port organization..................

E tsenllal

Imporlanl

U ttfid

N ature

Frequency o f eolleetlaa

List of individual port operators
Description of their functions

Information

Annual

Oassification by type
Depth of water alongside berth
Physical description

Information

Annual

Handling equipment. . . .

Classification by type
Technical characteristics
Capacity
Age

Information

Annual

Storage equipment

Classification by type
Physical description
Storage capacity

Information

Annual

Information

Annual

Port facilities
B erths................................

. . . .

Transport equipment for use
within the port area . . . Transport infrastructure (roadrail-inland water)
Classification of vehicles by type
Technical characteristics
Capacity
Age
Navigational a i d s ..................

Signalling system
Pilotage
Towage

Information

Annual

Servicing of sh ip s ..................

Facilities f or :
Bunker supplies
Water supplies
Repairs and maintenance

Information

Annual

Statistical

Continuous

Ship traffic
Type of s h i p ......................

Passenger ship
Break-bulk general
Cargo ships :
Liners
Tramps
Specialized ship
Mixed ship

'

Draught

CRT or NRT
DWT
Length

Size of ship

Continuous or sam
pling

Statistical

Continuous

By port of origin and
destination

Statistical

Continuous or sam
pling

Flag

Statistical

Continuous

Statistical

Continuous

Statistical

Continuous or sam
pling

Statistical

Continuous or sam
pling

Continuous or salnpling

Loading
Discharging
Loading and discharging
Bunkering
Repairs, maintenance
Other purposes

Type of operation..................

' .I?

By country of origin and
destination

Origin and destination of ship
Flag of the ship......................
Port operations
Turn-around time of ship

Statistical

Ucani

. Times o f :
Arrival
‘ Berthing
Departure
•

Times o f :
Pilot on board
Start handling
Handling stoppage etc.
Record of ship delay by main
causes

Services and facilities provided
by the p o rt......................... Successive berths allocated to
each ship
Handling and transport equip
ment for each working period
Amount of cargo loaded and
discharged during each work
ing period

Pilot and craft at each movement
No. of tugs at each movement

K»‘

Goods in sto ra g e ...............

For each unit of storage :
Goods received from ships
Goods dispatched to hinterland
Goods received from hinterlands
Goods dispatched to ships

Statistical

Supplies to ship ..................

Types and tonnages of bunker
Tonnages of water

Statistical

Continuous

Accidents

Accidents to ships
Damage to cargoes

Information

Continuous

ClassiTication of port data and Information (continued)

Port labour

For the whole p o rt;
No, of supervisory staff
No. of clerical staff
No. of permanent dock-workers
Average number of casual
workers

Classification by age

Information

Weekly or monthly

Rcc<,rtor.bs»«b,„».

s.a,«fal

Continuous

Statistical

Continuous

Statistical

Continuous

Statistical

Continuous

Statistical

Sampling

Statistical

Continuous or sam
pling

Number of supervisory staff
Number of clerical staff
Number of permanent dockworkers
Number of casual workers
Cargo flows
Type of t r a f lic ...............

Commodities

Type of packaging

Goods discharged
Goods loaded
Goods trans-shipped
Types of traffic:
Foreign
Domestic
Transit
Entrep6t

Ocean traflic
Near-sea traflic

Amount of cargo in bach class
of the port commodity classi
fication
. . . . Amount of cargo in each type
of packaging

Size of shipment
Number of individual shipments
in cadi class size
Type of operation
Transfer from ships to inland
transport and vice versa for
inward and outward traffic
Direct
Throtigli port storage
Through lighter
Through lighter and storage

I>C

e .2

MARKET RESEARCH AS A TOOL IN PORT MARKETING
Having considered the general factors determining a port's
traffic, there is a need to take steps to obtain relevant
information about cargo movements to or from some particular
region.
In this respect market research will be geared at
obtaining information from cargo interests.
Sometimes
the
necessary information
can be
obtained by
INTERVIEWS, without a prior postal survey.
However, this is
only likely to be possible when relatively few companies are
involved.
Otherwise,
there may be
scope for a
POSTAL
QUESTIONNAIRE.
Consideration will need to be given to the
likelihood of a response. There will therefore be a need for
follow-up calls and marketing
meetings as
relevant with
appropriate companies/persons as identified by the postal survey.

USES OF MARKET RESEARCH
This research technique is useful in:
a)

Pinpointing potentially available traffics : moving in
worthwhile volumes.

b)

Providing information for actual marketing meetings
with potential port users (For example, abut inland
cargo origin and destination).

c)

The information so gathered is useful not only to ports
but to the shipping lines. Therefore with the prior
permission of the companies concerned, this information
can be copied to a shipowner serving the port: enabling
him to market his shipping service - and the use of the
port - to cargo interests.

P0ST7UL SURVEYS - SOME PRACTICAL ASPECTS
1.

Carefully identify information needed - keeping it to a
minimum in terms of the work it imposes on the person
completing the questionnaire.

2.

Check the draft questionnaire questions on someone who knows
about the trade.
This prevents irrelevant and confusing
questions.

3.

Time allowing, do
a small 'pilot'
survey
questionnaire before launching the full survey.

4.

Length - not more than four sides.
sheet folded to give four sides.

5.

Draft a very careful letter to explain why the information
is desired.
Also explain why it is in the interest of the
company to reply (such as to enable the port to meet user
needs as well as possible, etc).
The confidentiality with
which the information will be treated must also be stated.

with

Ideally on

the

a single

If it is desired that a market survey should help a
shipowner canvass traffic for his ships/your
port, do
mention that the information will be given to the shipowner
as well. This will in fact give an excellent opportunity to
use the letter - composed jointly with the shipowner - to
give details of his service or proposed service.
6.

It is important to write and thank all companies who
completed the questionnaires, whether or not they show that
they are involved in the market being surveyed.
It might
also be useful to produce and send then a copy of a
simplified version of a report on the survey (excluding all
commercial information) in appreciation for their help.
This helps to provide marketing contact and can improve the
response rate in future surveys.

7.

On the questionnaire, ask the person completing it to
write in their
« Name
* Telephone number
if Function
indicate 'YES' or 'NO' - to whether they are
involved in the market (commodity or trade) being
surveyed, otherwise, companies not shipping will not

reply and their will not be any indication of how good
the response rate is or to whom a reminder letter and
or questionnaire should be sent.
8.

After a few weeks, send a reminder letter/questionnaire
those who have not replied.

9.

On the questionnaire, typical questions can include:

to

Tonnages: specifying weight of cargo sent to whatever
destinations the information is required
on; by main
commodities or specific commodities.
Cargo origins
Whether and how packaged;
and so on.

Container, pallets, break-bulk

- If any big changes are expected in future cargo volumes,
origins and destinations or packaging.
The latter may
indicate need for additional port services such as cargo
consolidat ion.
-

Terms of shipment (fob or cif etc.)

- Who controls shipments and port routings.
It may also be
worthwhile asking a general question as to the broad reason
for choice of port. This may be done by asking respondents
to tick boxes on the questionnaire as to the most important
resons.
- A last question could be one asking for any comments the
company may wish to make.

Source:

Extracted from E. Pollock's
August, 1991.

Lecture on Port Marketing.
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Common TariffCategories

Conservancy- A fixedfeeforaccesstotheportand useoftheaidstonavigation. This
chargeisbasedonthecharacteristicsofthevessel Itissometimescalled
LightDues, HarborRates or Channel Dues.
Port Du« -

A fixedfeeforgeneraluseoftheportfacilities. Thischargeisbasedon
thecharacteristicsofthevessel ItissometimesreferredtoasaHarbor
Dues.

Pilotage-

A unit,movement ortime-relatedcharge for pilotingthevesselinand
outoftheport. Thischargeisbasedon thecharacteristicsofthevessel

Tug Hire -

A unit,movementortime-relatedchargefortowingtheshiptoandfrom
theberthaswellasformoving thevesselwithintheport. This charge
is based on the characteristics of the vessel or the tugboat. It is
som^imes referredtoasTowage orTug Services.

Mooring/Unmooring

A fixedfeefortieingup and releasingvesselsatanchorageor atthe
thewharf. Thischarge issometimes basedon thecharacteristicsofthe
vessel Itmay be referred to as Anchorage or Dolphin Rates ifthe
vessels isat anchorage and as Berthing Fee or Line Handling ifthe
vesselisatthewharf.

Berth Hire -

A time-related charge for staying alongside the berth. This charge is
based on the characteristicsof the vesselaswell as the length ofstay.
Itissometime referredtoBerthage, Berth Rent, Quay Dues, Dockage,
Wharf Rates orBerth Occupancy.

Stevedorage -

A unit or time-related charge for transferring the cargo between the
wharfand thevessel. Thischarge isbased on thecharacteristicsofthe
carg as well as the period of time the labor isemployed. Itisalso
referredtoasCargo Handling, Labor Hire,DischargingorLoading.

Wharfage -

A unitchargeleviedagainstallcargomoved acrossthewharforhandled
intheport. Thischargeisbased on thecharacteristicsofthecargo. It
issometimes referred toasthe General Charge or theBerth Fee.

WharfHandling

A unitchargeformoving thecargo betweenwharfandstorage. This
charge isbased on the characteristics of the cargo. It issometimes
referredtoasCargo Handling orLaborHire.

Storage-

A time-relatedchargeforstoringthecargoinopen,covered,orenclosed
areas. This chargeisbased on thecharacteristicsofthecargo and the
typeofstorage.

EquipmentHire

A time-relatedcharge forthe useofportequipment bythestevedoring
companiesortheconsignee/shipper. Thischargeisbasedonthetypeof
equipmentused. Where cranesareused,thischargemay bereferredto
as Cranage or crane hire. For other equipment terms such asForklift
Hire,StraddleHire or PlantHire may be used.

Packing/Unpacking

A unitcharge forchanging the form inwhich thecargo isbeing
shipped. This charge depends on the type of cargo and the form in
which itisto be changed. Depending on the form ofthe cargo, this
charge may^ be referred to as a Depot, CFS, Consolidation/Deconsolidation,or Stuffing/StrippingCharge.

Delivery/Receipt

A unitchargeformoving thecargo between storageand landtransport
vehicles (road orrail)or directlybetween thevesseland land transport
vehicles. Hiischargeisbasedon thecharacteristicsofthecargoand the
mode ofland transport.

Source:ESCAP and UNCTAD reports,individualport tariffs
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CLASSIFICATION FOR A PORT FACT BASE
1.

THROUGHPUT
TFEND:

MARKET; CUSTOMERS-

Statistical performance and rate of'growth
Breakdown by type and mix :
commodity; import and export; domestic and
transhipment; FCL 8< LCL; empties and loaded
Sources of transhipment and domestic traffic
Shipping lines' throughput contribution and
mix;
•
.
,
Cargo interests'
II

Throughput by sources/destinations
Profit contribution in terms of : Customers;
transhipment and domestic traffic.
2.

MARKET

3.

TRENDS IN
MACRO
ENVIRONMENT

Trade patterns
global, regional and national economic growth
government regulations
trading agreements

4.

SERVICE

All facts about the Terminal's services;
Productivity
Crane and Equipment performance
Labour performance

- State
of the transhipment
and domestic
container market;
growth rates
total market size
KTO's share of the market
is KTO's share of the market increasing or
decreasing
Markets where KTO is losing ground and why
where is the Terminal doing well and where is
the performance poor
trends in the market; productivity, port
routing, services offered and technology

Quality and reliability assessment
Price of port services
Identification of additional services which
will complement existing range and increase
customer satisfaction.
5.

COMPETITION-

Identification of all major competitors
Strengths and weaknesses
Market share (trends)
Future plans
Pricing
Capacity
.

6.

CUSTOMER
ATTITUDE

What do customers regard highly of KTO's
services and what they do hot.

-
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GUIDELINES IN IDENTIFYING PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES
PROBLEMS
1.

Look for deviation from anticipated results:
- less market share than anticipated
- fewer customers or a narrow customer base
- declining market share
- loss of customers
- lower throughput or profit versus increased costs.

2.

Look for any deterrent to smooth Terminal operational
performance such as:
lack of personnel
poor equipment performance
inadequate service
facilities, such as: shortageof
equipment and stacking area
unfavourable government regulations (customs or port
investment)

3.

Look at any obstacles standing in the way of
performance goals such as
shortage of spare parts
low service quality
pricing levels
labour relations
customer dissatisfaction
low awareness in market of port facilities.

achieving

OPPORTUNITIES
Opportunities
are often
presented disguised
as problems,
therefore a review of the statement of problems and the fact base
can turn up opportunities associated with:
geographical location
service advantage
emerging technology
resource advantage
changing customer needs
improvement in service facilities.

It needs to be identified whether unfavourable trends are being
experienced by the Terminal only, or is it part of a wider
industry problem.
Thus the reason for the observed trend is
important.
A distinction has also to be made between solvable
and unsolvable problems.
In the case of the former, if its
profitable for the port to attempt a solution. Thus a statement
of problems and opportunities must be compiled.

AF^E^ElSrO I>C
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GUIDELINES IN THE STATEMENT OF PORT OBJECTIVES
State where relevant, assumptions underpinning the objectives.
These
assumptions must
describe management's
estimate of
important developments or environmental conditions beyond the
port's control which cannot be accurately predicted, but which
must be considered when carrying out the plan.
Assumptions in a port context could be related to:
changes in the national, regional and global economic
conditions
inflation rate
status of major competition
availability of financing and rate of interest
availability of spare parts
currency fluctuation
changes in patterns and direction of cargo flows
industry over or under capacity
economic well-being of major customers and trading
partners
impact of major innovations orexpected
developments
anticipated industry growth pattern and rate
company capabilities
government regulations
labour environment
It is useful to categorize these assumptions according to the
areas described under competitive forces in chapter 6. Namely,
Macro Economic, Industry and Company related assumptions.
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GUIDELINES IN STE?ATEGY MIVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
1.

Each action program outlined must start by first
the specific objective it is aimed at achieving.

restating

2.

Strategy must assign for each specific area of activity:
responsibility
,
deadlines
priorities
resources

3.

For effective implementation, strategies
need to be communicated to those involved in their
achievement.
For example. Operations and Maintenance
departments.
require motivation toencourage follow through, both at
the managerial and staff level.
need to be coordinated with other port functions and
therefore must be compatible with and can be integrated
into other functions.
It is useful and desirable to
summarize in the marketing
plan, the major port
activities which affect its achievement, even though
the responsibility for so carrying out, is outside that
of the marketing department.
must be based on the company's strengths, limitations
and assumptions about the future, if they are to be
viable action plans.

I :x: t '. 5
CONSIDEERATIONS IN DEVISING THE MARKETING BUDGET
While strategies propose the plan of attack, the marketing budget
specifies how much the various activities will cost. The first
step in formulating the budget is to isolate the marketing
department's area of responsibility.
This may be seen ,as the
activities relevant to securing and maintaining patronage of the
port. Thus the relevant cost areas will,be;
>
'-a
a)
b)
c)

Customer relations
Advertising, and,
Promotion, including incentives and rebates

Budgetary cost estimates must be assigned to the individual
marketing action plans.
This implies good knowledge of the cost
of the various activities. This costs includes not only data on
the external activities themselves, but also on personnel costs.
The marketing budget is therefore synonymous with marketing
department budget.
Costs can be projected based on historical and current data from
the
accounting
department, advertising
agencies personnel
department etc.
Each major budget figure must have a supporting statement to
justify the allocation in terms of the goals of the activities
and how necessary they are to the overall port performance.

ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF ESTABLISHING BUDGETS
There are essentially three methods of establishing budgets:
1.

Mechanical method:
This method is so called, because
it involves no input from members of staff in its
development, but is formulated by management and handed
down.
While it is simplest to establish, the fact
that it is often created in isolation, means that the
interests and concerns at the various levels might not
have adequately been considered.
This will lead to
lack of identification with and understanding of the

budget, translating
success.

in

reduced

enthusiasm

for

its

2.

The bottoms up method.
This is more popular than the
previous method, and is essentially a compilation of
the master budget based on estimates and plans of
various department managers.
This ensures that the
interests and concerns of the various organizational
sub-units are considered.
However, a possible problem
is that
plans of individual departments may be
incompatible
both with other departments and the
organization as whole. Thus some coordinating force is
necessary to prevent conflict.

3.

The Cooperative method.
the shortcomings of the
involves three phases:

This takes into consideration
two previous approaches.
It

a) Top management sends down a loose estimate (based
on port objectives) as a planning guideline
for
allocation of marketing funds.
b) Marketing planners develop their strategies within
those general guidelines, but with freedom to recommend
exceptions, backed up by full details justifying all
requests.
c) Top management fully reviews the marketing plans which calls for a detailed marketing budget - and
decide on a final approved figure.
While the merits of this method are obvious, the process is
time consuming and implies a high level of communication.
It can however be most effective.
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GUIDELINES IN FORECASTING PORT TOAFFIC

The final step in the preparation of the marketing plan is to
project the traffic level, costs and profit that the marketing
strategy is intended to achieve. Forecasts of traffic should be
broken down into categories to enable review against actual
performance so as to pinpoint problems or opportunities which may
be causing 'the variance.
Useful classifications for the projection of port traffic could
be: transhipment and domestic, by
(i)
commodity type
<ii)
geographic region
(iii) carriers or
<iv)
services, such as storage and distribution.
These can also be used as profit centres and so establish the
profitability of the different cargoes and services to the port.
Here there will be the need for a sound basis of fixed cost
assignment.
A forecast is rarely absolutely accurate, since it represents an
attempt to estimate likely future events and thus involves
uncertainty.
It is usual therefore, to qualify forecasts.
The
finished forecast should be supported by a description of the
underpinning assumptions and their effect.
The method of
preparing the forecast should also be described.
Forecasting methods can be divided into two major categories:
Objective methods, comprising various statistical approaches, and
subjective methods, based on
surveys and opinions.
The
statistical approach includes methods such as moving averages,
exponential smoothing and correlation, while subjective methods
employ surveys of user and expert opinions.
A more accurate
forecast for ports might be obtained by using a combination of
the two approaches.

METH0D0LCX3Y FOR FORECASTING CONTAINER TRAFFIC FOR KINGSTON.
The methodology
first utilizes forecasts of trends in world
trade and expected changes in commodity flows through the
Caribbean. These are determined by factors such as:
-

economic activity in individual nations that gives
rise to international trade.

-

changing industrial base of many nations
currency restrictions

-

protectionism

-

debt crisis.

Based on these, a forecast of cargo flows to and from specific
areas which make up Kingston's transhipment market can be made.
The procedures for carrying out the above analyses are outlined
below.
Step 1
Utilizing
both
qualitative
judgement
and
quantitative
evaluations, a generic view of world trade patterns, shipping
patterns, cargo types and vessel itinaries of the major carriers
that ship through the Caribbean basin must be developed.
A decision as to the appropriate basis to be used to make the
forecast must also be made.
That is, commodities or trade
routes?
Here for transhipment at KTO, the appropriate basis
would be general cargo.
General cargo can be derived by taking
all commodities traded (based on UN trade statistics) and deduct
liquid and dry bulk and other non~containerisable cargoes. This
gives the maximum cargo that can be containerized.
The analysis
should concentrate on trade (import S export) between specific
regions in the world and countries in the region,'' rather than
trade routes.

s te p 2

To forecast import and export trade flows through the Caribbean
Basin, there may be the need to divide
the world into trading
blocs.
This division can be based on considerations such as
historical trading relationships, participation of regions' in
international trade, distance from Kingston and types of products
the region might trade.
Consideration should also be given to
the prospects of these countries shipping any significant volume
of general cargo through the Caribbean.
4
3.
The next step is to identify the countries that will most heavily
influence future general cargo trade volumes for each region.
The^e 'indicator nations' can then be used to forecast import and
export for each of the regions, instead of it being derived based
on a country by country forecast. The decision to use indicator
nations will of course depend on the degree of accuracy required.
Step 4
The next task is to convert the projected trade flows to
container flows.
For this it is necessary to combine two data
sources in order to gauge the degree of container penetration:
General cargo trade based on the UN statistics with the container
movements
in
the
region provided
from
Containerisation
International Yearbook.
Based on the container flow as against
the total general cargo trade for a specific period (historical),
the present level of container penetration can be can be
calculated.
This rate can then be applied to the projected
general cargo trade flows (on a commodity basis) to get future
containerized trade flow.
To convert containerized trade flows to actual number of TEUs
requires the application of the various cargo stowage factors,
and where applicable, any existing regulations on container
weight limits. The process just described is summarized in the
flow diagram below;

Cargo Density

Container
Capacity

CONTAINER movements in TEU
and trade blocs
______________________________________I

Source:

Adapted from
(1)
Container Ships & Shipping by Roy
Pearson. Fairplay Publications Ltd, 1988.
page 46.
<2)
Kingston Port Development Study, Chapter II

The attached table also gives typical cargo stowage factors.

Typiral Cargo Stoagg Factors

CoBsodity

20' container
Tonnes per Box
cubic aetre length 18 tonnes
30 cbfi
(it)

Copper ingots

3.3

20

Zinc ingots

2.5

20

Pressed «ool bales 2.0

20

1.7

20

Nolasses (in bulk) l.i

20

Nails

1.4

20

Copper coils

1.1

20

Cesent (bagged)

1.0

20

Cars (in KD fora)

1.0

20

Plate glass

1.0

20

Salt (in bulk)

1.0

20

Iron I Steel scrap 1.0

20

Kardvcods

0.91

20

Tisber

0.8

20

Coal (high grade) 0.71

20

Sugar

0.71

20

Cheese

0.71

20

Potatoes

0.63

20

Condensed Nilk

0.59

20

Bacon

0.59

20

Voodpulp

0.59

20

Veg oil (in druas) 0.56

20

Coffee (bagged)

0.56

20

Rubber (bales)

0.53

20

Textile products 0.14

40

0.14

40

Doaestic elec gds 0.52

40

0.03

40

Nuts and bolts

Furniture

Fibreglass

weight out
space util. 1SX
weight out
space util. 24S
weight out
space util. 30X
weight out
space util. 35t
weight out
space util. 43!
weight out
space util. 43S
weight out
space util, 55S
weight out
space util. 60S
weight out
space util. 60S
weight out
space util. 60S
weight out
spate util. 60S
weight out
space util. 60S
weight cut
space util. 66S
weight cut
space util. 75S
weight out
spate util. 85S
weight out
space util. 85S
weight cut
space util. 85S
weight cut
space util. 85S
cubes out
weight util.98S
cubes out
weight util.98S
cubes out
weight util.98S
cubes out
weight util.93S
cubes out
weight util.93S
cubes out
weight util. 88S
cubes out
weight util. 23S
cubes out
weight util.,23S
cubes out
weight util,20S
cubes out
weight util. 5S

40' container
24 tonnes
66 cbi
weight out
space util. 51S
weight out
space util. 15S
weight out
space util. 18S
weight out
space util, 21S
weight out
space util. 26S
weight out
space util. 26S ‘
weight out
space util. 33S
weight out
space util, 36S
weight out.
space util. 36S
weight out
space util, 36S
weight out
space util. 36S
weight out
space util, 36S
weight out
space util. 40S
weight cut
space util. 45S
weight out
space util. 51S
weight out
space util, SIS
weight out
space util, 51S
weight out
space util. 58S
tfeight cut
space util, 62S
weight cut
space util. 62S
weight out
space util. 62S
weight out
space util. 65S
weight out
space util,^65S
weight out
space util. 69S
cubes out
weight util. 39S
cubes cut
weight util. 39S
cubes out
weight util. 33S
cubes out
weight util. 81

APPENDIX 7.7
COMPARATIVE DISTANCES IN NAUTICAL MILES
FROM KINGSTON & CRISTOBAL TO SELECTED PORTS
!COUNTRY/PORT

1

!CENTRAL AMERICA
1
Tampidd
! Belize*
! Honduras: Puerto Cortes
! Guatemala: Puerto Barrios
! Costa Rica:Limon/Moin
! Panama:Cristobal
J CARIBBEAN
^
1* ’Curacoa
! Aruba
^
I Cuba:Havana
! Haiti: Port-au-Prince
! Dorn. Republic: Santo Domingo
' Puerto Rico: Ponce
1
San Juan
! Antigua: St. John
! Guadeloupe: Point-A-Pitre
1 Dominica: Roseau
' Trinidad & Tobago:Port of Spain
I St. Lucia: Port of Castries
1 Barbados: Bridgetown
ISOUTH AMERICA
! Columbia: Cartagena
i
Barranquilla
1
Santa Marta
I Venuezuela:Puerto Cabello
I
Maracaibo
!
La Guaira
1 Brazi1: Belem
!
Recife
!
Manaus
1
Fortaleza! Guyana: Georgetown
!US EAST COAST
! Charleston
1 Jacksonville
1 Miami
! New York/New Jersey
1 Port Everglades
! New Orleans
Source:

KINGSTON JCRISTOBAL!
1263
696
671
732
616
555
^586
.529
743
278
428
597
635
867
912
912
999
952
1045

1
1
«
11
11
1
1
1
11
t
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
t
1
I

11
11
11
1
1
11
1
1
1

1473
798
714
824
279

!
!
1
!
!

766
632
990
863
891
1080
1082
1390
1440
1145
1248
1320
1440

!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
1
!
!

370
340
360
788
676
930
2316
3173
2982
2775
1550

i
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
1
!

1560
1505
1200
1972
1217
1403

'!
!
I
1
1
!

I

483
444
438
690
582
730
2170
3027
2836
2628
1326
1060
1012
747
1472
763
1155

I

1
11
1
1
t
t
1
1
t
1
1
t
1
1
1
1
11
1
1
t1
1
11
1
1
11
t
1
1
1

'%

World Wide Distance Tables
BP Tanker Company Ltd., London, 1976.
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DAILY DEMAND FOR K T O 'S SER V IC ES
B a s e d o n K T O 's P r o d u c t i v i t y
(T o ta l

F o r p e rio d

1 .1 .9 0

-

3 1 .1 2 .9 0

SATURDAY

NEDNESDAY THURSDAY {FRIDAY

{TUESDAY

MONDAY

{L IN E S

R ep o rt

V esse l C a ll P e r lin e ]

SUNDAY

1
1

1

! COLUMBUS

14

{CAROL

3

2

12

8

{
{

{N ISC O

2

{

1

1

{SEALAHD

1 {

2

25

{ZIM
{EVERGREEN

{CALYPSO

1

1
1

{HEDLLOYD

1

»

{JAM.

3

{

1

I
1

PRODUCERS

{BLUE CA RIBE
{N.

A u er.

{GOMEZ S H IP P IN G

16

‘3

2

1

{

2

2

1
1

3

■

6
2

1

1

1
t

3

1

{

4

5

1

3

{

6

1

1

1
1

{ARANAK

{

6

1

1
1

{CARAT

{

1

1

1
1

76

t

1

1

68

6

1

1
1

65

1

1

{CAVN L IN E

74

.

•

1
»

{

1

3

5{
4 {

CA RIB

%
20

1

7

{LIBRA

1

3

6

{

1

{

9

i

6

{

1

{

5

4

10

5

15

.

{

9

24

20

{scon

26

4

{

{

f
I

9

1
1

24

26
”

1

{

58

3

30

46

MONTHLY DEMAND FOR K T O 'S SER V IC ES
B a s e d o n K T O 's P r o d u c t i v i t y
(T o ta l

V essel

F o r p e rio d

IN E S

OLUMBUS
AROL

JANUARY

FEBRUARY

1

1

6

MARCH

3

C a ll

1 .1 .9 0

-

A PR IL

3 1 .1 2 .9 0

JUNE

MAY

1
5

R e p o rt

P e r L in e )

6

1

1

6

AUGUST. {SEPTEMBER{OCTOBER'.NOVEMBER{DECEMBER

{JULY

6

1

1

{

6

6

{

5

2

1

1

5

8

6

1
1

IS C O
EALAND

3

3

8

7

4

4

5

4

4

-5

{

3

6

4

4
11

12

11

14

12

13

12

10

12

{

10

12

14

VERGREEN

3

4

2

3

1

4

3

4

{

4

3

5

COTT

3

4

2

ALYPSO

3

2

1

IN

EDLLOYD

1

t

1

1
I
1
t
f
t

1

LUE CARIBE
A u e r.

1

1

AM. PRODUCERS

.

2

1

IBRA

1

1
3

CARIB

2

1

4

4

4

3

{

4

2

3

1

2

1

{

2

3

5

1
1
1
1
1
1

AVN L IN E
RAVAK
ARAT

37

S o u rce:

34

KTO P r o d u c t i v i t y

29

R ep o rt

31

fo r p e rio d

32

1 .1 .9 0

34

to

3 1 .1 2 .9 0

30

32

{

4

1

1

OMEZ S H IP P IN G

1
1

1

3

1
1
1

28

34

.

47

36

